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The ‘cultural industries’ and the ‘creative industries’ have received considerable 
attention over the last years. These two compound expressions, often used as rough 
synonyms, refer to suppliers of a range of products that “we broadly associate with 
cultural, artistic, or simply entertainment value” (Caves vii). The term cultural 
industries was first coined to address the production and dissemination of cultural 
content in mass media, e.g. in books and magazines, sound recordings, films and other 
types of audiovisual media. Today it usually refers to suppliers of mass media content 
as well as producers of the traditional arts that do not lend themselves to mass-
reproductions, such as live performances and the creative arts. Much of the literature 
also includes similar industries such as design, fashion, crafts, architecture, sports, 
software, or even tourism. In accounting exercises it is contentious to what extent 
complementary industries, e.g. producers of media technologies and entertainment 
electronics, should be included in assessments of the direct economic contribution of 
the cultural industries. 
Under the Labour administration in the late 1990s, the British Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport (DCMS) has played an important role in promoting the debate on 
cultural industries and the way they can be harnessed as drivers of economic 
development. The ambitious aim of the DCMS is to make “the UK the world’s 
creative hub” (DCMS website). In Germany, the responsibility for the subject is more 
dispersed with the federal Länder playing a key role. Nevertheless, the cultural 
industries are en vogue here as well. Extensive official reports on the economic 
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significance of cultural industries have been published by several Länder and debates 
on how best to support the sector abound (for an overview see Wiesand). 
The cultural industries are a promising field of cultural, social and economic research 
for several reasons. First, they are a significant arena for an exchange of meanings. 
Their function as means of communication and their potential for manipulation 
continue to be keys to understanding modern societies.  
Second, the cultural industries provide an exciting example for several contemporary 
socio-economic trends. Some cultural industries have long operated in highly 
integrated, even global markets and many are at the forefront of the broad changes in 
the markets for information goods. 
Third, some cultural industries seem to have grown comparatively fast over the last 
two decades. Many policy-makers expect them to continue to be drivers of economic 
growth and employment – an appealing prospect in particular for de-industrialising 
urban areas that already boast thriving cultural scenes such as Berlin. Cultural 
industries are prone to cluster in specific locations, so that attractive regions can hope 
to reap disproportionally high rewards from growth in the cultural industries. What is 
more, the bulk of the growth has occurred in the production of mass media content. 
Several factors conspire to make continued change in the mass media probable in the 
future. These include the diffusion of advanced information and communication 
technology (ICT) and the familiar issues of deregulation and integration of markets, to 
name but a few. In this context, the chances for a redistribution of resources seem 
higher than ever. Newcomers can hope to make their mark. Existent centres of cultural 
production are faced with new competition as well as new opportunities to increase 
their slice of the pie. 
More specifically to the research agenda at the interdisciplinary Centre for British 
Studies at Humboldt University, the cultural industries provide an excellent example 
of how societies organise the public arena and how they cope with economic and 
social change. Historically, the British cultural industries exhibit special features 
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which set them apart from their counterparts in continental Europe. They function as a 
magnifying glass through which scholars are able to target their studies of modern 
British society and economy. 
In Britain, modern forms of commercial culture developed several decades before 
those on the continent – and in some cases even centuries before. Modern sport in 
Britain, for example, began to develop commercially as early as the eighteenth 
century. People on the continent only became aware of modern sport at the turn of the 
twentieth century as a result of a cultural transfer instigated by British tourists, 
merchants and students. And music halls that offered popular entertainment to a 
working class audience were thriving in the 1850s in British industrial towns and 
cities, whereas the era of variety entertainment began on the continent only around 
1900 and reached its zenith in the 1920s. Similar, and sometimes larger, time lags can 
be found in the areas of the popular press and tourism.  
Furthermore, the growth of what is now called the cultural industries was a ‘natural’ 
concomitant of the rise of the market economy and the modernisation of British 
society since the eighteenth century. An increasing concentration of people in the 
growing urban centres meant an increase in demand for cultural consumption, and 
entrepreneurs who dared to invest organised the supply. Although the market worked 
differently than in more conventional areas of commerce, cultural industries in Britain 
were about artistry, genius and originality as well as – unashamedly – about business 
and profit. The market was the stage for all those involved. By contrast the role of the 
court, the state and other bodies like the church and local authorities in developing 
cultural industries was relatively insignificant. Therefore, we can observe a 
considerably different tradition in the attitudes and actions of commercial and public 
actors in Britain and those on the continent. Other characteristic features of the British 
experience are that little effort was lost to separate the high arts from mass culture. It 
seems that the British have no fear of putting them all in the same basket.  
Finally, in the course of the twentieth century, there was relatively little political 
instrumentalisation of mass culture in Britain either by the state, or by political parties 
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and movements. At the turn of the twentieth century the Labour Party, for example, 
failed to establish an ideologically organised cultural movement along the lines of 
social-democratic movements in either Germany or Austria at the time. And in the 
1930s the failure of the British fascist right can be ascribed to similar reasons. It is 
therefore worth discussing whether the extent to which commercial cultural industries 
managed to absorb the time and money devoted to leisure activities helps to explain 
that on the cultural level, British society has remained essentially individualistic. 
In the context of today’s reinvigorated interest in the cultural industries, studying the 
special case of Britain and comparing it with developments in other major economies 
might still provide valuable insights. Pivotal questions that connect the historical 
perspective with today’s structures are: Do commercial cultural industries in Britain 
still enjoy a lead over those in other European countries or have continental Europeans 
caught up in the meantime, perhaps as a result of the decline of the influence of parties 
and political movements, and even private societies and associations? Can we explain 
the relative success (or the relative decline) of British cultural industries and can the 
British experience provide general insights? 
However, before tackling questions like these it is necessary to agree about some basic 
conventions in this promising field of research. We continue to struggle with definition 
and measurement issues that bedevil the academic debates and the wider public 
discourse on the cultural industries. We need to discuss the significance and use of the 
available statistics. This is particularly important where we seek to compare the 
evidence across areas with different accounting practices. We also need to understand 
for what purpose these statistics have been assembled in the first place. In the face of 
these challenges, there is ample scope for an institutionalised exchange of information 
among researchers on the cultural industries both across academic disciplines as well 
as across geographical borders.  
The workshop “The Cultural Industries – The British Experience in International 
Perspective” promoted such an exchange. Organised by the Centre for British Studies 
of Humboldt University in February 2006, it attracted a number of German and British 
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academics as well as practicioners and policy makers, including the coordinators of the 
Berlin Senate’s Creative Industries Initiative. This publication contains revised 
versions of the papers that have been presented and discussed during the event.  
The papers are grouped into four themes. In a first section, entitled “Defining the 
Cultural Industries: Terms, Data, Methods”, three papers discuss the general problems 
of defining and using the terminology: Simon Roodhouse examines and criticises 
current definitions and quantitative methods of data collection applied in Britain. 
Susan Galloway and Stewart Dunlop analyse the different meanings of the terms 
‘creative’ and ‘cultural’ industries and discuss the policy implications of the, as they 
claim, ill-conceived creative industries definition. Roy Boyne contributes a 
sociological perspective by analysing the discussion about the social impact of the 
cultural field. 
The second section aims at “Extending the Analysis: Neglected Key Dimensions?” 
Christian Handke deals with the problem of copyright in a review of the economic 
literature. Rita Gerlach proposes a pragmatic framework for the comparison of British 
and German theatre quality. 
Additional dimensions of research in the different fields feature prominently in the 
third section, entitled “Embedding the Cultural Industries: Time and Space”. Lawrence 
Black discusses the change of attitudes of British governments towards the Creative 
Industries and Cultural Politics and Bastian Lange presents qualitative case studies of 
“culturepreneurs” and their role in urban modernization.  
The last section, “Embedding the Cultural Industries: Fields of Work”, holds 
exemplary papers that document the disciplinary and thematic width of current 
research projects: Gesa Stedman deals with the commercialisation of the literary field 
in the UK and literary or cultural merit. Annika Wingbermühle presents a study of 
marketing strategies for Scottish goods and services that take account of socio-cultural 
differences. Finally, Anna Dempster adds a business management perspective with her 
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analysis of theatre as a risky business in a case study of the musical Jerry Springer the 
Opera. 
Overall, the workshop demonstrated how stimulating interdisciplinary approaches to 
the analysis of the cultural industries can be. From the perspective of the organizers at 
the Centre for British studies, the exchange with our British and German colleagues in 
the course of this project has proven to be inspiring and encouraging. We could not 
have asked for more and we are looking forward to further fruitful cooperation.  
The editors would like to thank the Centre for British Studies for hosting this 
workshop and the staff of the Centre in general for their help before, during and after 
the conference. We would like to thank Corinna Radke in particular for her energetic 
and unfailing support in preparing this publication and Barbara Simpson and Catherine 
Smith for their effective proof-reading of the papers. 
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The Creative Industries: 
Definitions, Quantification and Practice 
Simon Roodhouse 
Professor of Creative Industries, University of the Arts, London; 





This chapter examines the definitional and quantification dynamics of the New Labour 
Creative Industries policy from 1998 to 2004 which replaced earlier Labour Party 
cultural industry interests articulated in the 1980s by the Labour controlled Greater 
London Council (GLC). It focuses on an empirical understanding of the sector and 
specifically sub sectors such as designer fashion, and graphics, through primary 
baseline analysis. It first considers the New Labour Creative Industries policy 
definitional framework and economic claims. It finds that there is conceptual 
confusion, at sector and sub sectoral level, the concept, which has yet to be owned by 
the sub sectors, is identified and accepted by the industry. This has led to a reappraisal 
of the definitional framework from a sub-sectoral, regional and local perspective, 
because data, if it exists, is often inaccurate and as a consequence provides a 
misleading evidence base. 
Secondly, consideration is given to the sources of data collection which underpin the 
policy, its reliability, and relevance to local and regional economic, cultural policy and 
practice. The chapter then demonstrates that collecting primary data at local and 
regional levels employing a practioner/business led definitional framework related to 
Simon Roodhouse 14
the national SIC coding system is an alternative means of building a realistic analysis 
of the sector which is recognizable by those in the industry. 
Thirdly, the paper suggests that the creative industry policy is exclusive, that the 
definition is pragmatic with no justifiable rationale. Furthermore the data used as 
evidence to support the policy is unreliable and flawed when placed in the context of 
sub sectors, locality and regions.  
Finally it concludes by suggesting that the introduction of a creative industries policy 
has inadvertently encouraged an emerging reconceptualisation of the cultural 
industries, particularly arts practice: culture as business, not, the ‘Tate’ effect, aesthetic 
peer group determined public culture. 
 
A Contorted and Torturous Definitional Historical Discourse 
The body of work is posited on successive United Kingdom (UK) national 
governments and their agencies defining and redrawing boundaries resulting in 
continuous public cultural policy and practice turbulence since 1945, commencing 
with the establishment of the Arts Council of Great Britain (Pick and Anderton). The 
pragmatic determination of these boundaries that is definitions, with no obvious 
rationale for inclusion or exclusion, lends itself to an interpretation of a public sector 
domain engaged in restrictive cultural practice; that is boundaries are constrained 
enough to match the level of available resources at any given time. It is the 
government administrative machinery responding to national policy by providing 
manageable and controllable categories, classifications and frameworks for the 
allocation of public funds rather than a rational empirically informed inclusive system, 
hence measurable, which conforms to the requirements of evidence based policy 
(Solesbury). Urban regeneration (Roodhouse and Roodhouse) and the creative 
industries (Roodhouse, Designer Fashion and Essential Facts) by the New Labour 
administration exemplify this practice.  
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The impact of this continuous boundary redefinition through national government 
machinery and by political parties for the arts, creativity and culture works against 
cohesion, interaction and connectivity although much is said by politicians about 
“joined up policy and action”. In particular, it encourages isolationism between 
national, regional, local government and agencies by relying on departmentalisation 
and compartmentalisation as the organisational means of delivery. As an illustration, 
culture resides within the Department for Culture Media and Sport (DCMS) and is also 
found in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office who fund the British Council (British 
Council, Britain’s Design and Creative Industries), the Ministry of Defence which 
resources a substantial number of museums, galleries and musical bands, the 
Department of Trade and Industry which supports creative industries through the 
Small Business Service including the export effort of these businesses; the Department 
for Education and Skills (DfES) (Allen and Shaw) and the Higher Education Funding 
Council for England (HEFCE) which provides entry to work and workforce 
development in the cultural field (North West Universities Association). This 
incidentally excludes all the devolved cultural arrangements for Scotland, Northern 
Ireland and Wales. 
This chaotic organisational pattern is replicated, at regional level, with DCMS 
sponsored Cultural Consortia, the Arts Council, the Museums Libraries and Archives 
Council (MLA), the Sports Council, the Tourist Boards, Sector Skills Councils 
(SSCs), and local authorities along with the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), 
Small Business Service, including Business Link, not to mention the plethora of sub-
regional intermediaries funded from the public purse, all pursuing differing cultural 
agendas, definitional frameworks (Hamilton and Scullion). Although attempts are 
made at overarching regional strategies, there is not as yet a shared understanding of 
and agreement to a definitional framework to operate and evaluate the effectiveness of 
these strategies. This leads, for example, to data collection replication which requires 
additional resource allocated for coordination. 
These issues were fore grounded by the 1997 “New Labour” government engagement 
in the creative industries concept, claimed to be a significant contributor to the UK 
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knowledge economy (DCMS, Task Force Report and Mapping Documents 1998 and 
2001). This concept generated by Leadbetter and Oakley is a contemporary 
reinvention of “Old Labour” GLC oriented cultural model. The Labour controlled 
GLC provided a significant challenge to the definitional status quo in the early 1980s 
at a time of high unemployment, significant industrial decline, and diminishing public 
funds for the arts by re-introducing the cultural industries model derived from social 
science and popular culture theorists such as Bourdieu. The introduction of the cultural 
and creative industries exemplars gave rise to a re-appraisal of the role and function of 
the ‘traditional’ arts, in economic terms (Myerscough), and in relation to new 
technologies such as instant printing, cassette recording and video making (O’Connor). 
So the concept of culture as an industry in a public policy context was introduced. The 
arts, described by the GLC as the ‘traditional arts’, were subsumed into a broader 
definitional framework which included “the electronic forms of cultural production 
and distribution – radio, television, records and video – and the diverse range of 
popular cultures which exist in London” (Greater London Council). The eventual 
successor body, the London Assembly and the executive Mayor of London have 
rekindled the theme (London Development Agency) this time with a focus on 
intervention in the creative industry networks and linkages. However, the creative 
industries development is derived from a longer history associated with defining and 
redefining the arts as an industry sector (Roodhouse, Interculturalism; Calhoun, 
Lupuma and Postone) and the relationship of the arts and media as cultural industries 
for example which others have addressed (O’Connor; Throsby; Pratt, The Cultural 
Industries; Garnham). 
The successor creative industry concept generated by DEMOS (Leadbetter and 
Oakley) constructed as a component of the knowledge economy model, can be found 
in one (Cunningham) of four key policy themes for the DCMS, that is, economic 
value. It can be argued that the theme of economic value is a maturing of the 
Thatcherite ethos that is efficiency, effectiveness, value for money, and market forces. 
Smith, the first New Labour Secretary of State for Culture Media and Sport, reinforces 
this interpretation: “ensuring that the full economic and employment impact of the 
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whole range of creative industries is acknowledged and assisted by government” 
(Smith). It was after all a continuation of the cultural economic rationale developed 
earlier by Walpole who was a strategic adviser to the Greater London Council in the 
1980s when Ken Livingstone was leader and supported the establishment of a cultural 
industries strategy to counter unemployment in the city and create a rainbow coalition 
of new voters. 
The government through the Creative Industries Taskforce, chaired by Smith defined 
the creative industries boundaries. The definition employed is largely pragmatic with 
little in the way of a rationale (Roodhouse, Designer Fashion and Essential Facts): 
“those activities which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent, and 
which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and 
exploitation of intellectual property” (DCMS, Task Force Report and Mapping 
Document 1998). The industrial activity sub sectors within which this activity 
primarily takes place are: “advertising, architecture, the art and antiques market, crafts, 
design, designer fashion, film, interactive leisure software, music, the performing arts, 
publishing, software, television and radio” (DCMS, Task Force Report and Mapping 
Document 1998). The representation of these activities as the UK creative industry 
sector generates structural and intellectual location tensions, for example architecture 
relates to construction and marginally engages with the arts and antiques trade, 
similarly, the arts and antiques trade has little or nothing to do with interactive leisure 
software. It is an emerging policy construct the DCMS has yet to embed both 
intellectually and practically in the consciousness of those working in the field. As a 
consequence the concept has more in common with the developing global economic 
interest in the knowledge economy (Leadbetter and Oakley; Howkins; Caves; Florida) 
than the DCMS designated constituent activities that is the 13 sub sectors established 
in 1998 and referred to earlier in this paragraph. 
Of particular note in this definitional discourse is the equitable inclusion of both public 
and private sector activity in public cultural policy by re-designating cultural activity 
as creative industries; and engaging with convergence arguments generated through 
advances in technology (Flew; Cunningham, Hearn, Cox, Ninan, and Keane). 
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Fundamentally this growing re-conceptualisation facilitates a reassessment of the 
traditional forms of policy intervention in support of the arts and culture (Roodhouse, 
Creating a Sustainable Culture). As elaborated by Cunningham (Cunningham) the 
term creative industries offers a workable solution that enables cultural industries and 
creative arts to become enshrined within a definition that breaks down the rigid 
sustainability of the long-standing definitions of culture and creative arts, to create 
coherency through democratising culture in the context of commerce, whereby 
creativity can become coupled alongside enterprise and technology to become sectors 
of economic growth, through the commercialisation of creative activity and 
intellectual property. Cunningham confirms: 
Creative Industries is a term that suits the political, cultural and 
technological landscape of these times. It focuses on the twin truths 
that (i) the core of ‘culture’ is still creativity, but (ii) creativity is 
produced, deployed, consumed and enjoyed quite differently in post-
industrialised societies. (Cunningham)  
This move from a traditional arts definition established by the Arts Council of Great 
Britain and successor bodies, “the arts for arts sake” argument (Jowell). 
 
Economic and Statistical Parameters 
Attempts have been made, by cultural economists, statisticians and cultural 
geographers largely since the early 1980s (Myerscough; O’Brien and Feist; Pratt, The 
Cultural Industries; Jeffcut), to arrive at suitable categorisations for the sector. Pratt 
for example argues that value chain and domain categorisation is a useful mechanism. 
This approach generalises the problem and reduces the importance of sub sectors 
specifying the activities within them. Whilst Jeffcut, from a knowledge management 
perspective suggests that the only way to understand the industry is as a cultural 
ecology. This relationship and interaction approach side steps the key issue which is a 
detailed explanation of the sub sector activity categories. Cunningham and particularly 
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Hearn (Hearn, Pace, and Roodhouse) take this further by engaging with a value chain 
ecology which relies on a thorough understanding of networks and shared detailed 
classifications developed by the author. What seems to have emerged from this work is 
a recognition that the Office for National Statistics’ (a UK government agency) 
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) and the Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) provide a common, imperfect, but nevertheless verifiable structure to collect and 
analyse data which corresponds with European, North American and Australasian 
systems. For example Table 1 provides an integrated definitional model based on the 
Australian SIC and SOC system used recently to collect primary baseline data on the 
music sub sector of the creative industries in Queensland, Australia (Cox, Ninan, 
Hearn, Roodhouse, and Cunningham). CIRAC is the Creative Industries Research and 
Applications centre at the Queensland University of Technology which has taken a 
lead in Australia in mapping the creative industries and created a further deeper level 
of classification. The Australian SIC and SOC system is know as ANZSIC and 
ANZSOC which is very similar to the EUROSTAT system. Finally the Australian 
Office of Statistics has established a Bureau of Leisure and Cultural Statistics and this 
group has provided a 5 digit coding classification for culture. These classifications are 
included in table 1 and for the purposes of illustration focused on music. 
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Table 1: CIRAC, ACLC, ANZSIC Business Activity Concordance Table 
CMIC (1) ACLC (2) AND UKSIC 
EQUIVALENTS 
ANZSIC (3) 
1. Music Composition 
(incl. Composers and 
Songwriters) 
231 Music Composition 
92.31 Artistic and Literary 
Creation and Interpretation 
9242 Creative Arts 
2430 Recorded Media 
Manufacturing and 
Publishing 
5. Record Company or 
Label 
233 Record Companies and 
Distributors 
22.31 Reproduction of 
Sound Recording 
4799 Wholesaling n.e.c. 
Source: CIRAC, 2004. 
 
However economists and statisticians who are expected to quantify the creative and 
cultural industry and/or arts activity to provide informed data for policy evaluation and 
development continue to be dogged by this tortuous and contorted definitional history 
(Barrière and Santagata; Evans). The weakness and inconsistencies of the definitional 
frameworks, for example, become apparent when used to quantify and determine the 
value of artistic and/or aesthetic activity. It requires a shifting from generalised 
descriptors and categorisations such as advertising to specific analysis of its 
component parts. Authors such as Baumol (Baumol and Baumol) and Heatherington 
(Heatherington) who are interested in understanding the economics of the sector with 
assertions that aesthetic pleasure has at least as much value as the difference in returns 
between works of art and financial assets quickly find that there is no common 
understanding of art or aesthetics. This leads, to the ultimate question – how to define 
a work of art.  
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Another issue for economists studying the cultural industries is the differentiation 
between artistic and industrial goods. Part of the difficulty here is that the total 
assimilation of art to commodities creates serious problems because art goods escape 
the standard rules of utilitarian market exchange (Barrière and Santagata). The 
consequences of this failure to engage in establishing common workable definitions is 
summed up by Towse in considering the visual arts (The Arts Council of England, 
Artists in figures 7): “The main point is that whichever definition is used, it is bound to 
produce different research findings.” This has led over time to “the paucity of 
alternative data sets with which to test the assertion(s) in practice” (2). Consequently 
even if the definitional jungle referred to can be avoided, there are difficulties in 
successfully locating cultural product within the accepted norms of economic practice. 
The fault line for cultural economists in delivering convincing economic analysis is the 
lack of clarity and consistency in defining cultural practice.  
 
New Labour Creative Industries Claims 
Nevertheless, the DCMS, 28 years after the UNESCO report published an audit in 
1998, with a follow up in 2001 based on this secondary data: the Creative Industries 
Mapping Documents (1998 and 2001), which claimed that these industries generated 
£57 billion (1998) and £112 billion (2001) revenues, and employment of circa 1 
million (1998), and 1.3 million (2001) described in Table 2 by sub sector: [I should 
have said earlier that of course the choice of activities was and remains controversial – 
why is the antiques trade ‘creative’ but museum exhibitions attracting millions of 
tourists not included?] 
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Table 2: UK Creative Industries Headline Data, 1998 and 2001  
Activity Revenues (£ Bn) 1998 2001 
Employment (Thousands) 
1998 2001 
Advertising 4.0 3.0 96,000 93,000 
Architecture 1.5 1.7 30,000 21,000 
Arts and Antiques 2.2 3.5 39,700 37,000 
Crafts 0.4 0.4 25,000 24,000 
Design 12.0 26.7 23,000 76,000 
Designer Fashion 0.6 0.6 11,500 12,000 
Film/Video 0.9 3.6 33,000 45,000 
Leisure Software 1.2 1.0 27,000 21,000 
Music 3.6 4.6 160,000 122,000 
Performing Arts 0.9 0.5 60,000 74,000 
Publishing 16.3 18.5 125,000 141,000 
Software/ Computer 
Services 7.5 36.4 272,000 555,000 
Television and Radio 6.4 12.1 63,500 102,000 
Total 57 bn 112.5 bn C. 1 mio. 1,322,000 
Source: DCMS, Creative Industry Mapping Documents, 1998, 2001. 
 
There are the usual health warnings associated with these statistics and 
recommendations for further work to be carried out in collecting and verifying the data 
underpinning the document. In particular it recommends: “Continuing to improve the 
collection of robust and timely data on the creative industries, based on a common 
understanding of coverage” (DCMS, Mapping Document 2001). 
The data in interactive leisure software, designer fashion (Roodhouse, Designer 
Fashion and Essential Facts), and crafts sub sectors was identified as particularly 
weak. When considering this matter at the regional level, the position is dismal, with 
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little information available (Department of Arts Policy and Management). 
Consequently one of the key issues identified was: “The need for more mapping to 
provide a better picture of what is happening on the ground and help inform policy 
development. The mapping also needs to be based on a common understanding of the 
coverage of the creative industries” (DCMS, Mapping Document 2001).  
However, the DCMS has recently developed a regional cultural data framework 
(I. Wood). This has yet to be accepted, not least because it does not universally 
conform to the national data collection classifications, relies on generalised notions of 
domains and a limited interpretation of value chains. This can only be perceived as a 
fundamental structural weakness, when increasing emphasis is placed on evidence 
based cultural policy and comparative international benchmarking. Despite spasmodic 
attempts (O’Brien and Feist; Davies and Lindley), the paucity of empirical evidence 
available and the structural weakness of the definitional frameworks to inform cultural 
policy, management or practice particularly in the fields of museums, galleries and the 
creative industries (Roodhouse, Designer Fashion and Essential Facts) to support the 
formulation and development of policy at local, regional (Devlin, Gibson, Taylor, and 
Roodhouse, “Cultural Industries Research Project” and “Cultural Industries in 
Rotherham”; Roodhouse and Taylor) and national levels continues. 
 
Sources of Data 
Much of the statistical evidence, however, used by the public sector agencies and 
government departments referred to earlier is traced to national census data, the 
Department for Education and Skills’ labour force survey, and new earnings studies 
along with several studies by the Office for National Statistics. EUROSTAT, on behalf 
of the European Union, has also been generating information in this field. It is, 
however, in reality secondary data when used in the context of the creative industries, 
with all the inherent weaknesses of such an approach (Department of Arts Policy and 
Management). This becomes worse with questionable sources when consideration is 
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given to the data employed to support the DCMS creative industry mapping 
documents (Roodhouse, Creating a Coherent and The new global growth). Much of 
this information is unverifiable, collected over differing periods of time, using 
unrelated methodologies. The Department has attempted to sift through these sources 
and select on the basis of compatibility. This process, however, reinforced the 
difficulties of using a variety of unverified sources which are not collected in a 
commonly defined framework. Smith confirmed however that collecting and analysing 
data to underpin creative industries policy is problematic, and past claims difficult to 
substantiate (DCMS, Task Force Report and Mapping Document 1998):  
One of the problems in this whole area is that the precise figures (for 
the creative industries) are hard to come by. Many of these areas of 
activity are of course dominated by small and medium sized 
companies almost working on a cottage industry basis, with a handful 
of big players striding amongst them; it is a pattern that makes 
definition and accurate counting very difficult but even more essential 
if public policy is to be maintained (Smith).  
Rather worryingly, a similar view was expressed as long ago as 1970 in the UNESCO 
report, Cultural Policy in Great Britain (Green, Wilding and Hoggart). 
 
Implications 
It remains the case that in the United Kingdom, Europe and Australia there is no 
consistent definitional framework and resultant verifiable and reliable data available to 
assist cultural managers and policy makers. This for example calls into question the 
accuracy of the claims made for the creative class (Florida). 
The most recent UK inspired policy initiative, the creative industries, which places 
significance on individual creativity as an economic wealth generator and contributor 
to the development of knowledge economies, fails to recognise for example the 
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specific visual arts contribution within the current DCMS creative industries sector 
definition and to make matters worse the government quango the Arts Council of 
England has additionally confused the picture by defining visual arts as a specific 
practice alongside crafts, architecture and fine art. There is equal confusion when 
economic and occupational definitions are considered as these do not marry with each 
other or the market approach found in the DCMS creative industries definition.  
What is required is the identification of criteria by which judgements can be made 
derived from the commonalities to be found in the international definitional landscape 
involving practioners, economists, statistians, cultural mangers and policy makers. 
This points ultimately to “biting the bullet” and engaging in establishing criteria to 
define activity such as sculpture.  
Unless we are consistent with definitional frameworks the data used by cultural 
managers will always remain unreliable, suspect and partial. Are cultural managers 
satisfied with this and the reliance on questionable data to inform policy, advocacy and 
management decisions? For example, measurement of performance relies on a 
definitive baseline to start from, in other words if we do not have a common 
understanding of what say the visual arts are or what an artist is, how can we measure 
investment and results? 
There is a case to consider the importance of creative industries as a defining 
mechanism for society. In other words, arguing for coherence and convergence, 
creative industries as a manifestation of society, the richness in diversity concept. By 
taking this stance it is possible to incorporate the wider issues that concern society, 
such as the environment, urban regeneration, social cohesion and community 
development. The other matter, which complicates these definitional debates, is how 
and who decides what art is, including aesthetics. In other words many of the public 
agencies such as the Arts Councils, Design Councils and Film Councils are charged 
with doing just this by promoting the creative industries making excellence accessible 
and educating society. While this may be admirable it poses problems such as, what is 
excellence in the creative industries, determined by whom and using whose criteria? In 
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other words the established national agencies have been given within their remit the 
task of determining our corporate sense of aesthetic. Is this right?  
Quite apart from facing up to defining or not aesthetics in the creative industries, we 
have yet to adopt a sensible approach to creativity in non-creative settings. Quite apart 
from this a significant sector, museums galleries and the heritage are excluded from 
virtually all published definitions of the creative industries, which is difficult to 
rationalise. The emerging definitional framework debate can be characterised as a 
struggle between the aesthetic (elitist) versus business (democratic) models. 
An alternative to these approaches is to,  
• collect data defined by product, service and /or process; 
• recognise a spectrum of activity free of aesthetic judgement and intervene on a 
business, research and development basis.  
Ultimately, it may be necessary to insure that activities encompassed in whichever 
creative industries definitional framework is ultimately used, are derived from the 
directly affected constituencies and stakeholders by attempting to consistently describe 
what they actually want.  
 
References 
Allen, K., and P. Shaw. Continuing Professional Development for the Creative 
Industries: A Review of Provision in the Higher Education Sector. London: 
Higher Education Funding Council for England, 2001. 
The Arts Council of England. A creative future; the way forward for the arts, crafts 
and media in England. HMSO, 1993. 
---. Artists in figures: A statistical portrait of cultural occupation. Research Report 31. 
London: The Arts Council of England, 2003. 
The Arts Council of Great Britain. An invitation to the nation to invest in the arts, A 
Great Britain success story. London: The Arts Council of Great Britain, 1985. 
---. The Arts Council three-year plan 1988/89 – 1990/9. London: The Arts Council of 
Great Britain, 1988. 
The Creative Industries 27
---. Better business for the art., An introduction to the Arts Council Inventive Funding 
Scheme for arts organisations. London: The Arts Council of Great Britain, 
1988. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics. Australian Culture and Leisure Classifications. 
Adelaide: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2001. 4902. 
Barrière, C., and W. Santagata. Defining Art, From the Brancusi Trail to the 
Economics of Semiotic Goods. AIMAC Proceedings. San Francisco: Golden 
Gate University, 1997. 
Baumol, W., and H. Baumol. “On the economics of musical composition in Mozart’s 
Vienna”. On Mozart. Ed. James M. Morris. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994. Chapter 4. 
Bennett, T., et al., eds. Culture, ideology and social process. Batsford Academic and 
Educational, 1981. 41-43. 
Brecknock, R. Creative Capital: Creative Industries in the Creative City. Brecknock 
Consulting PLI, 2004. 
British Council. Britain’s Design Industry: the Design Workshop of the World. 
London: British Council, 1998. 
British Council Creative Industries Unit. Creative Industries. London: British Council, 
2004. 
Calhoun, C., E. Lupuma, and M. Postone. Bourdieu Critical Perspectives. Great 
Britain: Polity Press, 1993. 
Caves, R. Creative Industries. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. 
Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies. Culture Cluster Mapping and 
Analysis. Draft one report for the North East. Newcastle upon Tyne: CURDS, 
2001. 
COMEDIA (East Midlands Creative Industries Pathfinder Group). Creative Industries 
Study – Phase One Final Report. 2001. 
Committee of Youth, Education, the Media and Sport, European Parliament. Draft 
Report on Cultural Industries. 2003. 
Cox, S., A. Ninan, G. Hearn, S. Roodhouse, and S. Cunningham. Queensland Music 
Industry Basics. Brisbane, Australia: CIRAC, 2004. 
“Cultural Statistics in the EU.” Final Report of LEG. Brussels: European Union, 2000. 
Cunningham, S. From Cultural to Creative Industries, Theory, Industry, and Policy 
Implications. Creative Industries Research and Applications Centre, University 
of Technology Brisbane, Australia, 2002. 
---, G. Hearn, S. Cox, A. Ninan, and M. Keane. Brisbane's Creative Industries 2003. 
Report delivered to Brisbane City Council, Community and Economic 
Development. Brisbane: Creative Industries Applied Research Centre, 
Queensland University of Technology, 2000. 
Simon Roodhouse 28
Davies, R., and R. Lindley. Artists in figures – a statistical portrait of cultural 
occupation. Research report. London: The Arts Council of England, 2003. 
The Department of Arts Policy and Management. Creative Industries Mapping 
Document Sources Review. London: City University, 2000. 
Department for Culture, Media and Sports (DCMS). Creative Industries Mapping 
Document. London: DCMS, 1998. 
---. Creative Industries Task Force Report. London: DCMS, 1998. 
---. Creative Industries Mapping Document. London: DCMS, 2001. 
Devlin, N., S. Gibson, C. Taylor, and S. Roodhouse. “Cultural Industries Research 
Project in the Wakefield District”. Wakefield: Bretton Hall College, 
unpublished paper, 1998. 
---, Gibson, S., C. Taylor, and S. Roodhouse. “The cultural industries in Rotherham”. 
Wakefield: Bretton Hall College, unpublished paper, 1999. 
European Union. Cultural Statistics in the EU. Final Report of LEG. European Union, 
2000. 
Evans, G. “Measuring the Arts and Cultural Industries – Does Size matter?” The New 
Cultural Map: a Research Agenda for the 21st Century. Ed. S. Roodhouse. 
Wakefield: University of Leeds, 1997. 
Flew, T. “Beyond ad hocery: Defining Creative Industries.” Cultural Sites, Cultural 
Theory, Cultural Policy. The second international conference on cultural policy 
research. Te Papa, Wellington, New Zealand, 23-26 January 2002. 
---, G. Ching, A. Stafford, and J. Tacchi. Music Industry development and Brisbane’s 
future as a creative city. CIRAC, Queensland University of Technology, 2001. 
Florida, R. The Rise of the Creative Class. New York: Basic Books, 2002. 
Galloway, S. Employment in Scotland Cultural Sector 1998-2001 – A CCPR Briefing 
Paper. Glasgow University, Centre for Cultural Policy Research, 2003. 
Garnham, N. “Concepts of Culture: Public Policy and the Cultural Industries.” 
Cultural Studies 1.1 (1987): 23-37. 
Greater London Council, Industry and Employment Branch. London Industrial 
Strategy: The Cultural Industries. Greater London Council, 1985. 
Green, M., M. Wilding, and R. Hoggart. Cultural Policy in Great Britain. UNESCO 
Report. 1970. 
Hamilton, C., and A. Scullion. The Effectiveness of the Scottish Arts Council’s Links & 
Partnerships with other Agencies. University of Glasgow, 2002. 
Hearn, G., C. Pace, and S. Roodhouse. “The shift to value ecology thinking.” CIRAC, 
Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia: unpublished paper, 
2005. 
Heatherington, P. Values in Art: Bases for Making Judgements of Artistic Value. 
Wimbledon School of Art & the Tate Gallery, 1992. 
The Creative Industries 29
Howkins, J. The Creative Economy: How people make money from ideas. London: 
Allen Lane, 2001. 
Jeffcut, P. “Knowledge relationships and transactions in a cultural economy: 
Analysing the creative industries ecosystem.” Media International Australia 
incorporating Culture and Policy 112 (2004): 67-82. 
Jowell T. Government and the Value of Culture. Department of [for] Culture, Media 
and Sport, 2004. 
Kelly, A., and M. Kelly. Impact and Values – Assessing the arts and creative 
industries in the South West. Bristol Cultural Development Consortium, 2000. 
Leadbetter, C., and K. Oakley. The Independents: Britain’s New Cultural 
Entrepreneurs. Demos, Redwood Books, 1999. 
London Development Agency. The Mayor’s Commission on the Creative Industries: 
Improving Links in Creative Production Chains. 2003. Online. 02 June 2004. 
Available: http://www.creativelondon.org.uk. 
Myerscough, J. The Economic Importance of the Arts in Britain. London: Policy 
Studies Institute, 1988. 
North West Universities Association Culture Committee. The Contribution of Higher 
Education to Cultural Life in the North West. North West Universities 
Association, 2004. 
O’Brien, J., and A. Feist. Employment in the Arts and Cultural Industries: an analysis 
of the 1991 census. Arts Council of England, 1995. 
O’Connor, J. The Definition of the Cultural Industries. Manchester Institute of Popular 
Culture, 1999. Online. January 2006. Available: http://mmu.ac.uk/h-
ss/mip/iciss/home2.htm.  
Pick, J., and M. Anderton. Building Jerusalem, Art, Industry and the British 
Millennium. Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999. 
Pratt, A. “The Cultural Industries Sector: Its definition and character from secondary 
sources on Employment and trade, Britain 1984 – 1991.” Research papers in 
Environment and Spatial Analysis 41. London: London School of Economics 
Department of Geography and Environment, 1997. 
---. “Creative clusters: Towards the governance of the creative industries production 
system?” Media International Australia incorporating Culture and Policy 112 
(2004): 50-66.  
Plymouth City Council. The economic importance of the arts and cultural industries 
sector in Plymouth. Plymouth City Council, Economic Development and Urban 
Regeneration Service, 2000. 
Roodhouse, S. “Interculturalism, in Particular the Relationship between Artists and 
Industrial Imagery.” Journal of Arts Policy and Management Law and Society 
27.3 (1997). 
Simon Roodhouse 30
---. “Do Cultural Industries Make a Difference to Economic Regional Regeneration in 
the UK?” Proceedings of AIMAC 5th International Conference on Arts and 
Cultural Management. Vol. 2. Helsinki: AIMAC, 1999. 457-466. 
---. “Where is Today’s Arkwright?” Journal of Arts Management, Law and Society 29 
(1999). 
---. “A misinformed Strategy: the creative and cultural industries contribution to the 
UK economy.” Incentives and information in Cultural Economics. FOKUS-
ACEI Conference, 2000. Online. January 2006. Available: http://fokus.or.at.  
---, ed. and contributor. Vital Statistics: the Cultural Industries in Yorkshire and the 
Humber. Bretton Hall College of the University of Leeds, 2000. 
---. Creating Sustainable Cultures. Sydney, Australia: Art Reach, New South Wales 
Museums and Galleries Foundation, 2001. 9-12. 
---. Is there a place for the Heritage in the Creative Industries as an engine of 
economic growth in the UK? European Institute for the Advanced Studies in 
Management Workshop, Managing Cultural Organisations, 2001. 
---. “Creating a Sustainable Culture for everybody.” The Reformer. London: Centre for 
Reform, 2002. 
---. “Designer Fashion: the Essential Facts.” AIMAC 7th Conference proceedings. 
Milan: Bocconi University, 2003. 
---. Essential Facts: The nature of designer fashion and its markets. Bolton Institute, 
2003. 
---. “Have Cultural Industries a Role to Play in Regional Regeneration and a Nation’s 
Wealth.” The International Journal of Applied Management 4.1 (2003). 
---. “Creating a Coherent Vocational Pathway to Enhance Employability and Personal 
Fulfilment.” Apprenticeship: an Historical Re-invention for a Post Industrial 
World Conference proceedings. UVAC, 2004. 
---. “The new global growth industry: definitional problems in the creative industries – 
a practical approach.” Counting Culture, Practical Challenges for the Museum 
and Heritage Sector. Eds. Roodhouse and Kelly. London: Greenwich 
University Press, 2004. 
---. “Management Information: Defining the visual arts for managers and 
policymakers.” AIMAC Conference Proceedings. Montreal: HEC, 2005. 
---, and M. Roodhouse. “Cultural Intervention in British Urban Regeneration since 
1945.” Proceedings International Arts and Cultural Management Association 
Fourth Biennial Conference. San Francisco, USA: AIMAC, 1997. 
---, and C. Taylor. The creative town initiative – Kirklees creative economic baseline 
study. Bretton Hall College, 1998. 
Rooney, D., G. Hearn, T. Mandeville, and J. Richard, eds. Public policy in knowledge-
based economies: Foundations and frameworks. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2003. 
The Creative Industries 31
Scott, Allen J. “The cultural economy of cities.” International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 21.2 (1997): 323-39. 
Smith, C. Creative Britain. London: Faber and Faber, 1998. 
Solesbury, W. “Evidence Based Policy: whence it came and where it’s going.” 
Working paper 1. ESRC Centre for Evidence Based Policy and Practice, 2001. 
Statistics Canada. A Canadian Framework for Culture Statistics. Culture Statistics 
Program, 2001. 
Throsby, D. Economics and Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
WERU and DCA. The economic impact of the arts and cultural industries in Wales. 
Cardiff: Arts Council of Wales and the Welsh Development Agency, SA4, 
DBRW, 1998. 
Wood, I. Counting Culture, Practical Challenges for the Museum and Heritage 
Sector, Collecting Cultural Data – a DCMS Perspective. Greenwich University 
Press, 2004. 
Wood, P. Think Global Act local: Looking forward to the creative region. The role of 
the creative industries in local and regional development. Government Office 
for Yorkshire and the Humber and FOCI, 1999. 
Simon Roodhouse 32
 
Published in: Christiane Eisenberg, Rita Gerlach and Christian Handke (eds.). Cultural Industries: The 
British Experience in International Perspective. 2006. Online. Humboldt University Berlin, Edoc-
Server. Available: http://edoc.hu-berlin.de. ISBN 978-3-86004-203-8. 
 
 
Deconstructing the Concept of ‘Creative Industries’1
Susan Galloway 
Centre for Cultural Policy Research, University of Glasgow 
s.galloway@arts.gla.ac.uk 
Stewart Dunlop 





‘Creative industries’ and ‘cultural industries’ are terms that tend to be used 
interchangeably by UK policymakers. However their meanings and uses are in fact 
very different. In this paper we will be exploring the differences between the two and 
arguing that, despite how influential it has become, the creative industries definition 
adopted by the British government is ill conceived in relation to culture. 
First, it confuses or conflates culture and creativity, two quite different concepts. This 
is partly because of terminological confusion about the word culture, which we will 
look at later in more detail. Second, we argue that the UK creative industries definition 
is wedded to notions of the knowledge economy, within which culture is valued 
primarily for its economic contribution. The result is a creative industries definition 
that fails to take account of the importance and distinctiveness of culture – in policy 
terms the creative arts have been subsumed within a concept which, as we shall show, 
has no cultural content at all. 
                                                     
1  An extended version of this paper will appear in the International Journal of Cultural Policy 13.1 
(2007). 
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While a lot of the arts world is very pleased to be included in the creative industries, 
there is also uneasiness about where the arts sit within these. This has been presented 
as the arts’ distaste for the world of commerce – in other words a tension between the 
subsidised and the commercial (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt). We think this is over-
simplistic. The economy of the arts is mixed: the publicly funded and commercial have 
a complex inter-relationship and UK cultural policymakers have engaged with this 
reality for years. It is a naïve idea that this is something the creative industries agenda 
has thrust upon them. 
In our view the uneasiness is more because of the perception that the rationale for 
publicly funding culture, and more narrowly, the arts, is being undermined. We will 
present this argument and look at some of the implications for cultural policy of the 
creative industries concept. First, we will look at what the different notions cultural 
industries and creative industries represent in policy terms. We will then turn to the 
differences between the two definitions, in particular comparing the complexity of 
Throsby’s definition of the cultural industries, with the official UK definition of the 
creative industries (Throsby, Economics). 
 
Origins of the Two Terms 
Adorno and Horkheimer originally coined the term cultural industry to make the 
distinction between the traditional artisan based creative arts and industrially produced 
cultural forms (Dialectic of Enlightenment). The arts were specifically not part of the 
cultural industries. The term ‘cultural industries’ which developed from this – referring 
to the ‘classic’ cultural industries of film, recorded music, broadcasting and publishing 
– was deployed to incorporate these forms of commercial entertainment, mass 
produced by industrial methods, as an object of government cultural policy. This was 
the sense in which the cultural industries became a subject of interest to the French 
government, and to UNESCO in the late 1970s and 1980s (Garnham; Towse, Cultural 
Economics; Flew). 
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By adopting the phrase ‘creative industries’ Britain’s New Labour government were 
doing the reverse: in other words bringing the creative arts into an economic policy 
agenda. New Labour purposefully adopted the term creative industries to replace 
‘cultural industries’ because it was regarded as a ‘unifying’ and ‘democratising’ 
notion. As a rhetorical device, it bridges the divide between ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture – 
between the mass market, popular cultural products of the cultural industries and the 
high art of the creative arts, now branded ‘elitist’. It also bridges the divide between 
‘art’ and ‘industry’ – between the demarcations of what is ‘publicly supported’ and 
what is ‘commercial’. It thereby provides a holistic approach to cultural production in 
its entirety, overcoming, at least conceptually, the traditional division of responsibility 
for culture within UK government, split between the Department of Trade and 
Industry and the Department responsible for Culture – previously Education, then 
DNH and now the DCMS. 
It has been described by Andy Pratt and others as representing the ‘re-branding’ of 
culture by the New Labour government (Flew; Caust; Pratt, The Cultural Economy). 
The question we raise is whether this is simply a change in language, a branding 
exercise, or whether it signals a more significant change in policy approach to culture.  
 
Definitions 
The terminological clutter that surrounds the term culture is to some extent 
responsible, in our view, for the failure to adequately consider the differences between 
cultural and creative activities. In particular, there is an assumption that there is 
nothing distinctive about creativity in the cultural sphere. Most definitions of the 
cultural industries are based around a combination of five main criteria – creativity, 
intellectual property, symbolic meaning, use value, and methods of production. 
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Creativity  
Cultural and creative industries are often described as those that are based upon 
individual creativity, and creativity is the key ingredient in official UK documents (see 
below). However, this would seem, almost tautologically, to define the ‘creative 
industries’, since any activity that involves creativity would necessarily be ‘creative’ 
(Pratt, Cultural Industries 33). Defining ‘creative industries’ against such a measure is, 
if nothing else, far too wide to be useful for any purpose. Any innovation – including 
scientific and technical innovations – of any sort in any industry is creative, and, in 
such terms, any industry is, therefore, potentially a ‘creative industry’. Conflating 
cultural creativity with all other forms of creativity fails to take adequate account of 




Intellectual property allows people to own the products of their creativity and therefore 
to exercise both economic and moral rights over these products. Towse comments that 
in the UK, copyright is now viewed as the ‘organising principle’ for the creative 
industries and is the basis for defining the cultural industries (The Cultural Industries 
170).  
However, it is equally clear that defining creative industries by their ability to generate 
intellectual property runs up against the same problem as defining them by using 
‘general’ creativity – many types of creative activity, including science, engineering, 
and academia, generate intellectual property. We also believe that defining the cultural 
sector by its ability to generate intellectual property is again too wide-ranging, since it 
again fails to identify adequately the distinctive aspects of the cultural sector.  
We should recognise that advocates of the ‘knowledge economy’ model, such as 
Howkins (Speech to the Inception Session), do argue that the term ‘creative industry’ 
should apply to any industry where ‘brain power is preponderant and where the 
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outcome is intellectual property’ (Howkins 2). They argue, on this basis, that the 
boundaries of official DCMS definitions (the UK government Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport, DCMS) should be extended to include both business and scientific 
creativity.  
This ‘everything is creative’ argument also underlies the UK government’s approach 
to creative industries, which it defines as 
those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill 
and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation 
through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property.2
There is a sharp conflict between this view, which sees cultural production as just one 
type of creativity, and the alternative view that culture and cultural products are 
something distinctive. For adherents of the latter view, however, definitions based on 
concepts of creativity and/or intellectual property alone do not adequately explain 
what is ‘cultural’ about the ‘cultural’ or ‘creative’ industries. These writers place value 
on a third concept, ‘symbolic meaning’.  
 
Symbolic ‘Goods’ or ‘Symbolic Meaning’ 
The ‘everything is creative’ approach is opposed by writers who place value on the 
concept of ‘symbolic meaning’. For these commentators, the generation, or 
communication, of symbolic meaning is the defining concept of culture and the 
economic value of goods is derived from, or reflects, their cultural value. In his 2001 
study, Economics and Culture, Throsby examined the etymology of the term ‘culture’. 
Drawing on the work of Raymond Williams (Keywords; Culture), he showed that, 
while it was originally defined in terms of cultivating the soil, the meaning of culture 
was later refined to encompass individual intellectual and artistic cultivation: it is for 
                                                     
2  Creative Industries Mapping Document prepared for the DCMS Creative Industries Task Force, 
October 1998.  
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this reason that we continue to refer to a person who is conversant in the arts as 
‘cultivated’ (Throsby 3). In its original sense, therefore, culture was used to describe 
activities that contributed to the intellectual and artistic development of individuals.  
However, during the nineteenth century the use of the term ‘culture’ was expanded, 
and it began to be applied in a wider sense, to describe the set of beliefs held in 
common by different societies. In the context of nineteenth-century nation building in 
particular, the term began to refer particularly to the development of individual 
nations. It thus evolved from describing the intellectual development of the individual, 
and began to be applied to describing features such as the belief system, customs, 
expressions, and so on, of a people or society. Subsequent development of this latter 
usage simply extends this definition further, and it has come to be used at a more 
micro level to describe a set of attitudes, expressions and customs common to or 
shared by groups within societies. For example, we now commonly talk about a ‘drug 
culture’, ‘youth culture’, and, at the very micro level, even of companies having a 
‘corporate culture’.  
However, it is also clear that, whatever group of people within society is under 
discussion, producing culture is essentially about generating and communicating some 
type of meaning. Thus O’Connor defines the cultural industries as ‘those activities 
which deal primarily in symbolic goods – goods whose primary economic value is 
derived from their cultural value’ (O’Connor 5). This definition, then, includes what 
O’Connor calls the ‘classical’ cultural industries – broadcast media, film, publishing, 
recorded music, design, architecture, new media – and the ‘traditional arts’ – visual 
art, crafts, theatre, music theatre, concerts and performance, literature, museums and 
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Use Value 
Others, including Bilton and Leary (What can managers do) and Martin (Defining 
Culture), while agreeing on the importance of symbolic meaning, differ from 
O’Connor by considering a fourth concept, that of ‘use value’ to be the defining 
characteristic. Symbolic goods and services have as ‘first use’ the communication of 
ideas, rather than a functional value. So while activities which produce books, films, 
plays, music are part of the cultural industries, those such as fashion design, 
advertising and architecture, where there is symbolic content, but where functionality 
comes first, are not considered to be part of the cultural industries.  
Throsby (Economics and Culture) presents a definition that combines all three 
concepts looked at so far, and also incorporates the issue of ‘use value’, allowing 
consideration of both the economic and cultural sides of the cultural industries. He 
argues that:  
1. the activities of the cultural industries involve some form of creativity in their 
production; 
2. the cultural industries are concerned with the generation and communication of 
symbolic meaning; and, 
3. their output embodies, at least potentially, some form of intellectual property.  
Taking the first two conditions together would seem to define the cultural industries. 
The first condition means that the activity involves some type of creativity, while the 
second limits this to symbolic meaning, importantly excluding the generation of 
scientific or functional knowledge. In Throsby’s view all three conditions are 
necessary to decide whether an industry is part of the cultural industries, and while 
they provide a clear set of criteria for doing so, in practice there are considerable 
difficulties involved in deciding whether, and to what extent, individual activities are 
‘cultural industries’. 
Throsby extends his analysis to define a three-fold classification of cultural industries. 
At the centre of this industry model lie creative arts such as music, dance, theatre, 
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literature, visual arts, crafts, plus newer forms such as video art and multimedia. He 
argues that the principal purpose of these industries is to generate and/or communicate 
meaning about the intellectual, moral and/or spiritual behaviour of the individual 
and/or the beliefs, values, norms, and other expressions of groups in society. We may 
disagree about the extent to which individual productions achieve this end, but these 
industries should properly be defined within the cultural sector because generating and 
communicating meaning is the main output of each.  
Throsby next extends his approach to include a wider set of activities centred on the 
creative arts, and it is at this point that difficulties begin to appear with regard to the 
proper definition of culture. He broadens his definition in two ways. The first involves 
extending the boundaries of the cultural industries to include industries that operate 
essentially outside the cultural sphere, but where some cultural input into final 
production may be required. Advertising, design and architecture, for example, in 
addition to producing culture as discussed above, may also in some instances use 
material drawn from the creative arts as inputs into final products. In doing so, it could 
thus be argued that they generate and communicate symbolic meaning. 
This, however, suggests that culture is used as an input into the production process of 
other industries. If, for example, an advertising campaign uses a reference taken from a 
painting, then it uses the output of a cultural industry to produce its own output. 
Industries that use cultural output may thus help to propagate culture, but since they do 
not themselves produce culture, they are not a part of the cultural industries. 
Throsby’s second extension is to include industries that produce goods which involve 
some degree of cultural output, but where it is difficult to ascertain the proportion of 
cultural and non-cultural output – in economic terminology, these activities produce 
‘joint goods’, and it is at this point that more substantial difficulties begin to appear 
with regard to the proper definition of culture. 
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Joint Goods  
This includes industries that may produce some cultural goods in the sense used above, 
but where industry output also involves the production of non-cultural goods – that is, 
the proportion of ‘core’ cultural goods is lower than in the creative arts. Throsby here 
is addressing essentially the same point identified by both Bilton and Leary (What can 
managers do) and Martin (Defining Culture). However, while they argue that it is 
possible to define precisely whether a good is cultural or functional, Throsby’s 
argument recognises that for many goods it may be difficult to ascertain the 
proportions of cultural and functional value. 
One example of this would be architecture, where the design of buildings may make 
cultural statements that extend beyond purely functional aspects. We would then have 
to decide what proportion of this output is ‘cultural’ as opposed to ‘functional’. 
Similarly, advertising and design may produce genuinely cultural statements, and the 
value created is both cultural and non-cultural. Clearly the balance is extremely 
difficult to identify.  
 
Terminological Clutter  
However, difficulty in identifying the balance between the cultural and functional 
output of any commodity is not the only problem here – a second arises from 
terminological clutter. We discussed earlier how the use of the term culture has 
broadened over time. This has now created the problem that it has become increasingly 
difficult to agree on where to draw the line. 
For example, Flew (“Beyond ad hocery” 13) discusses the way in which the use of the 
term has been extended over time, and points to the definitional problems that this 
creates. If we define cultural industries as those involved in the production of symbolic 
goods and services, he asks whether it is now “possible to exclude any activity of 
industrial production that has a symbolic content? Is the design and production of a 
Coca-Cola can a part of the cultural industry” (Flew 13).  
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The problem arises from the way in which the term itself is now increasingly used in 
an anthropological sense to describe aspects of everyday life. Flew argues that this 
development has its roots in the notion that culture (in this sense) is becoming an 
increasingly important part of everyday life, particularly with regard to consumption of 
goods and services – consumers are argued to use increasingly commodities to 
construct a personal identity, a process which Lash and Urry (Economies 61) call “the 
semiotisation of everyday life”. So,  
Culture is thus recast from a distinct sphere of social life to something 
that permeates everything, from the design of urban spaces, offices, 
means of transport and communication … to the promotional 
strategies of corporations and increasingly governments (Flew 2). 
Used in this sense, we might equally conclude that ‘everything is cultural’ and that the 
term is used in such a wide sense that it is impossible to assign it any actual meaning. 
 
Production Methods 
The importance of production methods to an understanding of the cultural industries 
was first identified by Adorno, who distinguished between those cultural industries 
that employ industrial technology and modes of organisation to produce and distribute 
cultural goods and services, which are themselves produced by largely traditional or 
pre-industrial means (such as books and records), and those where the cultural form is 
industrial (such as newspapers, films and television programmes) (see Garnham). 
It is often a combination of symbolic meaning and industrial-scale production methods 
that is understood to characterise the cultural industries (Garnham; Hesmondhalgh). 
This definition produces a list of what are often regarded as the ‘classic’ cultural 
industries, namely film, broadcasting, publishing and recorded music. Towse (Cultural 
Industries 170) describes the cultural industries as those which ‘mass-produce goods 
and services with sufficient artistic content to be considered creatively and culturally 
significant. The essential features are industrial-scale production combined with 
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cultural content’. Reviewing the cultural economics literature of the 1990s, Towse 
notes that as the ‘creative arts’ do not employ industrial-scale production methods, 
they are typically excluded from definitions of the cultural industries deployed by 
cultural economists.  
For Hesmondhalgh (The Cultural Industries 12) ‘the core cultural industries deal with 
the industrial production and circulation of texts (the production of social meaning) 
and are centrally reliant on the work of symbol creators’ (his term for artists). 
Hesmondhalgh’s list of core cultural industries therefore excludes the creative arts, but 
includes: advertising and marketing, broadcasting, film industries, internet industry, 
music industries: recording, publishing and live performance, print and publishing 
including books, video and computer games. For Hesmondhalgh the creative arts – 
including drama and visual arts – are ‘peripheral’ cultural industries; while they are 
centrally concerned with the production of texts (symbolic meaning), they use semi-
industrial or non-industrial methods of production. 
This understanding, based on industrial production methods, was the one on which 
UNESCO based its enquiry into the cultural industries in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. Significantly, UNESCO placed the issue of political and economic control of 
the technological and industrial production of culture central to the question of cultural 
development, particularly in developing countries. There is therefore a direct line 
between UNESCO’s early analysis of cultural industries and current debates around 
the notion of ‘cultural rights’ and the protection of cultural diversity (UNESCO, 
Cultural Industries; Convention on the protection). This is based on an understanding 
of the distinctiveness of cultural goods and markets and the consequences of market 
failure. 
In light of the above discussion it should be clear that we doubt whether the production 
method is itself a sufficient basis on which to define those activities that produce 
culture. It is evident that either industrial or artisan methods can produce culture. For 
example, a stage production of Don Giovanni and Losey’s film of Don Giovanni are 
simply different ways of presenting the same Mozart opera – defining cultural 
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industries by production method simply loses sight of what is being produced. 
However, it is the mass character of production that allows cultural industries to 
dominate consumption, and the structure and organisation of these industries that 
raises issues of ‘gatekeeping’ and control (Grant and Wood; Caves). Production 
methods don’t define what culture is, but are crucial for explaining why these 
industries must be considered part of cultural and not just economic policy.  
 
Culture and the Knowledge Economy 
The increased use of the term culture in the anthropologic sense discussed above, and 
the absorption of the cultural industries within the wider creative industries agenda, are 
both related to increased interest in the so-called ‘knowledge economy’. Analysis of 
the knowledge economy suggests that competitive advantage is increasingly derived 
from investment in intangibles, particularly information. Such information may be 
functional or scientific, but certain of the trends discussed above (e.g. a more 
sophisticated consumer demand) have led to suggestions that knowledge-intensity is 
an increasingly important competitive device in a wide range of consumer markets. 
One information set that, it is argued, increasingly underlies competitive advantage in 
such markets is the anthropologic type of cultural information discussed earlier. 
Much has been written on how the knowledge economy affects the cultural and 
creative sectors (Flew; Cunningham). But what is most relevant for present purposes is 
that increased interest in leveraging the economic potential of knowledge is clearly a 
further reason why the distinctive aspects of the cultural sector have been subsumed 
within the wider creative industries agenda – culture is now viewed as just one more 
‘knowledge economy asset’.  
The key problem, once again, is that discussed earlier – the failure to distinguish 
between cultural and other creative activities. This failure causes, in a policy sense, 
two problems. Firstly, it means that we lose the ability to measure the actual 
contribution that cultural (i.e. symbolic) goods make within the knowledge economy 
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context. For example, we do not know whether advertising or opera, both designated 
as ‘creative’ industries, has the more significant economic effect. More significantly, 
conflating culture with other creative activities again fails to recognise the distinctive 
aspect of symbolic culture. We now turn to address this issue. 
 
Cultural Distinctiveness 
Two factors define the distinctiveness of cultural products, one political/ideological, 
the other economic. These factors differentiate cultural goods from the wider set of 
creative industries and have important consequences for public policy towards the 
cultural industries. 
 
Symbolic Ideas and Freedom of Expression 
We have argued above that cultural products are distinctive from other creative 
activities because they are about the production and circulation of symbolic ideas. 
Cultural activities thus play a central role in the freedom of human expression, and this 
provides a direct link to questions of democracy. Enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, is the principle that every citizen should have the 
ability, through cultural participation, to freely develop their personality, and take part 
in the exchange of ideas (UNESCO, Cultural Rights 9). For this reason, we find 
ourselves agreeing with Dworkin’s proposition that the state, through cultural policy, 
has a role in ensuring that the “complexity and depth of forms of life” are open to the 
population now and for the future (Dworkin 232). This notion of cultural expression as 
a fundamental aspect of human freedom also underpins the UN Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO, 
Convention on the Protection). 
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Market Failure in the Market for Culture 
The distinctiveness of cultural goods also has an important economic dimension, 
central to which are arguments that cultural markets suffer from various types of 
“market failure”. From the argument that arts and culture create both private and non-
private values comes the notion that art and culture create benefits both for those who 
consume them directly (by attending a cultural event) and for those who do not attend. 
The notion that market failure affects cultural markets has a long lineage in the cultural 
economics literature (Throsby and Withers). The argument is essentially that, because 
of the existence of non-private benefits, the market mechanism working alone will fail 
to provide the amount of culture that society actually wishes to consume, and, 
importantly, is willing to pay for. This is the force of the recent statement by Baumol 
and Peacock, when they argue that “the arts confer benefits that people will experience 
whether they pay or not” (A Manifesto 2). O’Hagan expresses the same point as 
follows: 
While the arts do provide a service that can be bought and sold in the 
market place… they also provide another benefit, a non-private 
benefit that cannot be sold in the market place. (O’Hagan 22). 
Viewed from this perspective, market failure is a key justification for post-war state 
support for the arts – indeed, the establishment of Arts Council of Great Britain, can be 
considered as a form of ‘nationalisation’ of the cultural economy. While currently 
unfashionable in this post-socialist free market era, market failure arguments are none 
the less robust; at least robust enough for the UK government to support the UN 
Convention on Cultural Diversity in October 2005. It appears that a gritty 
acknowledgement of its shortcomings runs alongside an official acceptance of the free 
market principle. 
These two aspects of cultural distinctiveness are crucially interlinked. Both the 
production and consumption of culture are severely restricted if left entirely to the 
market, and the ensuing limitation of the field of cultural participation and expression 
represents a significant democratic deficit both for individuals and society as a whole.  
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Recognising these distinctive characteristics of culture provides us with clear grounds 
on which to distinguish cultural industries from the wider notion of creative industries. 
Cultural activities, whose primary purpose is to communicate symbolic ideas and 
meanings, play a central role in our ability to communicate and thus in the freedom of 
human expression. The same cannot be said of industries such as fashion design, 
whose prime purpose is to persuade people to buy certain types of clothing, or 
advertising, whose prime purpose is to simply persuade people to buy more. The key 
outputs of the cultural industry are not found in other parts of the creative industries, 
however defined, and it is this distinctive contribution that is lost by policy stances 
which subsume cultural creation within the wider creative agenda. 
 
Definitions in UK Policy 
Government interest in the ‘creative industries’ appears to stem from a belief that the 
UK has a strong track record in areas where individual creativity is important (in 
industries such as film and music), that the ‘creative industries’ have enjoyed high 
economic growth rates, and that this ‘creativity’ can be applied to the rest of the 
economy. 
As we have seen, the highly influential DCMS definition of creative industries is based 
on two of the concepts discussed above: creativity and intellectual property. Scottish 
Enterprise (SE) in its ‘Creative Industries Cluster Strategy’ also uses the DCMS 
definition. When defining ‘creative industries’, SE (Creativity and Enterprise 4) 
advances the notion that ‘creative industries are those in which creativity 
fundamentally is the enterprise’. This could include any industry, however, and the 
meaning of the ‘creative industries’ is, to say the least, difficult to pin down. It is 
clearly extremely difficult, on the basis of the definition supplied by SE, to know the 
extent to which these industries are ‘creative industries’ and thus to develop an 
appropriate set of policy responses. It may include those specified by SE but, if the 
criterion for entry is that ‘creativity fundamentally is the enterprise’, then, as discussed 
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above, we could equally well include a range of other industries (see also Bilton and 
Leary 50).  
The problem is that, while the cultural industries can be defined as those that generate 
symbolic meaning (as we have seen above), official definitions of the ‘creative 
industries’ make no reference to symbolic meaning and could involve any type of 
creative activity. Individual creativity could equally well include developing scientific 
innovations, yet industries that develop these are not typically included in definitions 
of the creative sector. The difficulty in identifying specific types of ‘individual 
creativity’ makes it very difficult to decide which industries are ‘creative’. Most 
importantly, in defining creative industries on the basis of creativity and intellectual 
property, the UK approach also fails to consider the nature of cultural creativity and 
so, as argued above, also loses sight of the distinctive public good contribution of 
culture. 
Significantly, the UK’s ‘knowledge economy’ approach contrasts strongly with the 
definitions of cultural goods and services and of cultural industries proposed by 
UNESCO (Convention on the Protection). These combine the concepts of creativity 
and intellectual property with a strong emphasis on the importance of symbolic 
meaning, which means that cultural goods ‘embody or convey cultural expressions, 




In short, why does this matter? Well definitions matter because they have implications 
for theory, policy and its practical application. These issues raise questions for cultural 
policy in the UK and elsewhere. Critical examination of the British government 
definition of creative industries reveals a lack of theoretical clarity. If the creative 
industries, by definition, have no cultural content, then we have to ask, is this an error, 
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or have the distinctive attributes of culture been purposely overlooked by the UK 
government in favour of a knowledge economy approach?  
It is hard to tell. But it was interesting to see the UK government supporting the UN 
Convention Protecting Cultural Diversity in October 2005. The Convention is founded 
on a definition of cultural goods and services developed with the advice of David 
Throsby, that has symbolic meaning at its heart. It is therefore in direct contradiction 
to the official UK creative industries definition. Was that a change of heart, or just a 
pragmatic vote for Britain’s economic interests? 
If the UK government does not recognise the distinctiveness of culture and cultural 
creativity, as the creative industries definition suggests, then does this also apply to 
government cultural policy? The creative industries agenda is one to which the UK 
Arts Councils and other cultural agencies are required to contribute. These agencies 
have intervened in the cultural economy for many years, but with cultural objectives. 
At a practical level, if not at a policy or rhetorical level, can these motivations be 
maintained or will they necessarily be over-ridden by economic concerns?  
On the one hand government interest in the creative industries has clearly benefitted 
some aspects of the arts through the prioritisation of support for artistic production. 
But alongside an acknowledgement of these gains, is the view that in the longer run 
culture may be being repositioned and with it the established arguments for cultural 
funding. 
If the essence of culture is the production and circulation of symbolic meaning or ideas 
– then there is a clear link to questions of democracy. The right to develop ourselves 
through cultural expression and participation are recognised as fundamental human 
rights. From this recognition flows a clear role for government cultural policy. But this 
is not acknowledged or addressed by the creative industries paradigm. 
Similarly the generation and communication of ideas within society is arguably 
restricted if left entirely to the market. Market failure has been an important 
justification of government support for the arts in post war Britain. The cultural 
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industries concept took this on, arguing for a cultural policy for industry or, 
alternatively, an industrial policy informed by cultural objectives. However the 
creative industries agenda ignores this. In our view, without an acceptance of cultural 
distinctiveness the whole context in which government support is debated and assessed 
is altered and an understanding of the public benefits of culture, those that cannot be 
captured by markets, may be diminished. 
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Methodology and Ideology in the Evaluation of Cultural 
Investments 
Roy Boyne1




The social impact of cultural institutions, their programmes and events is an imprecise 
concept, used in multiple ways by government agencies, cultural institutions, and 
researchers (AEA Consulting). At least in the UK,2 there has been a growing tendency 
to link cultural sector usage of the term, social impact, to questions of social exclusion 
(Policy Action Team Ten; DCMS, Libraries; Social Exclusion Unit, Preventing), but 
it is clear that the question of impact goes beyond this. The description and analysis of 
the current state of social impact knowledge within the cultural field must begin from 
the following four basic structural features: 
1. There is no benchmark classification (Boyne, “Classification”) of cultural 
institutions, their programmes and events.3 
                                                                                          
1  I must thank ITI-RI of the Marc Bloch University, Strasbourg, for providing me with the space and 
time to develop this work and what comes after it. 
2  This is the first publication deriving from a comparative research project, sponsored by the Durham 
University Office of the Partnership Venture Fund and Culture North East. The project aims to 
assess current methodological developments in cultural evaluation, and to develop some French 
and German case studies for comparative purposes. 
3  There is some work in the European context which is relevant. The Eurobarometer survey of 
cultural participation in 2002 appears to have been a ‘one-off’ and sought very little discrimination 
in its broad categories. Allin reports in 2004 on a serious attempt by European statisticians to work 
on this issue in the late 1990s, but having agreed a framework the problem was they had no 
substantive statistics to illustrate its utility, and the project ended without a future strategy partly 
due to a lack of political support. He also notes progress being made within the Eurostat sysem by 
the Audio-Visual Statistics Working Group. Madden (“International Comparisons”) provides a 
survey of current issues, and a checklist for cross-national comparison work. David Coish (“Census 
metropolitan”) has also done useful work on the culture industries for Statistics Canada. Finally, it 
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2. There is no reference list of the social groups impacted upon, either potentially 
or actually, by the cultural sector. 
3. Paradigmatic clarity with respect to the political, social and psychological 
processes which structure the sector’s engagement with and impact upon social 
groups and their members does not exist. 
4. There is no clear understanding of the permanence, duration or fragility of the 
social impact of cultural institutions and events. 
Individual cultural institutions have collected information about their own particular 
operations, sometimes for a number of years, but aggregation of this data is 
substantially beyond present methodological and resource capacities. In the UK, there 
have been five or so serious general studies (as opposed to project specific 
evaluations) of the social impact of cultural institutions and events (Matarasso; 
Hooper-Greenhill et al., Museums and Social Inclusion and A Catalyst for Change; 
Bryson et al.; Long et al.). There is scattered work in other places, including California 
(Mataraza et al.), Canada (see Brault), and Australia (Winchester, Australian Expert 
Group). 
It might seem surprising that the UK government’s drive, over the last 25 years of 
public sector review, to cut costs, reduce wastage, spend wisely where it is needed, and 
improve accountability, exemplified by its 1999 Best Value Local Government Act, 
has not led as yet to a clear general statement of assumptions concerning the social 
impact of cultural institutions and events. It is less surprising that this is so elsewhere 
in the world, since the UK has tended to lead the way in relation to the rationalisation 
and audit of public expenditure.4 The outcome of further development there is likely to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
might be noted that the California economic impact study refers to more that 650 separate types of 
creative industry organisation. (Mataraza et al. 18) 
4  Part of the reason for this may be the remaining dominance outside the UK of a general ideology 
(frequently trespassed against, it is sure) which tends to link artistic excellence (valued for its own 
sake) with autonomous cultural institutions. Thus the US National Endownment for the Arts 
phrases its current five year strategy as follows: ‘The National Endowment for the Arts enriches 
our Nation and its diverse cultural heritage by supporting works of artistic excellence, advancing 
learning in the arts, and strengthening the arts in communities throughout the country.’ While the 
Japanese Ministry for Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) is similarly 
focused on its own missions, which include, ‘to work to develop an environment that enables artists 
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emerge in relation to the dialogue between the UK Arts Council’s 1980s negotiating 
position that the prime social impact of cultural institutions and events is economic, 
and the late 1990s response, summarised by Matarasso (Use or Ornament?), which 
emphasised the many ways that cultural institutions and events can form, shape and 
enhance individuals and their communities. 
This was indeed the UK dialogue in 1997 when the new government Department of 
Culture, Media and Sport was formed, and when the national Museums, Libraries and 
Archives Council was formed three years later. There is as yet little sign of its 
transcendence – at least in the UK – but it is worth noting that both sides of the 
dialogue – between, as it were, two virtual positions within the command structure of 
the cultural sector – ground the value of cultural events and institutions outside of the 
field of culture itself; these institutions and events are reviewed and called upon to 
review themselves in economic and community terms, even if with intermittent 
reluctance on their part.5 As an important aside, it is important to recognise that both 
sides of this virtual debate simultaneously take for granted and ignore the 
commitments to the intrinsic values internal to cultural forms such as painting, 
sculpture, literature, architecture, music, dance, film and theatre which are essential to 
the existence and reproduction of the cultural field. To employ an organic metaphor, it 
is as if the institutions of cultural governance are only seriously interested in what the 
sector can do, not in how it is. Should this continue for a further substantial period, it is 
probable that the outcome will be a degree of loss, and that an unintended consequence 
of the present situation, whereby the only form of examination of the operative 
commitments to the intrinsic and constitutive values of the cultural field is through the 
current form of public management, will be that the sector is able to do less.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
and art organizations to conduct freely creative activities, and to make these cultural activities 
accessible to all people’. The Annual MEXT White Paper has not addressed Culture and the Arts 
directly since 1993 – in major policy terms, the Japanese state has allowed the sector to maintain its 
balance of intrinsic artistic values and consequent functioning contribution to national and 
community agenda.  
5  The defence of curatorial autonomy at the Baltic modern art museum in Newcastle upon Tyne, for 
example, presented from some quarters in terms of a logic of contemporary art, can be seen as 
constituting a rejection of the ruling economic and social impact paradigm. 
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At the level of the institutions and events themselves therefore, there has been an 
increase in the pressure to adopt the input-output paradigm, and to measure, review 
and evaluate in its terms. There has been an associated increase in initiatives to 
improve results through such means as audience development (McCarthy et al., A New 
Framework; Morton Smythe), collaborative projects, and outreach work. It is arguable 
that illustrating this work through case studies and descriptive accounts of participant 
reaction is an essential, if not the only, way to communicate what is being done. It is 
understandable although disappointing that the UK Audit Commission’s 2005 work on 
the evaluation of local authority cultural and related services, often referred to as the 
‘Culture Block’, appeared to give no thought whatsoever to qualitative aspects of 
evaluation, even though they clearly figure in individual inspections.6 The Audit 
Commission, like the scorpion, is what it is. Its demand is that measurement is 
essential to ensure and demonstrate success.  
What the current audit, review and management demands omit, however, is something 
really quite crucial in their own terms. Measured success matters because it 
communicates something important to a particular audience – the robust presence of 
an accountability regime, confirming verifiable excellence at best, admitted failure at 
worst. The governance function does not, of course, end with the receipt of 
measurements. Excellence must be announced, failure must be analysed and corrected. 
This too is part of the disposition to accountability. At this point graphic but reliable 
narrative accounts are needed. Their classic vehicles are the press release and the 
Inspectorate report. To cut a long story short – these qualitative measures, presented to 
the appropriate standard, should have been part of the measurement process from the 
beginning. The two key questions at the nodes of judgement (including, through the 
media, by the public) are, ‘We can see the figures, but what is it really like?’ and ‘We 
can see that these stories are wonderful and will stand up, but how are the figures?’. 
                                                                                          
6  See, for example, the Best Value Review of Shropshire Museum Services in 2001 (Audit 
Commission, Best Value Inspection). The pleasure expressed there by the two individual inspectors 
in the quality of the collections is in sharp contrast to the lack of such interest in the 2005 
consultation process on performance indicators for the cultural field. (Audit Commission, CPA 
Service Assessment). There is a significant contrast (and perhaps this is to labour the point) between 
Audit Commission evaluation demands and the advice given in well-regarded evaluation ‘toolkits’ 
(for example, Moriarty; Jackson).  
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This is why the Audit Commission’s neglect of the relationship between quantitative 
and qualitative measurement holds down the quality7 of its work.  
It is often very sound strategy to look for a strategy that avoids the worst of both 
worlds. But it does seem that, wise counsel though that last statement might be, the 
search is on for the one formula that will turn experiential narratives into solid 
evidence and that will add an axiological dimension to percentages, correlations and 
rank ordering. There are five ways in which such a leap might be produced: 
• Personal testimony could be ground between hard boards to leave a residue 
which cannot be denied or ignored. This is not necessarily a model of the 
interrogation or deep security clearance kind, since it more typically arises out 
of media amplification processes working on individual stories. The question is 
whether the area of qualitative methodology could be legitimately extended to 
produce comparable outcomes and therefore increase impact. The simple 
technique that springs to mind is to find the stories and keep telling them, but 
should there not be a professional sensibility behind that impulse? 
• Methodological breakthroughs in the field of culture research perhaps 
comparable to the development in 1972 of the statistical method of ‘partial 
liklihood’ in the health care field, which allowed rigorous estimation of hazard 
in relation to altering circumstances and over time. However, the signs here are 
not propitious. The International Statistics Institute does not have a cultural 
statistics sub-section, indeed its interest in such applied areas seems relatively 
weak. The most promising area for the future may be the joint work of 
UNESCO, OECD and Eurostat, but the UNESCO Institute of Statistics 
programme to 2007 is centred on work to agree international categories for 
cultural statistics, and appears to have no ‘blue skies’ aspect at all.  
                                                                                          
7  For some helpful reflections on statistics, contextualisation and quality, see Allin. 
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• Operational transcendence of the two critical dichotomies8 (the first in 
evaluation methodology; the second with respect to the strategic logics of the 
cultural institutions) 
□ Quantitative ~ Qualitative 
□ Goal-focused ~ Value-focused 
but it needs to be recognised that this may practically amount to a change of 
language and assumptions. 
• An innovation in the defining assumptions of cultural evaluation, which might 
have happened, but probably did not, with Pierre Bourdieu’s development of 
the concept of cultural capital – the message there being that finding a new 
language is relatively easy; the hard part is getting it accepted. To take an 
example, the recognition of the importance in cultural research of a generational 
time-scale is widespread, yet its strategic space within the cultural field is weak. 
• A collective re-working of the specific objects of the cultural research process 
led from within the cultural institutions themselves. 
Proceeding from that last bullet point, what kinds of impacts, social and economic, 
could the cultural research mechanism measure and describe? We can get a pretty 
good picture by integrating recent Californian and Canadian material with the work of 
Matarasso and others. The categories of impact and output which form the basis for 
what may be claimed to emerge from the work of cultural institutions (both intrinsic 
and applied) are as follows:  
• personal development of skills, vision and motivation, enabling 
□ increase in individual employability 
                                                                                          
8  There are theoretical resources available, such as attempts to reconceptualise, to emphasise its 
defining realism, the overall research paradigm which contains the quantitative-qualitative 
distinction (Thorleif); and the possibility certainly exists of the compatibility of the Frankfurt 
School critique of instrumentalism with a critique of religion, thus at least allowing the possibility 
of a transcending critique of both instrumentalism and ‘art for art’s sake’ immanence at the same 
time (Adorno is a place to start, but there is a huge literature bearing on the question whether 
demands which derive from principles of efficiency and management are inimical to creativity and 
imagination). 
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□ alleviation of some mental health conditions, and palliative strategies to 
work alongside serious and long-term medical treatment 
□ reduction in youth crime and alienation 
□ loyalty to shared and emerging values 
□ enjoyment of the arts for their own sake 
□ realisation of the life-long power of education, and self-determination to 
participate in further and higher education 
□ recognition of environmental responsibilities  
□ emergence of a reflexive approach to self, and a constructively critical 
approach to others 
• community cohesion, esteem, empowerment and self-development 
□ enhancement of local and regional identity 
□ positive reflections of cultural diversity 
□ project-based employment and involvement 
□ entrepreneurship in the creative industries and elsewhere. 
Before we engage with the methodological issues which arise in the area of social 
impact study, it is important to realise that the rigorous estimation of social impact is 
not the only model which is of importance for the cultural sector. No matter how 
defendable data might be, it will not serve any of the purposes and values of the 
cultural sector unless it is well-disseminated and then received non-prejudicially. For 
this reason, and as a check for cross-matching with the social impact work, it will be 
necessary to digress into the area of arts advocacy, and to consider two recent 
examples. 
For the 2004 California Economic Impact of the Arts study, 3,405 organisations were 
included (it has, of course, to be borne in mind that California is the world’s fifth 
largest economy). The top 200 in revenue terms were fully surveyed, the remainder 
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were statistically sampled. As the report explains, economic impact was calculated by 
taking the direct expenditures within the arts sector and adding a multiplier. When 
employees spend their salaries on household needs and bills, this creates economic 
activity in the areas concerned. Arts bodies buy a huge range of material and services 
which also creates economic activity. This derived economic activity is scaled up 
using the agreed multiplier (to take account of the subsequent economic activity due to 
these expenditures), and the aggregate sum is added to the total direct spending of all 
arts organizations. This provides the estimated total economic impact of the sector.  
The methodology is standard in public sector accounting and review. In the 
Californian case, it yields an annual economic impact figure for organization 
expenditures of 3.5 billion dollars, and this is not the end of the story. To be added to 
this is the figure, similarly derived, for audience spending, which is shown to be 
2 billion dollars. The combined total of 5.5 billion dollars is the measurement of the 
economic impact annually of the not-for-profit arts sector in California, and it affirms 
its presence and significance within the state and national context. Comparable work is 
done for the numbers of jobs represented by all this activity. The Study then breaks 
down the sub-sectors of the activity by arts area and by geographic region to provide 
details of sub-regional and sub-sector activity. The Study, having established the 
absolute scale of the sector proceeds to explore its importance in two further basic 
areas: quality of life and education. In the former, 2700 survey forms were distilled 
into Table 1. 
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Table 1: Quality of life factors ranked in importance by arts audiences 
 
Source: Mataraza 72. 
As can be detected, the respondents were asked to rank the importance of the arts 
sector on a scale of 1 (weak) to 10 (strong). To the economic weight, then, is added a 
measure of public opinion. The final descriptive point to be made about the Study 
concerns its demonstration of the value of the arts, both economically and non-
economically in primary education. It is made a significant area, with economic impact 
toward 700 million dollars annually, and strong indication of its education use and 
importance. 
The California study follows a basic arts advocacy model. Its simple message is ‘This 
is what we do. It’s big and important on lots of levels. Please continue to support us.’ 
The study in itself creates further interest in the arts. It is not a passive review, or an 
obedient evaluation. It very clearly, however, was a great deal of work. The previous 
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report of this form had been ten years previously. Alongside this can be set the 2004 
Canada Council Advocacy Resource Kit.9 The important headings from this are: 
• ‘Boxed’ quotations as ‘evidence’. 
• Provision of web addresses where further information can be accessed. 
• Why advocate – a conversational approach which exemplifies the approach – 
get the arts into the consciousness of decision-makers. 
• What to advocate 
□ Size 
□ Success 
□ International competitiveness and comparability 
□ Presence of major figures, events, achievements 
□ Role in new technology 
□ Importance for Canadian identity. 
• Why and how to take some personal responsibility and become an advocate – 
with many focused suggestions about how to do this (most are internet-based), 
and advice specifically for artists as well as enthusiasts for the sector generally. 
• Distinction between advocacy and lobbying. The former does not aim to 
influence decisions, but to raise awareness and understanding of the sector as a 
whole. 
• Key messages (with examples and references to consult) on community, 
diversity/minority cultures, participation, economic contribution, Canadian 
identity, relevance for creative thinking/problem-solving, and on young people 
and their positive development – all this reinforced in a later more detailed 
section. 
                                                                                          
9  This is not necessarily a pristine model of its kind, but while lacking a degree of organisation, it is 
comprehensive, and contains its own instructions (how to advocate) for further dissemination. 
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• Advice for Arts and Culture Managers, also Board members, including an Arts 
Advocacy Self-Assessment Tool. 
• Detailed, tabulated economic activity facts and figures broken down by 
province and by cultural sub-sector. 
• Culture sector employment facts, broken down by region and sector. 
• Focus on the culture industries: publishing, film, sound, broadcasting, 
multimedia, international trade figures for culture goods, heritage. 
• Current challenges, stories, issues. 
• Extended discussions of performing arts highlights. 
The arts advocacy model promises strength in the areas of dissemination and 
mobilisation. It deserves further study through comparative analysis of campaign 
effectiveness in the cultural field, both sectorally and regionally/nationally. On the 
other hand, the area of social impact studies promises rigour and evidence. Both are 
interested in the social impact of cultural investment, and methodological deficits will 
damage both. 
As Sara Selwood (“The politics of data”) shows, since at least the early 1990s10 the 
UK cultural sector has been directed to contribute to economic growth and reduce 
social exclusion. Cultural provision has been measured by its promotion of access to 
everyone, and subjected to monitoring and evaluation. However, funding decisions 
were based not on the evidence of outcomes achieved, but on the expectation that they 
will be achieved, and there has been growing realisation that proving the expected 
outcomes is not easy. In the 2003 DCMS Research Strategy, existing research methods 
are subjected to criticism: as far as social impacts are concerned, neither robust 
evidence nor systematic data has been produced. In the circumstances, it was not 
                                                                                          
10  From the beginning of the 1990s as access came to be a key issue, data collection would appear to 
demonstrate that people from all social sectors were participating in the results of cultural 
investment. The 1991 omnibus survey done by the Arts Council of Great Britain National Arts and 
Media Strategy was based on a sample of 7,919 people in the UK. Other surveys were produced 
(Selwood). 
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surprising that interest emerged in the possibilities for other kinds of evaluation that 
might deal differently with economic, educational and social impact. The hope, as 
mentioned earlier, was for a robust qualitative methodology. Selwood lists interviews, 
reflections, mind mapping of visitors, focus groups, social audit, case studies, project 
evaluations, critical incident techniques, organisational surveys, and public surveys. 
The conclusion that the debate edged towards was that such a trawl of the available 
qualitative methodologies did not promise a great deal, and it is at this point that the 
2004 Holden paper is published by Demos. His argument was that a new discourse is 
needed.11
This new discourse would need to go beyond Matarasso’s intuitionism. Despite the 
apparent rationality of his planning and performance indicator model, the fact that not 
even flawed processes and poor data looked to be supporting claims made (see 
Merli)12 saw the influence of his work waning after five years or so. Holden, no doubt 
riding the same wave as the DCMS Minister, Chris Smith, when he warned in 2003 
that an obsession with impact risks ignoring “the fundamental life force of the cultural 
activity that gives rise to educational or economic value in the first place”. So Holden 
looks to take us beyond evidence-based decision making in the field of culture. His 
notion of cultural value would create a new framework for cultural funding, 
recognising the affective side of cultural experience as well as measuring what is 
properly quantifiable, and also accepting the irreducibility of culture as part of social 
structure. His argument is that culture comes to be seen as something like health, an 
area which does not need to legitimate itself. Its constituent parts would include 
                                                                                          
11  Selwood did make the point that keeping the field of methodology and evidence disorganised might 
be an optimum solution for the cultural sector. 
12  The answers to the following questions about Matarasso’s work are not clear: What did his 
research measure? Did he lead his 513 respondents? Was it ever possible for him to use a control 
group? Could he measure the robustness of the social impacts he claimed? Why did he not 
systematically ask his respondents, across the 60 projects, if they were participants in the arts? Is 
participation a factor in explaining the 75% non-return rate of questionnaires? Why did he neglect 
to discuss adequately negative responses? If his sample was not representative, how could his 
‘findings’ be extrapolated to the wider society? Are none of his claimed fifty impacts measurable? 
(see Merli). 
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quality, plurality, community, creativity.13 For Holden, the danger is that the emphasis 
on measurement and evaluation – which focuses on what cultural activity causes rather 
than on what it consists of and expresses – will lead us to institutionalise cultural 
mediocrity.  
It is interesting that some values are given more weight than others. Thus there is little 
recognition of the possibility of a cultural multiplier which might operate in the same 
way as the economic multiplier, which we saw above in the Californian report. Recent 
work on derivatives may have some relevance for new thinking. In Holden’s thinking 
about a new framework for understanding cultural value and for relocating the funding 
process, he does look to widen the value range (learning from anthropology, for 
example), to incorporate non-economic values, and to find a language which allows 
the discussion of historical, social, symbolic, aesthetic and spiritual values. From 
environmentalism he draws out the importance of duty of care, and system resilience 
plus diversity and creativity. This focus here on the structural pre-conditions of 
continuing community well-being links to debates in accounting which have drawn 
attention to desirability of explicating the resource base that makes profits possible 
(and also to the dangers attendant on this, as can perhaps be seen in the Enron case, 
where the other in the ceteris paribus assumption is accorded perhaps undue weight). 
Holden does seem to think that we need to find ways to recognise why people value 
culture, and we may need a more powerful rhetoric of the creation of values. A 
formula might be something like: explicate the constituent values, relate this to social 
resilience, enhance conceptions of professional judgement, focus on value creation 
systemically, and enhance the public interest in the reproduction of cultural creativity.  
Michelle Reeves (Measuring) suggested that social impact research in the cultural 
sector has the following needs: 
                                                                                          
13  Holden does not deal with the arguments between the areas of public spending which have no need 
for legitimation (ie all of them!) but must still argue their case in the Government spending round. 
This may show that his wish to transcend methodological debate will not be fulfilled. 
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• Consistent use of key terms.  
• Evaluation consciousness. 
• Higher level of methodological rigour.  
• Bi-polarity: recognising both quantitative and qualitative information.  
• Short-, medium-, and long-term evaluation horizons. 
• Enhanced comparability between projects and organisations. 
But there is one sense in which such lists (and the work on which this interpretation is 
based is careful and comprehensive) may appear to miss the extraordinarily important 
distinction between measuring social impact and creating it. Where social impact is a 
priority (which need not be so for every funded cultural initiative!), measurement of 
particular social impacts is made easier, if the appropriate evaluation tools are 
constructed as part of the integral project design right from the beginning. At this first 
stage of project creation, one might go further and say that the intended audience 
needs to be intensely studied, and that the project and its intended outcomes should be 
substantially defined by that study (see AEA Consulting). 
 
Postscript: Towards Global Horizons 
In the vision of globalisation presented by such thinkers as Benjamin Barber and 
Antonio Negri (see Boyne, “Cinema”), the cultural field is subject to two 
countervailing tendencies. First, there is a set of forces which threaten the de-
differentiation of the cultural field. Thus, on the one hand, the rationalising and 
enveloping administrative logics of contemporary political, legal and economic 
structures may be seen as having the potential for further evolution. Whether the 
sources of this development are politically led, as may have been the case with the 
spreading doctrine of audit and accountability, or whether they are juridically led as 
new situations test the meaning of constitutions and existing law, or whether they are 
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economically driven as the search for value means a continual striving to subordinate 
everything possible to the rule of the market, a systems prediction of the outcome of 
these tendencies – were they untrammelled – could be further homogenization and 
instrumentalisation of the cultural field. Second, however, the operational continuity of 
mass systems is dependent on local trust and loyalties. Heightened performance 
measured against global parameters in areas like output, health, education, crime 
prevention, and so on, are also underpinned by positive subject formation at the local 
level. This latter, seen functionally, at least, requires a substantial measure of cultural 
continuity and perceived fairness of cultural provision. Thus it is that the forces of 
cultural de-differentiation and cultural preservation are in tension. This is, of course, a 
tension which is far from fully described here, and has other dimensions: regional 
competition and ethnic diversity to name just two of them. The overall point, however, 
is that globalising tendencies may be seen as a factor in the development of cultural 
evaluation practice. The question of whether to embrace social impact methodology on 
a regional or national scale, or even to pilot it on a trial basis, may be wound up with 
perceptions of what this might appear to signal to a variety of audiences: local, 
regional, national, international. It is even possible to think that the further 
development of evaluation methodology for the cultural field is not simply a question 
of scientific work, but also has ethical ramifications, since such research may be 
perceived to contribute to the future devaluation of culture in itself. 
Despite these arguments against the development and spread of the audit and 
accountability problematic across the cultural field, it remains the case, seen from a 
sociological point of view, that public spending on culture in any context requires in 
the long term robust legitimation. Unless a new language of cultural entitlement is 
learnt, or unless the roots of the public cultural funding ‘which has always been 
provided’ are absolutely secure, the utilitarian impulse behind social impact 
methodology is going to be irresistible. This does, finally, make one rather large 
assumption, which is that the methodology can be developed further to provide a solid 
foundation for at least that minimal level of public provision that would secure general 
assent in some form. The hope and expectation will be that it can go much further and 
Roy Boyne 68
demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that cultural investment – in well-maintained 
and access-friendly libraries, parks, sports facilities, museums, exhibitions, events, 
concert halls, and theatres … – has substantial and desirable social impact.  
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Copyright and Digital Copying Technology 
A Critical Introduction to the Economic Literature with Reference to the British 
and German Record Industries 
Christian Handke 





Copyright plays a pivotal role in the contemporary cultural industries. It applies to 
virtually all cultural creations that have been published over the last five to ten 
decades.1 It defines who is entitled to reproduce a protected creative work, who may 
make it available to the public and who may modify it. This has obvious implications 
for the commercial use of creative works and ultimately for who gets to consume 
them. It does not get much more central than this.  
According to the seminal European Directive on copyright in the information society 
(DIR 2001/29/EC), the official aim of copyright is to promote innovation and 
creativity in the regulated sector2. Over the last years, however, much of the copyright 
regime has been put into question. Right holders have found it difficult to enforce their 
exclusive rights to digitally captured copyrighted works. Many users circumvent 
copyrights on the Internet or by forwarding copies of protected works on CD-Rs and 
                                                 
1  Copyright applies automatically and without prior test of the quality of an original publication. The 
duration is harmonised among EU member states to cover 70 years after the death of the author or 
50 years after the publication date for performers’ ‘related rights’. 
2  With this Directive, the EU has begun to regulate central issues of copyright (especially relating to 
the digital environment) on the supra-national Union level. The Directive does not mention the 
protection of certain ‘natural rights’ of authors to the works they created that are an additional 
justification for copyright in much of continental Europe.  
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DVDs to third parties. A surge in unauthorised copying3 has probably been the most 
significant recent development in the markets for music. Industry representatives have 
claimed that they lose billions each year in the process. This new wave of unauthorised 
copying is also starting to affect the markets for television broadcasts and feature 
films. Many regard unauthorised copying via the Internet or CD-burners to pose a 
threat to commercial suppliers of reproducible cultural works generally unless 
restrictions are imposed. The response in most major markets has been to bring 
copyright extensions under way and to increase investments into enforcement 
measures.  
These measures are of strategic importance for the way cultural works will be 
incorporated into new digital information networks. Copyright is a cornerstone of the 
cultural industries as we know them. Nevertheless, there remain unsettling gaps in our 
knowledge of the extent to which copyright safeguards innovation and creativity in 
practice, and how it affects the cultural industries otherwise. 
In the context of a substantial shift in the copyright regime, it is hardly satisfactory to 
take copyright for granted. In order to understand recent developments in the cultural 
industries, we need to take account of changes to the copyright regime. This holds for 
researchers as well as policy makers. The purpose of this paper is to link the discourse 
on cultural industries presented in this volume with some of the economic literature on 
copyright. It attempts to provide an introduction to fundamental arguments and 
particularly pressing questions. In so doing, it draws on several forthcoming 
publications on the economics of copyright and the record industry (co-)authored by 
the author of this article.4 Economists seem to have taken the lead regarding empirical 
                                                 
3  In the long-run, file-sharing is probably the more fundamental challenge to the copyright regime 
and established business models. File-sharing has received a lot more attention in the economic 
literature. For convenience, unauthorised copying and file-sharing are sometimes used 
interchangeably below. 
4  Ch. Handke, P. Stepan and R. Towse, “Development of the Economics of Copyright”, Handbook 
on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, ed. J. Drexl (München: Max-Planck-Institut für 
Geistiges Eigentum, Wettbewerbs- und Steuerrecht, forthcoming).  
 Ch. Handke, “Plain Destruction or Creative Destruction? Copyright Erosion and the Evolution of 
the Record Industry”, Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues 3.2 (December 2006): 29-
51.  
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contributions to the debate. They are reasonably well equipped to promote our 
understanding of copyright in many respects. Nevertheless, as will be apparent below, 
many pressing questions relating to the copyright regime and its consequences 
probably require greater input by specialists on the cultural industries and from other 
academic disciplines.5
There seem to be two broad and salient gaps in much of the economic literature. One 
is that several idiosyncrasies of the cultural industries – the peculiar incentive structure 
of creators, the current industry structure and issues of competition, as well as broader 
technological changes – seem to receive little attention in economic studies of 
unauthorised copying. The other is that empirical evidence on the effect of 
unauthorised copying (e.g. via file-sharing networks) on consumers’ interests has 
received little attention. 
Section two introduces the example of the record industry and some of its relevant 
economic characteristics. The record industry serves well to illustrate the apparent 
relevance of copyright. A surge in unauthorised copying notoriously coincides with 
falling turnover in most major markets for authorised copies of sound recordings. This 
development has provided an important impetus to a series of copyright reforms and 
an intense debate on the future of the copyright regime more generally. 
Section three presents a broad-brush account of the economic understanding of 
copyright. It comes out clearly in this literature that simple slogans such as “you would 
not steal a chocolate bar, so do not steal cultural works” are unlikely to provide 
sustainable guidelines. Instead, the theoretical literature evokes trade-offs between 
competing ends. From this perspective, a set of reasonably well defined empirical 
                                                                                                                                                        
 Ch. Handke, Wachstum gegen den Trend – Grundlegende Ergebnisse der VUT-Mitglieder-
befragung 2005 unter kleinen und mittleren Tonträgerunternehmen, online, 16 January 2006, 
available http://www.vut-online.de/studie_wachstum_gegen_den_trend_-_vut.pdf.  
 Ch. Handke, “Bad for Universal – but Universally Bad? The Uneven Effects of the Current Crisis 
in the German Phonogram Industry”, RECIDA Working Paper 9 (2005). 
5  Regarding the music industry, the interested reader will find a useful, broader introduction to 
copyright from the perspectives of various disciplines in Frith and Marshall (eds.), Music and 
Copyright, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003). 
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questions need to be addressed in order to determine whether increasing levels of 
unauthorised copying justify a strengthening of the copyright regime. 
Section four points out two remaining gaps in the research agenda on unauthorised 
copying and the record industry. This section refers back to the idiosyncratic 
characteristics of the record industry introduced in section two and attempts to develop 
links to the literature on file-sharing. The basic point is that the assessment might be 
incomplete if the focus remains on the industry at large, rather than allowing for 
consumers’ interests and divergent interests among different types of producers to 
enter the analysis. 
Section five reviews some data with relevance to consumers’ interests and divergent 
interests among suppliers. For what this first glimpse at some of the evidence is worth, 
the findings seem at odds with frequently made assumptions regarding the effects of 
unauthorised copying. It goes to show that in spite of falling revenues, only very 
limited – if any – adverse developments on the supply side are apparent. The paper 
concludes by suggesting several topics for further research. 
 
The Record Industry and Unauthorised Copying 
The record industry has become emblematic in the debate on reforming copyright. 
This is due to two roughly simultaneous events. First, a surge in unauthorised copying 
via CD-burners and file-sharing networks has occurred. What this means is that users 
enjoyed an unprecedented catalogue of works at their disposal at comparatively 
minuscule costs and without compensation to right holders. The record industry was 
affected as the first of the traditional cultural industries.6 Second, the record industry 
has reported a worldwide recession in the market for phonograms (International 
Federation of the Phonographic Industry [IFPI]). According to many, there is a causal 
link between a greater intensity of unauthorised copying and falling sales. The 
                                                 
6  The software industry has had this problem from the moment it started serving a mass market. 
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example of the record industry has inspired highly politicised debates on copyright 
reforms.  
The prevailing notion is that something needs to be done. Legislators throughout the 
major markets have extended the scope (and sometimes the duration) of copyright 
entitlements. Important copyright owners have lobbied for such extensions. Many also 
invested in enforcement measures including technical measures such as Digital Rights 
Management (DRM), ran awareness campaigns and filed suits against downloaders. 
As it is, copyright reforms will affect all types of protected works. They do not only 
aim to revert recent dramatic developments in the record industry. They will also set 
the rules under which other types of copyrighted, creative works enter the digital 
realm. 
The following section addresses some basic economic characteristics of the record 
industry, many of which they share with other cultural industries and which seem of 
particular relevance in the debate on reforming copyright. 
 
Basic Economic Characteristics of the Record Industry 
The record industry produces and commercialises sound recordings, mainly of musical 
performances. Media technologies that allow to store, reproduce, distribute and 
consume sound enable them to do so. The focus of this paper is on the primary market 
for records, in which copies of recordings are sold to end-consumers. 
The record industry shares several basic characteristics with other typical cultural or 
creative industries (cf. Caves 2000). The cultural goods and services marketed are 
highly differentiated and so are the skills of creators. Suppliers face uncertain demand 
conditions especially for new creations and have to deal with great risks. Creative 
workers are often self-motivated. Their production decisions cannot always be 
explained by a rational maximisation of pecuniary rewards alone (cf. Frey; Caves; 
Throsby; Towse, Creativity, Incentive and Reward) and many create value as more or 
less unpaid amateurs (cf. Brosio). Furthermore, recordings are durable and 
 
Christian Handke 76
reproducible information goods that cannot easily be turned into exclusive private 
property. Copyright can in large parts be understood as a measure to alleviate the 
problem associated with the provision of such ‘public goods’ by private suppliers. This 
point will be developed further in section three. Copyright is another uniting feature of 
the cultural industries. It automatically applies to the vast majority of new 
publications. 
The contemporary record industry is of general interest because it clearly displays 
several trends throughout the cultural and creative industries. First, the record industry 
has grown substantially over much of the 1980s and 1990s (for a time-series of 
turnover in the UK and Germany, see figure 2). More recently, the data published by 
industry lead-bodies suggests that this expansion has come to an end and made way for 
a recession that is particularly pronounced in Germany (British Phonographic Industry 
[BPI], Statistical Handbook 2006; Bundesverband der Phonographischen Wirtschaft 
[BV Phono]). Second, the record industry has a long history as a truly global industry 
in which multinational firms distribute media content in virtually identical form 
worldwide (e.g. Malm and Wallis; Negus; Towse, Cultural Economics).7  
Yet, this global aspect of the record industry is only one of its aspects because, third, it 
exhibits a polarised industry structure. On the one hand, a handful of relatively large 
multinational record companies – the so-called ‘majors’ – account for around three 
quarters of the world market and cover most aspects of the value chain in-house 
(IFPI). At the moment, these majors are Universal Music, SonyBMG, Warner Music 
and EMI. These companies excel especially in international distribution and provide 
related services even to many of their smaller competitors. The other extreme is found 
in the creation of musical recordings. This occurs in a multitude of small 
organisational units. Creators and intermediary firms such as record companies form 
temporary exclusive cooperation agreements (e.g. a ‘record deal’). A vast number of 
smaller record companies – with or without links to the major actors – create a middle 
                                                 
7  The integration of an important part of the record industry does not mean that there is no scope for 
local traditions, styles and trends, however. In Britain and Germany about half of the market value 
is comprised of “domestic repertoire” (47% and 48% in 2003 respectively) according to the IFPI 
(157). 
 
Copyright and Digital Copying Technology 77
layer between the two extremes of multinational corporations and small creative 
projects. Locally operating small, independent companies seem to have an advantage 
in niche markets and in the discovery and development of new creative projects, new 
styles and trends (e.g. Negus 42ff.; Burnett). Ideally, a dynamic balance between 
majors and so-called ‘indies’ leads to a mutually beneficial co-existence. Burnett (The 
Global Jukebox) draws an analogy to a “symbiosis”. This certainly does not preclude 
fierce competition and conflicts, in particular during recurrent periods of crisis due to 
broader changes in the industry (see e.g. Chapple and Garofalo; Caves; Tschmuck).8
Fourth, the record industry appears to be in a period of relatively swift technological 
change. The diffusion of powerful copying technology is one momentous aspect of 
this. Another one is the authorised delivery of musical recordings without a specially 
dedicated tangible carrier – via the Internet or mobile telephone networks – that is 
relatively well advanced.9 ‘Digital’ distribution has often been predicted to bring 
pervasive change to the industry (Goldstein; Alexander; Burnett; Tschmuck). One way 
to determine the significance of technological change in the record industry is 
investigating its interplay with the industries’ creativity, i.e. the creation of new 
cultural goods and services. Another is what the consequences of technological change 
and innovation are for various types of market participants, competition and 
efficiency. At first sight, it might seem likely for example that consumers’ interests 
with respect to the regulation of file-sharing diverge from those of many suppliers, or 
that creators have different interests from those of some intermediary firms. 
Not all contributions to the debate on file-sharing and the record industry take account 
of the industry’s idiosyncrasies. Arguably, this omission leaves important gaps in the 
assessment of the situation. Before the implications of these points are developed 
                                                 
8  A recent example is the intervention of the industry lead-body for independent record companies 
IMPALA with the European Competition Authorities that looks likely to force Sony Music and 
BMG to retract from their merger executed in 2004. 
9  Of course, unauthorised copying and authorised digital distribution make use of essentially the 
same ICT devices and networks, the main difference being whether right holders retain some 
control over who gets access so that they can enforce their commercial interests. Undoubtedly, the 
application of ICT has had similarly broad, but much less well documented, implications beyond 
the distribution of recordings, e.g. concerning the recording process or back office tasks. 
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further, this paper reviews some of the basic empirical observations that sparked the 
debate on file-sharing in the first place. 
 
The Surge in Unauthorised Copying and Demand for Authorised Copies 
In many major markets for recordings, the surge of unauthorised copying with the 
diffusion of CD-burners and of file-sharing networks coincide with a slow-down in 
sales for authorised copies. This supports the view that unauthorised copying 
diminishes demand for authorised copies. The coincidence is especially striking in the 
German market – the second largest in Europe and fourth largest worldwide. For this 
market, relatively detailed data is available – probably because right holders sought to 
communicate their difficulties effectively. See figure 1 for a time-series of the real 
value of sales in the primary market of recordings10 where authorised copies – e.g. on 
CDs, cassettes, vinyl records or as downloads – are sold to end-consumers for private 
use. Figure 1 also includes various indicators for unauthorised copying (for a more 
detailed discussion of the data see Handke, “Plain Destruction”). According to roughly 
simultaneous developments in the use of copying technology among end consumers 
and turnover in the market for authorised copies, it seems possible to distinguish 
between two periods: first, the (end of) boom period during which turnover hummed 
along at historically high, if stagnating, levels; second, the recession period during 
which first CD-Burners, then – since June 1999 and the emergence of Napster – file-
sharing networks and more recently DVD-burners were widely used and sales of 
authorised copies fell by more than 2% annually in real terms. A dotted grey line 
separates the boom years 1990 to 1997 and the recession period 1998 to 2005. During 
the years 2001 and 2003, sales fell especially fast. Overall, the market value decreased 
by more than 43% between 1997 and 2005.  
                                                 
10  At retail value. 
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FIGURE 1: Real value of sales in the primary market for recordings in 
Germany and the diffusion of copying technology
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Not all major markets have experienced a similarly pronounced recession since the late 
1990s. See figure 2 for a time-series of the sales in Britain and Germany. A dotted 
grey line marks the beginning of the mass distribution of digital copying technology. 
To facilitate comparisons, the data is presented as an index setting the year 1997 (the 
year before unauthorised copying via CD-burners and file-sharing was first 
acknowledged as a problem for the record industry) at 100. In Britain – the largest 
primary market for recordings in Europe – sales11 fell after 1997, too. Yet, they did so 
considerably later and so far less severely than in Germany. These divergent 
experiences cannot be explained by lower levels of unauthorised copying in Britain 
alone. To be sure, for this country no complete time-series of the estimated number of 
downloads was available (the results of the main studies are proprietary) and the 
methodologies of German and British surveys are not comparable. Nevertheless, it 
seems that the diffusion of copying technology in Britain is not radically different 
from that in Germany. Unauthorised copying via file-sharing networks or CD-burners 
also seems to be widely practised in the UK. The BPI (Statistical Handbook 2006 86) 
quotes data that “downloaders reduced spend may have cost the industry as much as 
£1.1 billion in lost retail sales over the past three years”, which amounts to nearly 20% 
                                                 
11  Trade deliveries at retail value. 
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of actual sales between 2003 and 2005. According to their sources, in 2005, 360 
million blank CDs were sold in the UK, up from 251 million in 2000. Of these blank 
CDs, 62% (223 million) are supposed to have been used for “home recording” in 2005. 
The BPI (Statistical Handbook 2004 and 2006) emphasises problems with professional 
counterfeiting of CDs, which seem less intense in Germany. 
FIGURE 2: Index of sales (real value) in the German and British 
primary market for recordings (1997=100)


































































Divergent experiences in different national markets are only one of several reasons to 
be cautious with firm statements on the effect of unauthorised copying on demand. 
Generally speaking, it is anything but easy to determine what things would have been 
like without the intervention of a surge in unauthorised copying. Turnover in the two 
markets investigated has fluctuated substantially in the past. Neither was particularly 
dynamic in the years immediately preceding the mass diffusion of digital copying 
technology, even though the general trend over the last fifteen years or so had been 
positive. Nevertheless, at face value the data is reasonably consistent with the view 
that the diffusion of copying technology reduces suppliers’ revenues. In Germany, the 
size of the market has fallen dramatically. In Britain, the industry stopped growing 
with a surge in unauthorised copying.  
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Most elaborate empirical contributions studying the short run impact of file-sharing on 
record sales find that file-sharing has had some adverse effect on record sales. (For 
surveys of the literature see Peitz and Walbroek, “Piracy of Digital Products”, and 
Liebowitz, “Economists”). Estimates of the extent of this effect differ considerably, 
however. The majority of the available studies focus on the US market. They attempt 
to control for various factors that might have influenced sales such as the size and 
wealth of relevant age groups in the population, the operation of effective promotion 
channels such as broadcasts featuring attractive music, the retail infrastructure, or the 
availability of competing entertainment goods and services. Beyond this task, there are 
two further challenges to empirical studies. First, the data available on the record 
industry and unauthorised copying of recordings are a prime example of the more 
general difficulties with access to reasonable comprehensive and reliable data on the 
cultural industries (Towse, Cultural Economics; Caves; Liebowitz, “MP3 
downloads”). Much of the publicly available data has been assembled by interested 
parties. Second, it seems particularly difficult to isolate the effects of unauthorised 
copying at this point in time. On the one hand, the record industry is highly 
concentrated in a handful of multinational firms and concerns for market power are 
rife. That competition authorities have thwarted several proposed mergers between 
major record companies over the last years provides a good illustration. On the other, 
the record industry appears to be in a state of technological and structural change. In 
this context, two basic abstractions that facilitate econometric analyses – perfect 
competition and market equilibrium – cannot easily be taken for granted.  
In short, empirical evidence suggests that the interests of suppliers at large have been 
harmed somewhat by unauthorised copying. To many, the examples of the relatively 
well researched US market or the particularly hard-hit German market establish that 
file-sharing is a serious threat and deserves careful attention. Yet, a considerable 
degree of uncertainty remains regarding the exact scale of its adverse effect, which is 
another good reason to pay attention to file-sharing, especially because the issue plays 
such an important role in driving the debate on copyright reforms. The following 
account of the basic economics of copying and copyright will illustrate that this 
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uncertainty is even more fundamental than acknowledged so far. That is because 
establishing the effect of unauthorised copying on sales of authorised copies is not 
enough to guide public copyright policy.  
 
The Basic Economics of Copying and Copyright and its Application to the File-
Sharing Debate 
Copyright endows creators with temporary monopoly rights – the rough equivalent of 
property – to their original creations. Creators often pass on large parts of their 
copyright entitlements to firms that specialise in the exploitation of such rights (e.g. 
publishers and record companies) so that intermediary firms are important right 
holders, too. A range of economic concepts has been invoked to justify copyright or to 
explain its function. Below, an attempt is made to lay out the foundations of the 
understanding of copyright as developed on the basis of economic theory while 
restricting the use of the specialised terminology.12 The focus is on the question of 
how to determine the effect of unauthorised copying and by implication the adequate 
level of investments into countermeasures such as copyright. The natural rights 
argument that few economists have addressed (and even fewer endorse as providing a 
useful function) is not included.13 Alternatives to copyright (e.g. Plant; Shavell and 
van Ypersele; Farchy and Rochelandet; Varian) or the details of copyright law (see 
Towse, “Copyright and Artists”; Landes and Posner) are also beyond the scope of this 
account. 
The basic argument starts out with two characteristics of information goods such as 
reproducible creative works. First, while creators have to invest time and resources to 
produce a new work, these creations are difficult to turn into exclusive private 
property. Once a creation has been published, it can be reproduced and disseminated at 
                                                 
12  For a more extensive survey see Handke, Towse and Stepan; Gordon and Bone; Towse and 
Holzhauer; Liebowitz and Watt; Towse, “Copyright and Artists”; and the wide-ranging Landes and 
Posner. 
13  As mentioned in section 2.1, creators do not seem to be responsive to pecuniary incentives alone. It 
is imaginable that privileges reserved to creators in copyright law that have no apparent 
commercial use safeguard their intrinsic motivation.  
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relatively low costs by whoever has access to a copy and the adequate ICT. 
Controlling this process is beyond the scope of most individual right holders. The 
question arises how right holders can recoup their investments into creativity if many 
can benefit form the output without compensating the creator. Second, information is 
not depleted by use. In contrast to a material object – say an apple that is eaten – use 
by one individual tends not to preclude the use by others. These two characteristics of 
reproducible cultural works mean that in contrast to material goods, the exhaustion of 
information through excessive use is not a problem but safeguarding pecuniary 
incentives to create might be. Musical recordings are a prime example: they require 
input by skilled contributors as well as the use of instruments and recording 
technology. Once the recording process is completed, the costs of copying the work to 
a CD or to put it online and download it are relatively low.  
Copyright aims to foster incentives to create by endowing creators with temporary 
monopoly rights to their creations. It allows right holders to bar others from using and 
distributing a copyrighted work. They can charge prices in excess of the costs of 
producing additional copies, which gives them the opportunity to recoup their initial 
investment in the creative process.14  
However, a copyright system is costly (Watt; Landes). To start with, it entails 
administrative and enforcement costs. A copyright system needs to be defined and 
administered by governmental (legislative) and judicial bodies. Laws have to be 
backed up by enforcement efforts, i.e. infringements need to be identified and 
sanctioned. Some of these costs fall onto the general public. Others fall onto each 
participant of a regulated market, who needs to administer her own rights or to ensure 
compliance with other rightholders’ entitlements. What is more, a copyright system 
creates access costs. Consumers who value the work by more than the cost of making 
additional copies, but less than the price being charged are excluded. The point of 
copyright protection is to keep those unwilling to pay the asking price from using 
                                                 
14  In practice, income to creators is skewed so that looking at individual creators, a situation where 
costs are recouped is the exception. Most published copyright works do not recover their costs, 
while a minority generates great profits to right holders. Over the entire repertoire of a larger 
publisher or record company, the concept of recouping costs might be more realistic. 
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protected works. It thus usually generates a state of underutilisation of the existent 
pool of cultural creations. Policy makers are faced with a trade-off between 
underproduction in the context of unauthorised copying and underutilisation in the 
context of (temporary) monopolies. Sometimes this is taken to mean trading off 
suppliers’ and consumers’ interests. Access costs also incur where creators are 
deterred from building upon prior works because they are unwilling to pay the price 
the copyright holder demands. It follows that over time, “(p)aradoxically, too much 
copyright protection can reduce the number of new works created” (Landes 13). 
In short, a system of property to intangible information goods such as cultural works 
tends to be a lot more costly than it is in the case of material goods. It is more difficult 
to establish because information cannot easily be fenced in. The opportunity costs of 
doing so are also relatively great because once a creation is captured in reproducible 
form, no amount of use would devalue it. That is, one basic argument in favour of 
private property – avoiding overuse and the depletion of resources in the public 
domain – does not apply. Many economists take this to believe that copyright 
entitlements should be weaker than property to material assets, as in fact they are.15 
This reasoning leads most economists to address copyright in terms of a cost-benefit 
trade-off, where the costs of unauthorised copying need to be set into relation to the 
costs of effective countermeasures. That is, economic theory alone makes no clear-cut 
prediction as to the net effect of unauthorised copying on producers or for society at 
large. Assessing this effect and by implication the desirability of countermeasures 
requires an analysis of the specific circumstances of the market affected. It is an 
empirical question (cf. Towse, “Copyright and Economic Incentives”; Liebowitz, 
“MP3 downloads”). 
 
                                                 
15  These limits include the limited duration of copyright and so-called “fair use” that permits 
unauthorised copying under certain circumstances without the right holder’s permission. 
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Does a Surge in Unauthorised Copying Justify Strengthening the Copyright Regime? 
In the record industry, the current diffusion of a more powerful copying technology 
has lead to a surge in unauthorised copying. In this context the question arises whether 
increased levels of unauthorised copying justify efforts to strengthen the copyright 
regime. To answer this question, the effect of unauthorised copying needs to be 
specified. For the argument developed in this paper, it is useful to clearly distinguish 
between three steps in this assessment:  
1. Cheaper unauthorised copies can substitute the purchase of authorised copies. 
Where this happens, unauthorised copying displaces demand. The extent of this 
substitution effect depends on the relative costs of unauthorised and authorised 
copies, the extent to which consumers favour originals, and the deterrence of 
would-be infringers through existent enforcement measures.   
2. Second, if there is a significant substitution effect, unauthorised copying makes 
it more difficult for producers to recoup the costs of producing the first original. 
Creators and intermediary firms that finance them are at a cost disadvantage in 
comparison to free-riding competitors that make copies available without 
investing in the creation of the original. The economic literature on copying 
suggests that there are some factors that might offset the adverse effect of 
unauthorised copying on those investing in creativity. Network effects might 
apply so that the value of some information goods increase with the number of 
people that use them (say if people appreciate talking about music they are 
familiar with). Furthermore, when right holders are aware that a particular type 
of users passes on the copyrighted works to many others, they might simply 
charge this group higher prices. Liebowitz (“Copying and Indirect 
Appropriability”) coined the expression ‘indirect appropriability’ and observed 
that this was precisely what publishers of academic journals have done with the 
arrival of photocopiers in most libraries. They simply charged libraries higher 
subscription fees. Finally, consumers might come to value some authorised 
copies more if they are able to sample them via free streams or downloads. If 
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authorised copies are perceived to be more valuable than unauthorised 
downloads, sampling might have a similar promotional effect as airplay on 
broadcasting channels is supposed to have. It is a contentious question whether 
any of these potentially mitigating factors do play a significant role in the case 
of the record industry affected by file-sharing.  
The effect of unauthorised copying on producers’ interests is addressed in these first 
two steps in the reasoning for copyright. The related questions – whether copyright 
displaces demand and suppliers lose revenues – has attracted copious attention. 
Section 2.2 presented some of the widely debated prima facie empirical evidence and 
referred to the results of existent studies that by and large find that file-sharing has 
harmed suppliers’ interests to some extent. Subject to the scale of the problem and the 
costs of private countermeasures, right holders can decide whether private 
enforcement measures make good business sense.  
However, concerning the justification of public investments into fighting unauthorised 
copying cannot be the end of the story. That is because consumers probably benefit 
from unauthorised copying in the short run. File-sharing facilitates access to a great 
number of recordings – perhaps many more than are available via conventional outlets 
– at low costs. These benefits to consumers have received little systematic attention. 
As a rare exception, Rob and Waldfogel (“Piracy on the High C’s”) estimate that 
consumers’ welfare gains from file-sharing are considerably higher than producers’ 
losses. This type of argument has not caught on among economists due to a crucial 
extension to the reasoning for copyright in a third step.  
3. If revenues to producers fall due to unauthorised copying, pecuniary incentives 
to produce and disseminate works will be diminished. Some of the producers 
that find it harder to recoup their costs will cease to operate. There will be fewer 
investments into creativity than would be ‘socially desirable’.16 The extent of 
this problem depends on how responsive producers are to pecuniary incentives. 
                                                 
16  What economists mean with this is that some resources, which would generate greater value for 
society if they were dedicated to the production of cultural works, are put to alternative uses. 
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Subject to the sensitivity of supply to falling pecuniary rewards, the 
underproduction of inexcludable cultural goods and services will be the 
outcome of unauthorised copying. Less new creations will be supplied. Landes 
(13) predicts with a view to file-sharing that “[…] given the speed and low cost 
of copying, as well as the difficulty of employing private measures to prevent 
copying, we would expect a decrease in the number of new works created […]” 
unless copyright protection is reinforced. 
This extension to the argument is crucial for determining the adequate level of public 
investments into copyright protection, because public policy does not aim to maximise 
revenues to private corporations but social welfare more generally – which includes 
consumers’ interests. In the short run, consumers might benefit from unauthorised 
copying. In the long run however, after suppliers have had the time to adapt their 
production decisions to changes in the market, this might not be the case. To the extent 
that the supply of new creative works does dry up in an environment of intensive 
unauthorised copying, unauthorised copying is not only a problem of suppliers but 
becomes a problem for consumers, i.e. society at large. That falling revenues to 
suppliers will translate into a diminished supply of creative works has largely been 
taken for granted in the debate on file-sharing. The extent to which this occurs in 
practice remains largely unspecified. That is one of the gaps in the research agenda on 
file-sharing, which the following section addresses. 
 
Gaps in the Research Agenda on File-Sharing and the Record Industry 
The economic literature on file-sharing and the record industry has focused on the 
harm of unauthorised copying for suppliers – the first two steps in the above account. 
Hardly any empirical work has been published on the obvious immediate benefits of 
file-sharing to consumers. It seems reasonable to expect that consumers’ interests will 
eventually be adversely affected if suppliers cease to make reproducible creative 
works available. The extent to which an adverse effect on suppliers comes to adversely 
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affect consumers’ interests has not been specified, however. Arguably, this is one of 
the most uncomfortable gaps in our knowledge concerning current copyright reforms. 
It harks back to the extensive and inconclusive literature on whether intellectual 
property such as patents or copyright does in practice foster innovation and creativity. 
Even if that were the case, public policy-making would benefit from specifying 
exactly how sensitive supply is to suppliers’ income and what role copyright 
protection plays in determining it.  
Nevertheless, this might appear to be an awkward question under the assumption that 
the record industry is competitive and production methods are stable as the impact of 
file-sharing is playing out. Under such circumstances, a displacement of demand due 
to increased unauthorised copying would certainly diminish supply. As seen in section 
two, however, these assumptions might not reflect the reality of the record industry to 
a satisfactory degree. Competition in the record industry is probably significantly less 
than perfect if recent objections to further mergers by competition authorities are 
anything to go by.17 At the same time, the industry seems to be caught up in a period 
of relatively swift technological change.  
Much of the literature on file-sharing does not address issues of competition and 
broader technological change (beyond the diffusion of copying technology). This is a 
second significant gap in the research agenda. It is worthwhile to go through a short 
reasoning why such an omission might matter. Innovation and technological change 
can imply that productivity increases – costs fall or the quality of products increases. 
Radical technological change further tends to subvert market power (e.g. Abernathy 
and Utterback; Freeman and Perez; Klepper). Many accounts of the history of the 
record industry find that to have been the case during past periods of swift 
technological change in the record industry. These saw the entry of a great number of 
small new firms that challenged and sometimes even did away with the predominant 
position of incumbents (see Gillet; Peterson and Berger; Chapple and Garofalo; Caves; 
Tschmuck). Both the erosion of market power and thus greater efficiency or 
                                                 
17  Strictly speaking, due to product differentiation the industry would be in state of monopolistic 
competition in the absence of barriers to entry. 
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technological change and greater productivity could mean that costs fall. If costs fall, 
suppliers’ profits need not be affected by falling revenues. Supply might remain stable 
or even grow in spite of falling revenues.  
This is a complex argument. Without empirical evidence supporting it, it holds little 
sway. The following section presents some exploratory empirical evidence regarding 
the record industry and the supply of sound recordings. It appears that supply has been 
surprisingly resilient in spite of falling revenues and high levels of unauthorised 
copying. The data suggests that the diffusion of copying technology is very likely to 
coincide with other significant changes in the record industry. 
 
Supply and Market Entry in the Presence of File-Sharing   
The following section of the paper addresses some quantitative data on the number of 
record companies in Germany and the supply of new publications in Germany and 
Britain. More than seven years after Napster established file-sharing as a mass 
phenomenon and after eight years of a severe recession in the market for recordings, to 
what extent has a problem on the supply side materialised? 
 
Market Entries (the Number of Record Companies) 
Record companies (i.e. organisations that acquire and commercialise rights to sound 
recordings) traditionally play a pivotal role in the record industry. They tend to 
coordinate the various specialised activities concerning the creation, reproduction and 
distribution of recordings. Figure 3 presents the number of paying members in two 
industry lead-bodies catering for record companies in Germany: the German division 
of the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI Germany) and the 
German Association of Independent Labels, Publishers and Producers (VUT). A 
dotted grey line marks the beginning of the recession period. The IFPI Germany 
mainly attracts larger record companies. All major firms are members and so are their 
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subsidiaries as well as some of the larger, more commercially orientated indies. The 
VUT predominantly provides for smaller, independent record companies.  
FIGURE 3: Paying members in industry lead-
bodies catering for German record companies
Sources: Handke, "Plain Destruction" (BV Phono, various issues; 
VUT data-base)















1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
IFPI Germany members (full and associated members) VUT members
 
According to this data, the number of record companies in Germany has increased in 
spite of a severe recession and in the presence of high levels of unauthorised copying 
after 1997. Data on the number of record companies that are members with the 
collecting society Gesellschaft zur Verwertung von Leistungsschutzrechten (GVL) 
confirms that there seems to have been alleviated numbers of market entries during the 
recession period. (For a more detailed discussion of the data, see Handke, “Plain 
Destruction”).  
An alleviated number of market entries is inconsistent with common-sensical 
expectations in the context of a severe recession and alleviated levels of unauthorised 
copying. What is more, apparently the population of larger record companies 
developed differently from that of smaller firms. The number of IFPI Germany 
members stagnated during the recession, while the number of VUT member firms that 
are mostly smaller record companies increased substantially. There seems to have been 
a greater number of market entries by smaller firms during the recession than in the 
preceding boom years in the German record industry. Handke (“Plain Destruction”) 
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suggests that this is more consistent with creative destruction in the context of 
technological change rather than with the demise of an industry due to unauthorised 
copying. 
 
The Number of New Publications in Both Britain and Germany 
Figure 4 exhibits a time-plot of the annual number of new albums released on the most 
widely used sound-carrier format of CDs in Britain (BPI, Statistical Handbook 2004 
and 2006) and Germany (BV Phono, Jahrbuch 2005 and 2004). To avoid double 
counting of the same content, singles and releases on other sound carrier formats than 
CDs (cassettes, vinyl records or minidisks) are excluded.18 So are any musical 
recordings that are published only as downloads. The data does not invite detailed 
cross-country comparisons because underlying methods differ and the data for 
Germany excludes imports whereas the data for Britain does not.19
                                                 
18  The BV Phono ceased to provide separate figures for CDs and cassettes after 2003. For 2004 and 
2005, the new category of album releases is presented. 
19  What is more, the BV Phono explicitly acknowledges important limitations to their measures of 
publications. They estimate that their figures capture only about half of the entire number of 
releases. Presumably, they capture the bulk of those releases that eventually become easily 
available to a wider public on tangible sound carriers, however. 
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FIGURE 4: Number of new albums released on CDs in 
Germany and Britain 
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Germany: number of new titles published on full-length CDs (excluding imports)
Britain: Number of new album releases on CDs
 
Neither of these two short time-series provides any evidence for any significant and 
permanent fall in the number of new releases in absolute terms with a surge in 
authorised copying after 1997. If anything in Britain, an expansion in the number of 
new publications might have slowed somewhat in the late 1990s but if that had 
something to do with unauthorised copying the effect was probably not permanent. 
After the year 2000, the average number of new publications per year in both Britain 
and Germany were very high in comparison to earlier years.  
Again, this conflicts with common-sensical predictions in the context of weak growth 
and a surge in unauthorised copying. Certainly, the descriptive analysis of the limited 
number of observations presented here does not support any firm conclusions. 
Nevertheless, this empirical evidence is clearly at odds with the view that falling 
revenues due to unauthorised copying would severely affect the supply of new sound 
recordings. This issue requires further attention.  
Investigating the number of publications helps to make this point. Quantitative 
methods of the type that is championed by economists will have its limits regarding 
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the resolution of this issue, however. Ultimately, the quality of the creative works 
supplied needs to be addressed. Other academic disciplines are better equipped to do 
so and the debate on unauthorised copying and changes in the record industry might 
benefit considerably from their contributions.  
 
Conclusions 
Changes to the copyright regime are among the most significant recent developments 
for the cultural industries. Today it is hardly possible to address those cultural 
industries that supply reproducible media content without acknowledging this issue.  
The predominant notion is that copyright is essential for commercially viable cultural 
production, because it defines property to cultural creations and allows suppliers to 
recoup investments into creativity. A recent surge in unauthorised copying – via CD-
burners and file-sharing networks – appears to require extensions of copyright law and 
more vigorous efforts to enforce these rights. Copyright matters even if one does not 
underwrite this view, simply because of the ongoing political and legal process that 
aims at nothing short of setting out the playing field for the way that reproducible 
aspects of cultural creations are handled in the future.  
Economic theory suggests that copyright relates to a trade-off of competing ends and 
that the right level of copyright protection depends on the specific conditions of the 
affected market. Empirical studies are crucial to guide copyright policy. There are at 
least two important gaps in the available literature: the first regards the extent to which 
unauthorised copying affects the supply of creative works and thus how consumers’ 
interests are affected; the second regards broader changes within the industry. 
Technological change and increasing competition might make it more difficult to 
isolate the effect of unauthorised copying. 
In fact, this paper presents some evidence that conflicts with the view that a recent 
period of falling sales and high levels of unauthorised copying would have had an 
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adverse impact on supply. There are three unexpected observations in the recession 
period: first, in Germany, the number of record companies has grown rapidly, and, 
second in particular many small firms have entered the market. Third, in both Britain 
and Germany, the number of new full-length releases on CDs has increased. 
In as far as these observations hold, the current recession in the record industry has 
neither been uniformly nor unambiguously harmful. Many smaller firms are entering 
the market and the number of new creative works supplied seems to have increased. 
Concerning the effects of the diffusion of powerful copying technology it seems that 
either this erosion of the copyright regime does not have the predicted adverse effects 
on the supply side, or other significant factors overlap with recession and diminished 
copyright protection. 
It remains to be seen whether the provisional empirical findings presented above can 
be confirmed in more comprehensive investigations. If the general drift of these 
observations is confirmed, the question is what explains the apparent resilience of 
supply. Regarding the basic economic characteristics of the record industry introduced 
in section 2.1, several hypothetical explanations come to mind. First, growth in 
alternative sources of revenue to suppliers might be an explanation. Yet for much of 
the time period under investigation, revenues generated via sales of downloads have 
been of minuscule size (and the German turnover figures include sales of downloads 
since 2004). There is also little evidence for additional earnings from the secondary 
market for copyrighted works (where performing or synchronisation rights are sold 
mainly to commercial users) that would have compensated for much of the losses in 
the primary market. Second, cost-reductions due to process innovation or lowered 
barriers to entry and increased competition in the context of technological change 
might be an explanation. Here, an important question is whether the Internet and 
perhaps even file-sharing actually foster competition because they diminish the 
reliance on the traditional promotion channels and retail outlets in which the products 
of smaller firms are rarely visible. Blackburn (A Study of Online Piracy) finds that 
sales of publications by previously well-known artists are diminished in the presence 
of file-sharing networks while file-sharing appears to boost record sales for previously 
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unknown artists. Third, the intrinsic motivation of many creators could provide an 
explanation for some of the resilience of supply. The costs of recording seem to have 
fallen with the diffusion of PCs and specialised software. Together with lower costs of 
promotion and distribution via the Internet, amateurs that do not rely on recovering all 
their costs when they supply recordings might become more important. Finally, 
copyright protection as it was before file-sharing might simply not have maximised 
incentives to produce. The costs of copyright protection might have been 
underestimated or its benefits overestimated.  
There is ample scope for further research on this and a multitude of other questions 
related to recent changes within the record industry. Specialised expertise on the 
idiosyncrasies of the cultural industries from a range of academic disciplines seems 
indispensable and could be fruitfully employed.  
Finally, the market value of music is probably not its most outstanding feature, as even 
economists readily admit (Liebowitz, “MP3 downloads”; Liebowitz and Watt). What 
is spent on music makes up a miniscule part of the economy. Nevertheless, as media 
content music is virtually omnipresent in daily live (Burnett 1; Vogel 192). Arguably, 
the most interesting questions relate to this wider meaning of music in society. 
Copyright reforms in the face of file-sharing are likely to exert an important influence 
on who consumes what, who contributes and who gains in the music industry and in 
other cultural industries. This field should not be left to the ploughs of economists or 
legal scholars alone. 
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The Question of Quality in a Comparison of British and 
German Theatre 
Rita Gerlach 





“It is a common claim and a justified one that British theatre is the best in the world,” 
said Chris Smith when he was head of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport 
(DCMS) (Runciman 9). But many German cultural politicians and theatre practitioners 
are convinced that the German theatre system deserves that position. Who is right, or 
can both be right? And what does that imply considering that the theatre systems of the 
two countries represent very different types: Germany is known for its state-owned 
Stadttheater which employ permanent ensembles and keep a whole range of 
productions in their repertoire, while the reputation of British theatre rests to a large 
degree on commercial conglomerates, particularly those in London’s West End. 
Within Europe, one may locate Germany and the UK at the two ends of a spectrum, 
with Germany as an example of a public or highly subsidised theatre system at the one 
end and at the other the UK – closest to the extreme model of a theatre system that 
rests nearly exclusively on private involvement as we can find in the US. Therefore, 
answering the question ‘which theatre system is best’ includes finding out whether 
more subsidies actually result in ‘better output’ or, contrary to this, whether stronger 
market competition brings about higher quality theatre productions. Theatre can also 
be seen as a paradigmatic case within the larger cultural field. Even though the 
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performing arts are a particular case,1 finding a persuasive way to describe their 
quality, a framework for (not only international) comparison, would provide a starting 
point for other cultural sector analyses as well.  
My article aims at discussing quality definitions to find out whether there are criteria 
for quality theatre which make such a comparison possible and at proposing a 
manageable framework for comparing the outputs of the two theatre systems. When 
speaking about the ‘output’ of a theatre system, I mean its ‘product’ in the widest 
sense. It embraces the general theatre supply in the whole country or a specific city as 
well as a single performance: what is on offer and can be ‘consumed’. 
When attempting to define quality, I need to analyse what the available definitions are 
and discuss which criteria can possibly be used for my comparison.  
Whenever the topic of quality of the arts is being discussed, two seemingly 
irreconcilable aspects are emphasised: artistic achievement and degree of 
commercialisation. In the same way, the groups involved in cultural production are 
said to belong to two different – and competing – camps.2 On the one hand, there is 
the opinion that artists and theatre directors believe in the ‘noble’ objectives of their 
tasks, irrespective of more mundane matters. On the other hand, there is a group whose 
members like to consider themselves as pragmatic realists. They are interested in the 
actual running of a theatre and, whilst being aware of the well-known economic 
arguments for state intervention,3 discuss more efficient and less costly ways of 
                                                 
1  This case has been extendedly and persuasively argued by numerous authors since Baumol/ 
Bowen. 
2  The descriptions of the groups are based on Alan Peacock who calls the artistic group “pundits”. 
Cf. Peacock 12ff. 
3  Economic arguments for state subsidies can rest on different assumptions which are all restricted to 
the economic realm and do not refer to artistic content or social impact. Firstly, in Paretian welfare 
economics, cultural products are considered to be public goods, so state intervention is justified by 
market failure and external effects. Secondly, subsidies are justified when cultural products are 
seen as services rather than duplicatable products. This service argument, for theatre, is enforced by 
the criterion of live performance that requires immediate consumption and makes a duplication 
without losses impossible. Thirdly, the theory of merit goods justifies state intervention because the 
arts are considered by society as meritorious without generating adequate private consumption. Cf. 
Wahl-Zieger, Throsby. A selection of major contributions to this discussion has been published in 
Towse. Obviously, economic reasoning can also be used to argue against state subsidies, e.g.: 
Sawers. 
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producing plays.4 But this self-proclaimed ‘pragmatic’ approach is not exempt from 
criticism. Cultural producers or politicians often fear a loss of what is not concerned 
solely with the economic side of culture, i.e. the content, or quality.5 In my opinion, 
the contradiction is artificial: the parties concerned should become aware of the fact 
that in reality good management and artistic achievement go together. 
In the following chapters I will first look at more measurable criteria and discuss what 
the quality debates in the management and economics fields can contribute to my 
research question. Then I will turn to the more complex discussion in the artistic 
sphere. I will show that both strands do offer useful criteria – but are limited to and 
conditioned by different disciplinary mentalities and methods. Their different results 
need to be combined in an interdisciplinary effort to avoid their shortcomings and use 
their benefits. Therefore, I will propose a tentative solution to how theatre quality in 
the two theatre systems can be analysed and compared. I will argue that both 
quantitative and qualitative aspects need to be addressed. Results from cultural 
economics, arts management and related quantitative methods need to be 
supplemented with qualitative approaches from theatre, reception and cultural studies. 
 
Quality Concepts 
Based on its Latin origin, qualitas, a descriptive understanding of quality could be a 
property, characteristic, trait or attribute that distinguishes one thing from another (cf. 
OED). This objective and neutral sense of quality is relevant to my discussion but not 
at its focus. My main concern here is the more prescriptive understanding of quality as 
a grade of achievement, excellence, superiority or value, which almost naturally has 
positive connotations. This definition automatically involves evaluating something and 
granting it a higher status, a special “value”. Value, too, can mean either an assigned 
                                                 
4  For example, the German economist Stefan Tobias ventures only to measure German public 
theatre’s inefficiency and proposes cost cutting measures without discussing the demand side – let 
alone content. Cf. Tobias. 
5  To give just one example: on a recent conference, the Bundesverband Deutscher Stiftungen, the 
German umbrella organisation for foundations and trusts, claimed that quality criteria are currently 
being displaced by quantitative aims. Cf. Bundesverband Deutscher Stiftungen. 
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numerical quantity, i.e. something measurable, definite, unambiguous, or something 
considered worthwhile, desirable; i.e. something subjective. 
In short, quality definitions are either determined by measurability or by value 
judgement. These alterations correspond with different positions adopted by the 
disciplines researching the cultural industries: economics or management studies on 
the one hand and sociology, cultural studies and the humanities on the other. In the 
former group one finds those who believe in the market with consumer sovereignty 
and pragmatic decision-taking, in the latter the individual is understood as hybrid, 
culturally embedded, socially dependent and hardly subject to rational behaviour.6 In 
the following, I will look at these two different practices of defining quality: the 
production, management and economic sphere on the one hand and the cultural or 
artistic world on the other. 
In an attempt to systematize the existent definitions of quality in use in production and 
management, David Garvin distinguishes five different approaches to product quality 
(cf. Garvin, Product Quality). Following Garvin, the understanding of quality can be 
• transcendent (in philosophy): absolute, universal, unanalysable, recognizable 
through experience; like Plato’s concept of beauty, it “can be understood only 
after one is exposed to a succession of objects that display its characteristics”; 
• product-based (economics): precise, measurable, inherent, objective; enabling a 
hierarchical dimension – if attributes are considered preferable by virtually all 
consumers; the focus is here on durability; in this case follows that quality 
differences are actually quantity differences; here, higher quality also comes at 
a higher cost; 
                                                 
6  The are also differences in the research interests: whilst economists prefer to keep value 
judgements out of their considerations, the humanities and social sciences not only acknowledge 
that human activity and thinking always, “by nature” involves or necessitates ordering and 
evaluating, but considers it a major field of research. 
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• user-based (economics, marketing, operations management): highly subjective: 
the ability of a product or service to fulfil a specific customer’s needs, e.g. 
Joseph M. Juran’s “fitness for use”; 
• manufacturing-based (operations management): quality means meeting ‘a 
priori’ standards and specifications, Philip Crosby’s “conformance to 
requirements” and “no defects”, “making it right the first time”; the focus here 
is on reliability engineering and statistical quality control, i.e. cost reduction; 
• value-based (operations management): quality depends on the (subjective) 
evaluation of the cost-benefit ratio or the (individual) willingness to pay. 
In this list, quality definition and measurement obviously focus on “good” products or 
goods. But this is no longer exclusively the case today: production processes and 
services are under scrutiny as well. Although quality management started as ex-post 
control of defective output it has developed into the documentation of production 
processes and, lastly, into customer-orientation. Table 1 summarizes these changes and 
gives, for each stage, an overview of the different status quality is granted, of where 
the responsibility for quality management lies and who the parties involved are. It 
shows that the old-fashioned understanding of quality made room for a rational and, 
later, a more emotional understanding.  
The table also includes references to the sets of norms that were developed by the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) according to the different 
understandings of quality. Attempts to define quality in management have resulted in 
sets of standards to be followed and audits certifying their achievement which have 
been adapted according to new developments in quality management (cf. Zingel). This 




Table 1. Changes in Quality Management 
Old Understanding of Quality 
ISO norms prior to 1994 
Rational Understanding of 
Quality 
ISO 9000: 1994 
Emotional Understanding of 
Quality 
ISO 9000: 2000 and TQM 
• Quality is one of many 
management functions 
• Specialists’ responsibility 
• Product control 
• Integration of quality in 
functional departments  
• Everybody’s responsibility 
• Documentation, warranty 
• Quality becomes a central 
management task, quality 
manifests ‘new’ competitive 
advantages 
• New customer 
understanding 
• Stakeholder perspective 
Development in Time 
 
Source: Zingel 11. 
 
The question is whether those management or production quality criteria can be 
applied to the arts. It is conceivable that in the broadly defined creative industries 
where material (tangible) cultural “goods” are produced – for example, in the music or 
film industries where CDs and DVDs are manufactured – product quality measures 
such as performance, features, reliability or durability (cf. Garvin, Competing) can be 
applied. To a certain degree production quality can be applied to cultural production, 
especially in branches such as the printing or phonogram industries. The more recent 
management understanding of service quality can also be useful: if theatre is 
understood as a ‘service’, the ideas of customer orientation or process management 
would be applicable. But, again, I would suggest, only to a limited extent: only for the 
management processes, technical production or customer service, ticket sales or the 
front-of-house area. The crucial question of which criteria should be used for 
evaluating the performance’s or the ensemble’s quality, however, cannot be answered 
with the help of the definitions outlined above. So we are back to square one. 
Have cultural economists or economists in general developed an understanding of 
quality that could help answer my question of which is better, subsidised or 
commercial theatre? In 1992, Alan Peacock of the Scottish Arts Council claimed that 
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“[e]conomists have tried to circumvent [the problem of individual, differing, 
unmappable, untranslatable values] by a simple subterfuge. We do not need to specify 
a set of values at all.” (Peacock 9) The initial assumption is “that the individual is the 
best judge of his/ her welfare” (ibid.). In 1996, Susanne Krebs stated that the question 
“what is good and bad (performing) art?” has hardly interested economists so far 
because value judgements are beyond analysis and because there is no consensus 
among economists about the compatibility of aesthetic judgements with models of 
economic behaviour which emphasize individual evaluation, consistent preferences 
and rational decision-making (cf. Krebs 14).7  
But there have always been discussions about quality or value in theoretical economic 
thought, from Adam Smith’s “value in use” and “value in exchange” or the “labour 
value” and “surplus value” of Karl Marx to the “marginalist revolution” that replaced 
cost-of-production theories with a model of economic behaviour based on individual 
utilities which is the basic assumption underlying most contemporary economic 
thought. Even though that had been challenged by “old institutionalists” like Thorstein 
Veblen with a social theory of value as a socially constructed phenomenon, utility 
theories of consumer behaviour and the theories of demand and supply (consumer 
preference based on individual needs and price determination in competitive markets) 
are the economic models which deal with questions of economic value today (cf. 
Throsby 20ff.). The two main trains of thought are costs and prices. 
In the discussion of production costs, Krebs has shown that they are not a useful 
indicator for theatre quality. Even though one could expect stars and better trained 
actors or more lavish stage design and modern stage technology to be more expensive, 
there is no guarantee that higher expenditure will please audiences’ tastes, or that the 
spectators’ subjective evaluation of quality rises. It may well be that higher costs 
simply mean inefficient spending (Krebs 17). 
                                                 
7  In her study, the author goes on to use economic models for the analysis of quality as a determinant 
of demand for theatre. 
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Economists have also discussed the theory of price as a theory of value and found that 
price is only an imperfect indicator and not a direct measure. Reasons for this are the 
many price distortions for any commodity. Whilst price determination in competitive 
markets concerns the supply side, preferences on the demand side have also been 
looked at. Even though there have been studies on the willingness to pay for cultural 
goods, there is still no unanimity among economists on whether standard methods 
generate adequate estimates of what is their value. One could separate cultural goods 
and services into private goods for individual consumption and public goods for 
collective consumption, and one could add qualifications such as accumulated, time-
dependent taste for the demand side and external effects8 for the supply side – but one 
still faces the same problems: prices are limited – though in practice probably the only 
– indicators (Throsby 22ff.; Krebs 30f.). In sum, neither costs nor prices seem to by 
useful for my evaluation of British and German theatre quality.  
Nevertheless, cultural economists in particular have contributed to the understanding 
of a wide range of issues concerning the cultural industries such as economic impact, 
innovation or the productivity of theatres (cf. Austen-Smith; O’Hagan and Neligan). 
All, of course, remain within the academic conventions of their discipline and are 
confined to quantifiable indicators that deliver statistically valid results. They do not 
attempt to address any other than measurable aspects of theatre production. 
Let us now see what the other side has to offer for a solution of the problem of 
assessing theatre quality. In the humanities, social and cultural studies and philosophy 
there is a long tradition of thought about art and its function; valuing the arts not for 
any purpose but for “art’s sake” is a rather modern invention. The term “aesthetics” 
from the Greek aisthanesthai, to perceive the external world with the senses, was 
coined in 1750 by the German philosopher Alexander Baumgarten. Aesthetics became 
the study of art and, particularly, of beauty: “of the criteria whereby manifestations of 
the arts are judged to be good or bad” (Björkegren 5). Therefore I briefly outline what 
                                                 
8  In the case of the cultural industries, externalities are beneficial effects caused by cultural 
production but shared by other participants in the economy who neither contribute to the 
production nor pay a price for it but at the same time cannot be excluded from consuming the 
benefits. 
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I consider the main developments in the philosophy of the appreciation of beauty and 
good taste in order to get a better understanding of the conception of what is 
considered artistically valid, beautiful, or pleasing. 
As a concept, the “fine arts” are an eighteenth-century innovation, for the first time 
distinguishing different realms of artistic production. This would pave the way for a 
hierarchy of high and low, or popular (and later “mass”) art, of refined and vulgar 
tastes that underlies a large part of the discussion of art and great art to this day. 
Broadly speaking, aesthetic thought in eighteenth-century Europe developed in 
different directions or traditions, Germany housing the idealist camp, Britain the 
empiricists. While much of today’s understanding of aesthetics is based on Kant’s 
third critique, his interest in form, the requirement of disinterestedness and so on (cf. 
Kant 282ff.), I think for my particular interest a dialectics between production and 
reception, intention and interpretation might be helpful. I am interested in meaning, 
content and idea of the artwork, so a location of the meaning of a work of art in a 
triangular relationship between artist, artefact and audience seems to me particularly 
useful for the discussion of theatre quality. 
Aesthetic judgement, the act of deciding whether something is beautiful, can be either 
objectivist or subjectivist. When beauty depends on certain qualities perceived to exist 
in an object, as with simple objectivism, the qualities which are judged are in the 
object itself and everyone without exception ought to agree. That is obviously a 
problematic point of view. Contrary to this, a simple subjectivism bases its judgement 
on the reaction of the individual spectator which means that is can never be objectively 
right or wrong. Obviously, criticism has been voiced against and for both both views, 
more sophisticated versions have been put forward and there seems to be an agreement 
that no alternative to a sophisticated subjectivism is available. 
There was a time when the “humanists” who dominated aesthetic discourse claimed to 
have access to universal criteria for artistic quality and absolute values for beauty. But 
since the second half of the 20th century at the latest, this belief has lost its persuasive 
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power. The so-called “anthropological” definition of culture has broadened the horizon 
of what are commonly considered “legitimate” art forms (incorporating popular 
culture, for example). What is more important, the historicity and temporality of arts 
evaluation, its dynamic nature and dependence on its context have been emphasised.9 
The position has been criticised because it does not offer a satisfactory explanation 
why there is consensus about certain cultural works and how quality might be 
evaluated instead.10 In other words: the discussion has not yet reached a final 
conclusion or a consensus on how excellent and influential works can be evaluated. 
I will therefore focus on how theatre quality could be analysed in a pragmatic way. By 
doing so I make use of David Throsby's lists for assessing cultural value. He splits 
cultural value into its constituent elements which may make it possible to evaluate an 
artwork (Throsby 28f.): 
• aesthetic value: are properties of beauty, harmony, form visible in the work of 
art? 
• spiritual value (religious or secular): what beneficial effects, understanding or 
insight can be derived from it? 
• social value: does the work convey a sense of connection with others or 
contribute to the understanding of the nature of the society one lives in? 
• historical value: does it reflect the past or illuminate the present? 
• symbolic value: is one able to extract meaning from the work? 
• authenticity value: is it “the real, original, unique artwork it is represented to 
be”? 
                                                 
9  For example, Pierre Bourdieu developed a theory of cultural taste and consumption which connects 
the capacity of experiencing and expressing taste to education, social background and material 
standard of living. Cf. Bourdieu. 
10  One critic is, for example, David Throsby whose solution is to separate aesthetics and the sociology 
of culture (cf. Throsby 28). 
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Throsby claims that these criteria can always be analysed, that this framework is useful 
no matter whether the scales of assessment are fixed or movable, objective or 
subjective. Nevertheless, one must be wary: all of those components are contingent 
categories and depend on historical and cultural circumstances, i.e. they are not fixed 
and they are subjective, so that cultural backgrounds and individual dispositions of 
both the viewer or evaluator and the researcher have to be taken into account. Still, the 
methods Throsby proposes for analysing works of art are useful – only, they must be 
applied with a different assumption in mind: that they do not provide a objective 
solution. Evidently different from the approaches used in economics or management 
studies and beyond empirical quantitative research, he concedes that the following 
evaluation methods derived from the social sciences and humanities are useful (ibid., 
29f.): 
• mapping: a contextual analysis of the object; 
• “thick description”: a type of interpretation developed by ethnographer Clifford 
Geertz that aims at exposing underlying cultural systems of the work and at 
deepening understanding of contexts and dependences; 
• attitudinal analysis: methods such as social surveys to assess the social and 
spiritual value of a work; 
• content analysis: identification and codification of meaning to understand 
interpretations of the symbolic value of a work; 
• expert appraisal: essential to judge the aesthetic and historical values of a work. 
These methods provide a suitable basis for my own approch to theatre quality analysis 
and comparison. Together with measurable data and previous empirical research 
findings a pragmatic methodological mixture aiming at a rounder, a more inclusive 
understanding of theatre quality can be developed. 
What do the two camps offer for my theatre quality comparison? Theatre is defined as 
an experience, an event where an actor or a group performs in front of an audience. 
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Thus, the requirement for defining the performing arts is that someone who acts is in 
the same place at the same time with someone who watches (cf. Wahl-Ziegler 18). 
This feature – and not any particular institutional form – defines theatre.11 The existing 
institutional practice can be subject to an analysis of efficiency or economic impact 
with quantifiable criteria and measurable outcome. But there is something important 
that cannot be understood in terms of management studies or economics: the artistic 
(or aesthetic) part of theatre quality, or, its cultural value. Therefore, two clusters of 
indicators have to be taken into account: those measuring management quality and 
economic value on the one hand and those referring to artistic quality or cultural value 
on the other. Figure 1 schematically illustrates the two sides that need to be taken into 
consideration in any analysis of theatre quality. Management and economics 
definitions of quality can be used for analysing quantity indicators such as in-house 
services or the profitability of a production. Processes of production and their effects 
on audiences belong to the realm of cultural or artistic quality. Even though the artistic 
aspects may not be directly measurable, it does not mean that they cannot be analysed 
at all – one just needs different methods and assumptions that are offered by other 
disciplines. As David Throsby has pointed out, economic and cultural values have to 
be separated from each other. But they both have something different to tell us about a 
theatre’s (or a theatre system’s) quality (cf. Throsby 20ff.). 
                                                 
11  That is why those involved in the discussion of the theatre crisis in Germany should not bemoan 
the death of theatre – if anything, they should lament the danger to the three-tier, state-funded city 
theatre as practised in Germany which is indeed under threat because of significant cuts to 
community budgets. Theatre as such will certainly continue to exist as it has always existed in the 
history of mankind. Thus, the German stage association’s (Deutscher Bühnenverein) call “Theater 
muss sein!” is absurd. 
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Figure 1 
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After this graphic summary of the main points of my argument so far, in the last 
section, I will outline the research design which I have used for my comparison 
between the British and German theatre systems. 
 
A Modest Proposal Towards a Definition of Theatre Quality 
My dissertation project aims at finding out whether German or British theatre supply is 
“better”. I understand both “supply” (or “output”) and “theatre quality” in a broad and 
inclusive way: Whilst the former includes the supply of theatres on a national level but 
also the artistic product of a single theatre group, the latter encompasses a range of 
measurable criteria on the one hand and unquantifiable, but analysable characteristics 
on the other. Thus, beside the national theatre systems of Britain and Germany and the 
regional theatre landscapes of London and Berlin, my thesis focuses on case studies 
selected according to the type of theatre organisation. For each country, a subsidised 
(or state-owned), a commercial and a small independent theatre company will be 
treated in depth. When analysing “quality”, I will be working my way from the more 
objective criteria towards the more ambiguous ones, and, at the same time, from the 
national level down to the level of single productions. The national theatre systems 
reflect to a certain extent substantive differences in the degree of commercialisation or 
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state involvement which can be gathered from a comparison of organisational 
structures and processes of theatre production in the two countries. With the help of 
case studies that represent certain theatre types, one can see how the “typical” features 
of organisation and funding are actually put into practice. Additionally, the case 
studies enable a comparison on the individual theatre level when it is necessary to 
make up for lacking national data. 
As a general design for such a comparison, a “bottom-up” approach would 
theoretically be conceivable. This would require starting with evaluating single 
performances,12 and then collecting all evaluations of all productions13 and theatre 
characteristics14 to come up with this specific organisational type’s quality. This is, of 
course, practically impossible. 
Instead, in order to analyse each theatre system’s quality, one is compelled to 
selectively work “top-down” and to explain the criteria for selection on the one hand 
and for evaluating certain features as higher on the other. The final judgement on 
which system works best, German or British theatre, will be based on accumulated 
intermediary results of a step-by-step comparison of fifteen different criteria. These 
include both quantitative and qualitative aspects so that the comparison requires an 
interdisciplinary approach that makes use of cultural policy research, statistics and 
findings from cultural economics studies. I will also generate and analyse new data 
and texts for the evaluation of artistic quality on the level of individual theatres or 
productions. Six assumptions about theatre quality inform my selection: 
The most basic assumption is simply that the more theatres there are in each country, 
the better the theatre supply. Therefore, a first quantifiable indicator of Germany’s or 
Britain’s theatre quality is the number of theatres (1). As this does not discriminate 
                                                 
12  The reason is that in each performance (even of the same production) errors or events “marring” 
the quality can occur which depend on each actor’s daily form etc. 
13  This part of analysis would take into account each production’s overall characteristics such as 
lavishness of decoration, set and stage design, number of actors etc. 
14  Those overall characteristics could include, for example, type and amount of stages, existence of a 
permanent ensemble or guest artists, doing touring etc. 
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between the output produced at those theatres, production and performance figures 
need to be looked at to measure the actual productivity of theatres (2). 
Secondly, I suppose that when theatres are geographically well-distributed, i.e. as 
equally available and easily accessible as possible, the theatre provision is better. This 
reflects cultural policy requirements and looks at regional spread of theatres (3). Of 
course, these indicators need to be regarded in relation to population size and 
distribution. My analysis will therefore be based on theatre statistics and reports even 
though German and British statistics collect different data, in different ways and for 
different reasons.15
Thirdly, diversity (in the sense of variety) is used for the evaluation of a nation’s 
theatre supply. The assumption is that a theatre system is better, the more different 
types of theatre offer their productions and the more diverse the output is in terms of 
genres, play categories and authors (4). This analysis of theatre programmes will also 
not be easy because in Germany, for example, only genres are represented in statistics, 
play categories are not, and because generating new empirical data that matches 
British statistical findings is beyond the scope of my research project. 
My fourth assumption concerns innovation, an important feature in the creative 
industries: more original theatre output is considered to be better. Of course, one needs 
to discuss the different understandings of innovation or originality. The evaluation of 
artistic innovation needs to be discussed on the level of individual productions. For the 
national and regional levels, I propose to look at four measurable indicators of 
different degrees of newness: new productions (5), adaptations (6), translations (7) and 
new work (8).16
                                                 
15  For Germany, I mainly rely on the annual Theaterstatistik of the Deutscher Bühnenverein (DBV) 
and a few general surveys such as Institut für Länderkunde. For Britain, official statistics are 
irregular, incomplete and partly contradictory, e.g. DCMS, Mapping Document 1998 and DCMS, 
Mapping Document 2001 so that a selection of reports by Arts Councils and theatre management 
associations must be used. The first two assumptions are tested in Gerlach, Money. 
16  In Germany, new work and translations are covered as Ur-/Erstaufführungen by the Werkstatistik 
of the DBV. For British information, one has to contend oneself with sporadic surveys such as 
Feist et al. or the reports from the Society of London Theatre or the Theatrical Management 
Association, cf. Gardiner or Tayleur. There are also a few empirical studies about the innovativity 
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Next, another quantifiable variable important in the discourse about theatre quality 
needs to be regarded: success in the market. Here, it is assumed that good theatre is 
valued and in high demand whereas bad theatre fails. Thus, the fifth assumption 
establishes a link between the unmeasurable artistic quality or individual theatre 
experience and quantifiable indicators. This proposition needs to be discussed: Does 
success really mirror quality? And do production numbers, i.e. the plays performed 
most often (9) and audience numbers, i.e. the plays visited by most people (10) 
provide adequate success criteria? Can turnover or intake from ticket sales (11), or a 
theatre company’s success in acquiring additional funding either from the state or from 
private sources (12) form useful measures? 
As I have stated earlier, any comparison of theatre quality needs, as a prerequisite, an 
analysis of the discourses on theatre quality in the two (national) cultures. How do 
British and German theatre producers, directors, etc. define “good theatre”? What do 
audiences expect of theatre in the two countries? And how do those who dominate the 
discourse about evaluating theatre, the critics, arrive at their judgments? This method 
bears reference not only to discourse analyses but also to Throsby’s attitudinal and 
content analyses in order to uncover the social and symbolic components of the value 
of each country’s theatre system.17 Such analyses do not exist yet, a fact which 
urgently requires more research. On the basis of interviews (13) a selective 
investigation into these national differences should be undertaken to answer the 
question whether both statements about “the best theatre in the world” may be right 
when they reflect completely different definitions of “good theatre”. 
                                                                                                                                                        
of theatre programmes. However, these are scarce, often outdated, and out of the half dozen studies 
I found, only Austen-Smith, and O’Hagan and Neligan) concern themselves with Britain, none with 
Germany. Usually, not innovativity but productivity or variety are measured. For preliminary 
results of a comparison of British and German theatre innovation cf. Gerlach, Money. 
17  As Pierre Bourdieu and others have shown that the milieu of the speaker, the educational and social 
background, class and family, the exposure to the arts and theatre, influence the way one defines 
what one considers good theatre, it is only logical to suppose that quality concepts vary between 
national cultures as well – in the way national institutions and histories, values and norms frame 
and influence people’s ways of thinking and conceptualizing reality, and the part of reality called 
the arts. For example, German definitions are conditioned by the existence of a mostly state-owned 
and -funded theatre landscape considered to be unique in the world: good theatre is almost always 
characterised by features “only” ensemble work and repertoire can provide. 
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Furthermore, the criteria and processes of evaluation in expert appraisals need to be 
analysed. Theatre is considered by cultural economists as an experience good, and 
aesthetic judgement is generally held to be an acquired taste which requires a certain 
exposure. Thus, the sixth assumption I work with is that aesthetic aspects, artistic 
originality and other unquantifiable aspects which require subjective evaluation call 
for a certain knowledge and expertise about the work, its genre, its context and the 
existing culture of theatre criticism. 
Here, I first look at British and German theatre awards (14) because they claim to 
reward the “best” of the theatre professions and thus serve as a “quality test” for the 
theatregoing public.18 The award-granting criteria and processes, the composition of 
juries and their actual relevance need to be discussed, and the results analysed: which 
theatres receive the highest acclaim and is there any tendency as to the type of theatre 
more successful in this regard? Secondly, I study expert appraisals on the micro level 
and intend to analyse individual reviews of single productions (15). As the aesthetic 
theatrical aspects are not measurable but can be described, reviews can be analysed as 
textual embodiments of the critics’ evaluation. Thus, detailed text analysis is a 
legitimate method for my research question and adds considerable results to its 
qualitative part.19 Both analyses of experts’ appraisals cannot go without a critical 
assessment of the reliability of critics’ and opinionmakers’ views, their limitations and 
problems. 
Thus, by defining theatre quality relatively broadly and by addressing a range of 
measures or, as I prefer to call them, auxiliary criteria on different levels, I hope to 
come up with a less judgemental and one-sided result about the overall quality of 
                                                 
18  For the United Kingdom, I analyse the Lawrence Olivier Awards, the Evening Standard Awards, 
the Critic’s Circle Awards and the TMA/ Barclays Theatre Awards. For Germany, with its wealth 
of very small, artistic awards, and only one national theatre award, Faust, newly established and be 
presented for the first time in November 2006, I need to determine equivalents to the popular 
British awards. For example, the results of the the annual polls by German theatre magazines such 
as Theater heute and Die deutsche Bühne and the invitations to the prestigious theatre festival 
Theatertreffen Berlin have to be discussed. So far, there are no publications on theatre awards in 
the two countries except for my own account of British awards, cf. Gerlach, Theater. 
19  The selection criteria for “representative” reviews take into account theatre goers media 
preferences, the influence and backgrounds of critics, theatre types, case study theatres, productions 
having received awards, and particularly positive vs. particularly negative reviews. 
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German and British theatre: it will neither be based on just numerical evidence nor will 
it voice only subjective opinions of individual people. 
 
Conclusion 
To sum up, the discussion of quality in management and economics concentrates 
mainly on objective, measurable criteria but is opening up for other considerations. For 
answering questions about the connection between theatre type and output the research 
tools and designs of these disciplines alone are not sufficient.  
Aesthetic thought has been shown to be a more complex matter where objectivist and 
subjectivist approaches are discernable, as well as approaches claiming universality 
versus those acknowledging context dependence. My own position is that the 
evaluation of quality depends on the socio-cultural and historical context and that it is 
subject to change. As there is no alternative for a sophisticated subjectivist approach 
which calls for other qualitative methods, they need to be incorporated into a holistic 
analysis and comparison of British and German theatre supply.  
The different methods and indicators of the two competing camps deliver productive 
results for each facet for which they have been developed. As a result, I decided to 
choose a step-by-step approach that combines the useful findings of each discipline. 
This combination will produce an overall result which will enable scholars to answer 
the question which theatre system – the British or the German one – is “best”. 
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‘Not only a source of expenditure but a source of income’: 
The Creative Industries and Cultural Politics in Britain from 
the 1960s to Cool Britannia1
Lawrence Black 





Interrogating the cultural agenda of the Wilson government (1964-1970) seems 
relevant given the shifts assumed to characterise British cultural life in the 1960s. This 
paper does so by focusing on Jennie Lee’s tenure as Arts Minister. Besides debates 
about culture within the government and between it and various artistic communities, 
the paper highlights continuities (and differences) with later periods and notably New 
Labour’s seemingly novel advocacy of the creative economy. 
Lee’s 1965 White Paper, A Policy for the Arts – The First Steps, tallied with Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson’s modernizing homilies. It asserted that “in any civilized 
community the arts… must occupy a central place”; welcomed the prospect of 
“increasing automation bringing more leisure” and aligned itself “against the drabness, 
uniformity and joylessness of much of the social furniture we have inherited from the 
industrial revolution”, in favour of “making Britain a gayer and more cultivated 
country” (Cmnd. 2601 pars. 14, 91, 100). This echoed Wilson’s ‘white heat’ speech 
that saw in “scientific progress… the possibility of leisure on an unbelievable scale”. It 
also drew on revisionist thought. Jenkins’ 1959 Penguin election book outlined a 
                                                 
1  A related version of this article was published in the journal Contemporary British History 20.3 
(2006). 
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modern, civilizing cultural agenda.2 A 1964 research department paper, The Quality of 
Living, pressed for cabinet representation for the Arts and acclaimed the regional 
funding case made by the Northern Arts Association. In 1964 Labour promised 
“generous support for the Arts Council, the theatre, orchestras, concert halls, museums 
and art galleries” and 1966’s manifesto regarded, “access for all to the best of Britain’s 
cultural heritage” as a “hallmark of a civilized country”.3  
Political interest in culture and leisure was not Labour’s preserve. Conservatives, 
notably the Bow Group, argued that the state should compensate for shortfalls in 
private patronage and encouraged greater business generosity towards the Arts Council 
of Great Britain (ACGB). From 1967 an Arts Policy Group was interested in Arts 
Council funding, regional initiatives and, anxious not to lose ground on Labour, a 
shadow Minister was appointed in 1968.4
 
‘The Biggest Increase in State Subsidy this Country Has Ever Known’ 
In 1971 Lee told Wilson: “throughout the whole of the arts world, establishment, 
avant-garde, the older and younger generation, I am continually being thanked for 
what the Labour government did”. When Lee lost her parliamentary seat in 1970, 
National Theatre staff and actors wrote to say “future generations have need to be 
grateful to you”. Even Lord Eccles, her Conservative successor as Arts Minister, paid 
tribute to Lee and Arnold (Lord) Goodman (ACGB Chair, 1965-72).5 For the Open 
University as well as her Arts work, Lee is today, a “sanctified figure” in the opinion 
of Geoff Mulgan, a major expert in cultural industries politics.6  
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Lee emerged from the Government with her reputation enhanced. Working class 
Scottish origins, radical tone and marriage to Aneurin Bevan, who died in 1960, made 
her a potent Labour icon and aided her carrying off the grand itinerary of her 
ministerial post. If the left spared Lee talk of an aristocratic embrace, the subject did 
excite comment. A standard charge was that Arts spending “is a luxury this country 
cannot afford”. Other critics asked, “what has your ministry of arts done beyond the 
Thames and Millbank? We in Wales have not benefited… don’t patronize us by 
sending a company to play a Greek tragedy here at the Miners’ Institute”. Her defeat at 
Cannock (a Black Country coal-mining constituency) in 1970 was ascribed to 
metropolitan gallivanting and theatre-going – activities that did not impress those 
Barbara Castle dubbed the “philistines of Cannock”.7 Nor was the White Paper’s 
reception unanimously rapturous. Some argued it was more spin than substance. 
Denys Sutton, editor of galleries-museums-antiquities review Apollo, thought it 
“jejune”, well-intentioned, but overly reliant on (a phrase borrowed from it) 
“temporary inflatable structures” (Financial Times 2 March 1965). 
Nonetheless, histories of the Arts routinely focus on the 1960s as a key moment in the 
flowering of cultural life in Britain and expansion of public funding. For Gray, the 
creation of the Arts Minister, 1965’s White Paper and relocation in the Department of 
Education and Science (DES) meant that ACGB expenditure “mushroomed during the 
1960s, increasing by nearly 500 % in real terms”. The 1965-66 ACGB report talked of 
a shift from subsistence to growth (Gray 47-51). The ACGB grant grew from £3.205 
million in 1964-65 to £9.3 million in 1970-71. The ‘Housing the Arts’ fund established 
in 1965 more than trebled by 1969/70. Only 40 % of government arts spending went to 
the ACGB in 1967/68 – most flowed directly to the national museums and galleries. 
Total spending increased most sharply in 1966-67 by 45 %, celebrated by Lee as “the 
biggest increase in state subsidy this country has ever known”.8
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The shift from subsistence to growth was as significant attitudinally as fiscally. In 
1965 Political and Economic Planning (PEP) noted how former ACGB secretary-
general, William Emrys Williams, had complained of functioning too much as crisis 
management, doling out assistance to prestigious but needy institutions. This “bread 
line image” (the 1958-59 ACGB report was subtitled “the struggle for survival”) PEP 
thought “wrong”: “The Arts Council if it is to carry out its function properly must be a 
body which strengthens rather than rescues”.9 If this summarized Labour’s hopes, it 
regularly underlined that “no amount of money can manufacture an artist”. Nor was 
there any desire to be a patrician cultural provider, or “to dictate taste”.10 The state 
promoted change in the 1960s, as an enabling force and by reducing its powers of 
censorship of publishing and theatre. The 1944 Education Act, expansion of higher 
education and subsidies to Arts premises and Art colleges, did produce artists and 
audiences. But “the most valuable help that can be given to the living artist”, the White 
Paper surmised was “a larger and more appreciative public”. As a 1966 DES Arts 
bulletin saw it: “social changes including a better education for all, have increased the 
number of people able and eager to appreciate the arts while, at the same time reducing 
the scope for individual philanthropy.”11
This reduction of private patronage was problematic for the high arts. Goodman’s 
1967 ACGB Chair’s report noted, “private bounty or investment is now totally 
inadequate to sustain a civilised ration of music and theatre, of poetry and pictures” 
since “the government has garnered in much… of the wealth that cultured patricians 
and public-spirited industrialists could formerly bestow” (Goodman, Not for the 
Record 121-122). The Institute of Directors formed an Arts Advisory Council in 1963. 
Leading TV art critic Sir Kenneth Clark and W.E. Williams (with Laurence Olivier, 
Peter Hall and Henry Moore) advised it. Business donated to "The Mermaid", a new 
City of London theatre opened in 1958.12 One suggestion was a US-style tax remission 
for business donations and charitable foundations such as the Gulbenkian Foundation. 
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Many on the left disapproved of business ties. In 1965 the IOD complained about 
Salford West MP Stan Orme, who had criticized using art for profit.13  
 
Elites 
The ACGB was an unpromising instrument for the left. In 1968-69, one third of its 
spending went on the National Theatre, Royal Opera House, Royal Shakespeare 
Company and Sadler’s Wells. An elitist vision of what arts were worthy of funding 
prevailed. Film and photography, the latter “Britain’s leading hobby” according to a 
1966 survey, were ineligible for funding until the 1970s.14
On the other hand, as Travis history of obscenity relates, Goodman’s (and Lee’s and 
Jenkins’) impeccable liberal sensibilities damned Scotland Yard’s pursuit of 
pornography and offensive art in the Victoria and Albert Museum, the Tate, the 
Institute of Contemporary Art and International Times in 1966-67: everywhere it 
seemed but Soho. In 1968 the ACGB created a working party to review the obscenity 
laws. Its own form of irreverence was sounded, when the Chairman noted that in 1965-
66 as much was spent on military bands as awarded to the ACGB.15 Jazz became 
eligible for subsidies in 1967 and Film also benefited as the British Film Institute’s 
budget leapt two-thirds in Lee’s first year and a National Film School was created.16
Confounding the fear Labour ministers had of being countermanded by Whitehall, Lee 
dealt successfully with civil servants. Like Bevan, she combined firebrand tendencies 
with administrative ability. She defended the Cabinet Arts and Amenities Committee 
against Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend’s efforts to dissolve it.17 This was combined 
with political advocacy of the Arts, to which Lee brought the tenacity she applied to 
the Open University. One argument put to Patrick Gordon-Walker (Minister of 
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Education in 1967), was that demarcating the Arts rather than merging it with Sport 
(as the Treasury favoured) “has given the government a lead envied by our opponents 
and deeply appreciated by institutions and individual artists”. Another was that a small 
increase in Arts spending, could yield disproportionate benefits – culturally and 
politically for the government. Lee marshalled this case repeatedly in the spending 
round, although not always successfully – in 1965 she had to “bully” Crosland to bail 
out the National Youth Orchestra.18
The Arts seemed an area of government success, empowering Lee. In 1969 she told 
Chancellor Roy Jenkins how, “the full consequences of cutting below 10 % increase in 
real terms is not fully appreciated by colleagues… it would… endanger our good 
reputation in this field”, by contrast with troubles elsewhere, “when a relatively small 
additional sum to that proposed by your department can save the day”. Lee warned 
Wilson in 1969 that spending cuts would mean an end to “making the best generally 
available”, cuts in regional funding or to Covent Garden and that since “we spend less 
than any other European country on our opera… all the high Tory gentry would be on 
their feet, ensuring maximum political damage”. “At relatively small cost”, she 
posited, “we can maintain a buoyant and optimistic atmosphere”.19
Lee’s battles were with Crosland and Jenkins, precisely the revisionist theorists who in 
the late 1950s had urged the left to pay greater interest to culture and leisure, as 
economic and welfare matters were resolved. Jenkins must have recognized Lee’s case 
for the merits of a small spending increase, since in 1959 he had argued that, “a 
government policy of moderate generosity would make the world of difference to the 
whole climate of our cultural life” and that the “money needed would not be 
enormous”. Jenkins’ contemplated increase, from 0.1% to 0.3% of budget expenditure, 
was more than Lee achieved.20 There was also political baggage here – Crosland, 
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Diamond and Jenkins had been leading Gaitskellites, something Lee could deploy 
when she called on (and often received) Wilson’s support.21
Jeffrey thought Lee “never let her own left-wing prejudices show” (Sinclair 145). 
Though Lee could be partisan. “As the NHS [National Health Service] stands as the 
most important contribution to the future by the 1945 government”, she told Tribune in 
1967, “this government will be honoured for what it has done for the arts. The Tories 
can’t undo what is being done.” Richard Hoggart, critical of the White Paper’s 
blurring of high and low culture and categorization of “the young” as “raw material”, 
nonetheless felt it “inconceivable that a Tory government could have produced its best 
paragraphs”.22  
 
Section 132  
Bevan believed “that only the best was good enough for the workers and was 
determined to smash open the great houses, their libraries and wine cellars”. He 
grieved that art was “immured in museums and art galleries”. Rather, Bevan wanted 
the state to “enfranchise artists, by giving them our public buildings to work upon”. 
However, Charier of the state, J. B. Priestley, who also had Lee’s ear, insisted “the 
state must leave the artist alone with his work after creating reasonable conditions for 
them”. 23
The left was steeped in Bevan’s high-mindedness. Labour’s Leisure for Living looked 
forward to people aspiring to own “an oil painting of real merit for half the price of a 
television set”. It applauded the BBC for broadcasting classical music and London’s 
Mermaid and Coventry’s Belgrade theatres in “bringing drama to a largely apathetic 
public”. The 1962 Festival of Labour displayed Labour’s cultural repertoire: a classical 
concert at the Royal Festival Hall, international and modern art exhibitions and 
attempts to commission ballet, all chiming with Bevan’s and Lee’s preferences and 
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belief in public art’s therapeutic value. But as at the 1951 Festival of Britain (a social 
democratic vision, Conekin insists), a distinction was drawn between such activities 
and the mere entertainment of a carnival parade and sports.24
Lee envisaged her work extending Bevan’s. Labour griped about the scarce use local 
authorities made of their voluntary power to spend up to a 6d rate on music and arts, 
provided by section 132 of the 1948 Local Government Act, an amendment Bevan 
introduced. Speaking in 1964 at Darlington’s Little Theatre, Labour’s Anthony 
Greenwood explained:  
Nearly ½ the authorities who are empowered to spend up to a 6d rate 
on promoting music and the arts and helping voluntary bodies are in 
fact spending precisely nothing – and the rest spend little more than a 
penny rate… If we are to… meet the challenge of increased leisure we 
must have a strengthened Arts Council. 
A 1965 DES circular pressed local authorities on this.25 Since section 132 was 
permissive, Conservatives wondered what powers the government had to “make these 
backward authorities spend more”. The left voiced the same concerns, fearing not 
dirigisme but inertia.26
 
“Not Only a Source of Expenditure but also a Source of Income” 
Lee’s own passions were for Italy and George Eliot (rather than Henry James). She 
disliked opera, particularly Wagner; found the James Bond films “boring – all the 
same” and was “allergic to football”, especially on TV. That “she wanted nothing to do 
with sport” was partly a matter of taste and partly to avoid being combined with Denis 
Howell’s portfolio. Lee told one interviewer “if the world was made in my image it 
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would be perfect”, but generally suppressed such instincts in favour of emphasizing 
her “function is merely a permissive one”.27
In what was touted as a technocratic government of experts replacing an aged, 
gentrified Toryism, Lee was an avowed amateur when it came to the Arts, and senior 
too at 60. This facilitated her ability to press the Arts’ case without seeming to infer 
taste judgments. Lee played the populist, concerned for the audience and visitor as 
much as producer or performer in insisting on “improved restaurant facilities at the 
British Museum” and “the enlivening of the atmosphere of the great museums and 
galleries”. 28
Lee made a virtue of her amateurism, contrasting her approach to André Malraux, 
French Minister of Cultural Affairs (1960-69), an old radical like Lee and writer on 
art. “We are not French”, Lee explained in 1966, “we are our own empirical selves”.29 
French regional policy was more etatiste than British. Temples (maisons) de la culture 
were funded by state and municipalities – though reportedly attracted few workers 
(The Times 11 October 1971). West German regions received more generous business 
support. Except in Bavaria, lower taxes were levied on artists and Munich invested as 
much in the Arts as the annual ACGB budget. West German audiences were larger – 
helped by the tradition of the Volksbühne, with cheaper tickets for workers. But US 
federal spending was lower than Britain’s – if with tax concessions for private 
donations to state arts bodies.30  
The Wilson government’s Arts policy aimed to provide support more than direction 
and, like the BBC, to do so at “arms length”. But as with the BBC’s Reithian ethos, 
culture was conceived as a cohesive force, overcoming social divisions through a 
common national identity. This had been the purpose of the innovations during the 
Second World War like the Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts 
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(CEMA) that marked the state’s formal incursion into cultural realms. The White 
Paper saw exclusion “from the best of our cultural heritage as damaging to the 
privileged minority as to the under-privileged majority”.31
Increased spending was induced by the belief the Arts were a remedy for social 
problems. As Goodman put it, “a dose of culture could turn hooligans into citizens”. 
The Arts might, Lee (like Matthew Arnold) imagined, fill a spiritual void in a secular 
society. Or there was the prospect, as John Maynard Keynes outlined as Chair in the 
ACGB’s first report, that as economic problems receded, “the heart and head will be 
occupied… by our real problems… of life and human relations, of creation and 
behaviour and religion”.32  
This was Lee’s defence for public spending on minority, elite pastimes – that 
improving access to them might have a cultivating trickle-down effect or therapeutic 
value, combating commercial, mass, American, popular culture. Lee contended: 
“before we arrogantly say that any group of our citizens are not capable of 
appreciating the best in the arts, let us make absolutely certain that we have put the 
best within their reach”. Lee revived the National Theatre, dormant since 1949 and the 
White Paper aspired to bridge cultural gaps, noting how “in… jazz the process has 
already happened; highbrow and lowbrow have met”. Her proudest achievements were 
26 branches of the National Film Institute, 125 Art Centres and 36 regional theatres. 
Audience creation saw rising attendances at concerts, exhibitions and libraries. Local 
government library spending increased, partly as Boots’ and Smiths’ lending libraries 
closed. It also prompted an author’s revolt by 1969 at Lee’s failure to institute a public 
lending rights scheme of royalties for those whose books were borrowed.33  
Change of the sorts Lee desired could be detected in broadcasting. Local radio, 
corresponding with Lee’s regionalism, started in 1967 with BBC Radio Leicester. 
Monitor, BBC1’s Arts series won audiences of three million, as did Omnibus, its 
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successor from 1965. Commercial broadcasting saw Sir Kenneth Clark make 48 Arts 
programmes for Anglia Television from the 1950s.34 Programming like this, socially 
aware TV drama and BBC2 (partly through Open University programming), assuaged 
fears of Americanization and saw the left surmount the hostility it had towards TV in 
the 1950s, coming to regard it more as a cultural protagonist than a threat in itself. 
Another rationale for Arts policy, Lee told the Royal Academy in 1970, was that “the 
arts are not only a source of expenditure but also a source of income… income from 
tourists next year will have reached the six hundred million pounds mark”. Tourism 
was increasingly a government concern. London hotel developers claimed subsidies 
under a Wilson initiative. Crosland’s prudence at education became more generous 
(particularly towards the National Film School) at the Department of Trade and 
Industry.35
In 1966 Lee argued artists “are not essentially takers… they are givers”. In this 
context, Wilson’s award of MBEs to The Beatles in 1965 denoted more than a 
courting of popular opinion. Though it certainly denoted this quality – witness 
Wilson’s use of Steptoe and Son’s Harry H. Corbett (a TV émigré from Joan 
Littlewood’s Theatre Workshop) during the 1964 election and at the Festival of 
Labour, where he presented Coronation Street (his favourite TV programme) with an 
export award for sales to Australian TV. A British (and Northern, key to Wilson’s own 
identity) cultural revival was identifiable. Tangible economic achievement was also 
evident: the record business doubled in size in the UK in the 1960s, making Britain a 
global player.36 This can be seen as part of a marginal agenda identifying the 
contribution creative industries could make to the economy and quality of life, a theme 
extolled by New Labour. 
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The Break-up or Extension of Keynesianism? 
Lee’s distinctive aim was regional funding, straining at the dead wood of the 
metropolitan establishment. Rather than being socialized by elite institutions, Labour 
was attempting (tentatively) to refashion their influence in civil society. If culture 
meant the best of the ‘high’ arts, there was a built-in drag to London – and around 30% 
of ACGB spending went on London to 1965. Goodman and the ACGB were having 
none of suggestions that they themselves might relocate to Woking, Manchester or 
Basingstoke. The “provinces” inferred narrow-mindedness, so reference was to “the 
regions”. Goodman’s 1968 ACGB Chair’s Report noted that in offsetting Londo-
centrism, it was “only in very rare cases seeking to stimulate some local activity where 
at least the nucleus of existing demand is not already established”.37  
The state’s role was then defined within traditional, liberal parameters; permissive not 
prescriptive. If there was occasional frustration that the full potential of state agency 
was constrained, this limited power also provided a useful opt out. Thus, those who 
felt Exeter’s Northcott Theatre should have been built in the city rather than on the 
University campus, were told by Lee, “you argue this out among yourselves”. Not that 
Lee evaded debate. At Coventry’s Belgrade Theatre in 1966 after the musical comedy 
Lock up your Daughters to which trade unionists had been invited, she heard debate on 
theatre decorum and the desire for Sunday performances (“the very night we could fill 
the place” one told). Sunday was an institution questioned by 1960s’ modernity. Jim 
Haynes’ Edinburgh Traverse Theatre pioneered Sunday opening and Monday closing. 
Lee initiated Sunday opening at the Victoria and Albert in 1966. A private members 
bill to legalise Sunday theatre opening was defeated in 1968 (though Lee and Hugh 
Jenkins got it onto the statute book in 1972).38
In 1967 Scottish and Welsh Arts Councils were created to match Northern Ireland’s. 
The proportion of total Arts investment going to Scotland almost doubled between 
1964-70. This reversed the ACGB’s metropolitan propensities – CEMA’s last regional 
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offices closed in 1956 – under Keynes. The Keynesian consensus broke down after 
1964 as a regional focus prevailed; the ACGB returned to DES control; and the elitist 
maxim of “few but roses” reverted to CEMA’s mantra of “the best for the most”.39 By 
post-imperial analogy, the power of the metropole was diminishing. Yet in other ways 
metropolitan standards were extended. The ACGB’s focus remained professional, 
unlike CEMA’s encouragement of amateurs. Lee told the Commons in 1970 that 
“there should be no cutting back on metropolitan standards in order to spread the 
available money more evenly throughout the country”. Keynes standards were here 
being exported. The 1969 Musicians’ Union May Day concert heard in a familiar note 
from Lee, “that we should be trying to bring the best within reach of all; but at the 
same time… broadening of opportunities should not lead to a lowering of standards”.40 
The equation of culture, civilization and ‘high’ Western art held good, just as for 
Keynes in the 1940s. 
Regionalism was not without critics. PEP believed the ACGB should “concentrate” 
expenditure – London’s 30% was reasonable given its “potential audience” and 
“international level”. Funding to theatres outside London should be cut PEP proposed. 
Even if this entailed “hardship for those areas of the country where the level of artistic 
life is dismally low”, PEP felt, “where it exists it must be fostered… but the present 
level of subsidy makes it too expensive to create an appetite from scratch” (PEP 329-
330). 
Eric White, ACGB assistant secretary in the 1960s argued that regionalism was one 
area in which the Arts Ministry displayed “the character of a shadow arts council 
secretariat” (White 72-74). Although initiative mostly resided in the regions. “Best 
practice” came from the North East Arts Association (later Northern Arts Association), 
established in 1961. He convinced local authorities and business to contribute £40,000, 
with £500 from the ACGB. Business contributions were no mean achievement given 
condition of the region’s industry, though annual donations in the 1960s never topped 
£8,500. The difficulties section 132 had encountered were overcome. In 1967 no local 
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authority contributed more than a ¼d rate, but 72 of 89 authorities in the region did 
contribute. The Association’s director, Alexander Dunbar, rectified the ACGB’s 
parsimony, such that local authority contributions were pegged to the ACGB’s, which 
by 1966-67 totalled £60,000. Eight of the twelve English Regional Arts Associations 
started up between 1964 and 1970.41
Spending in the North East on music, ballet, drama, film, arts centres and transport 
tripled 1963-67. From October 1965 the Association sponsored a project to use 20 post 
offices as mini Art Galleries. Postmaster General Tony Benn wanted “the post office 
through stamps and crown buildings to promote the arts in the community”. But it 
would be wrong to imagine a uniformly vibrant, cultural scene in the North. 
Postmasters were “afraid… that they would be required to show nudes painted by local 
artists” and government spending constraints after 1967 hampered local authority and 
business contributions.42
Another instructive example of local difficulties was the Nottingham Playhouse. Both 
parties supported civic theatrical development, but the issue was politicized on the city 
council over rates and whether a new building or a re-fitted cinema should be used. 
The Playhouse opened in December 1963 and Hayes notes, to be hailed as “one of the 
best examples of the ‘utopian’ type of facility for which Jennie Lee had been calling”, 
particularly director John Neville’s youth, education and outreach work. Mervyn Jones 
agreed the Playhouse was a success, playing to 85% capacity at “a high artistic 
standard”, but concerned that its fate had been politically precarious enough to hang on 
the Mayor’s vote and may not have been built had the Conservatives won the 1960 
elections. It was difficult for local government, especially in “Coketown” (industrial 
areas), to prioritise theatre as “what the people want” and required the Arts Ministry to 
be more strident. ACGB funding was promised only once the Playhouse was open.43
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‘With It’? 
Many Britons were engaged in an entirely different cultural world by the 1960s. If 
Britain was palpably gayer in the second half of the 1960s – and for most 
commentators the “if” only concerned whether this was more cultivated – this was 
more coincidental with than a product of Lee and Labour's efforts. Although Lee 
flirted with the élan of 1960s pop and youth culture, talking up “cultural revolution” 
and “cultural bonanza”.44 In London’s Evening News in 1966 she enthused:  
Youth today isn’t servile any more. They don’t want to fit into 
orthodox middle-class society. You’ve got your Carnaby Street and 
your Mary Quant – that’s this country’s raw material – this enormous 
energy. Off… on their scooters… to some seaside town and start 
punching up each other. 
Whilst trumpeting a “hurrah for turbulent youth”, Lee cautioned that “one of the 
saddest and funniest things in the world is older people trying to be with it” (Evening 
News 25 May 1966).  
The Arts Council had “tried to remain… ‘with it’”, its 1970 annual report explained. 
But its New Activities committee, a basis for the claim, was itself invaded by radical 
protesters in 1969.45 Nevertheless, such was the atmosphere Lee engendered that 
Private Eye applied for funding. “Nothing could be nearer to my own wishes”, Lord 
Gnome enthused, than “Jennie Lee’s determination to foster a gay, fun-loving Britain 
through the influence of the arts”. The editors were dissuaded when it was pointed out 
the magazine’s anti-authoritarian edge might be blunted by association with so 
establishment an institution as the ACGB.46
Jim Haynes’ experimental Arts Lab, based in two Drury Lane warehouses had ACGB 
applications vetoed by Goodman. In 1962 Haynes established the Edinburgh Traverse 
Theatre Club as an outpost of the city’s festival fringe and hub of sub-cultural 
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happenings. Arts Lab followed suit in 1967. Haynes was key to the International 
Times (IT), a counter-cultural newspaper, launched at a party-cum-rave at the 
Roundhouse in 1966. Goodman disapproved of the drugs associated with IT and Arts 
Lab. Lee, though at odds with IT’s apolitical stance, was close to Haynes and 
combated Goodman over the ACGB grant. Ironically, the main bankroller of Arts Lab 
and IT, Nigel Samuel, the son of wealthy socialist Howard Samuel, was Goodman and 
Lee’s godson.47  
Labour’s relationship with popular culture was uneasy. Its definition of culture, 
exclusive of much everyday culture (dress, dance, music), limited its influence in these 
areas, but also insulated its fortunes from them. Commentators differed over the 
credibility of awarding MBEs to The Beatles.48 Lee admired left-cultural activities like 
Littlewood’s Theatre Workshop and dramatist Arnold Wesker’s Centre Fortytwo 
project, named after a 1960 TUC motion. This argued the Labour movement had 
privileged material at the expense of cultural well-being and contrasted British with 
US and European trade union cultural participation. Lee thought it a “brave idea” that 
could “rescue us from the torpor of a subtly totalitarian culture” and sat on its 
management committee until 1964. Gifted the Camden Roundhouse, a Victorian 
railway shed, by Louis Mintz (a Mermaid governor), ambitious plans for an artistic 
hub were hatched and a funding appeal launched. Despite reassurances from Wilson, 
Lee, the TUC, ACGB and a Downing Street fundraiser, material aid was as limited as 
popular interest in Centre Fortytwo and by 1970 the scheme was abandoned.49
If more proletarian and folksy in content, Centre Fortytwo shared Lee’s vision of 
professional standards countering mass culture. Both strove for business interest and 
Centre Fortytwo ran regional festivals to 1962. A Policy for the Arts’ belief that 
cultural provision was a right like health or education was absorbed from Wesker.50 
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But after 1964, Centre Fortytwo was a negative reference point, rapt in the 
Roundhouse, it retreated to London and was overrun by the counter-culture, 
diminishing its funding profile. Lee did not contemplate Britain’s cultural life being 
moulded in the left’s own image. 
As the ACGB's historian Andrew Sinclair argues, “the collapse of Centre Fortytwo 
showed the independence of the Arts Council” and that if “a common culture were to 
be created and spread to most communities, only state grants could do it”. Otherwise, 
Sinclair worried, “the consumer culture of the young would pullulate in its many 
contradictions, or the virus of the… ‘counter-culture’”. True, Centre Fortytwo lost out 
to pop and counter-culture. But Labour did little to hamper pop culture and for many 
it, rather than state projects, made for a gayer Britain. As Centre Fortytwo’s artistic 
director, who resigned in 1968 on the grounds that social change had undermined its 
premise that class divided cultural life, explained: “new theatres, dance groups, bands, 
newspapers and fashion… there was nothing to stop the avalanche, helped by the 
Labour Government”.51
It was not, as PEP pessimistically suggested in 1965, that “the appetite for culture in 
this country is less voracious than many of us pretend”, but that changing popular 
aspirations competed with and limited the impact of Labour and the ACGB’s 
ambitions for popular participation in the arts (PEP 329-330). All around new forms 
flourished and the common national culture was increasingly diverse. 
 
Wilson and New Labour’s Heritage 
Labour was a convinced advocate of traditional elite culture, liberal and inclusive in 
purpose. It regarded it as civilizing, uplifting and a barrier to commercial mass culture. 
Lee’s efforts in the 1960s involved a belief in the moral value and uses of culture and a 
desire to infuse Britons with it; a populist awareness of its commercial potential; focus 
on its consumers and audience besides producers and artists; the state as enabler rather 
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than deliverer. These were also sources for New Labour’s take on creative enterprise. 
Labour’s traditionalism in the 1960s contained traces of what by the 1990s was seen as 
a more modern approach and interest in what were termed creative and cultural 
industries. 
This shift can be traced through notions of heritage. In the 1970s and 1980s The 
Heritage Industry had been glumly tied to “a climate of national decline”, preservative 
not innovative or progressive and a more-or-less conservative version of national 
identity. But it was increasingly read as evidence of a healthy historical consciousness; 
not confined to grand houses and galleries, but including popular pasts. In that case it 
was a marker of post-industrial consumption patterns – heritage and modernity were 
not opposed but twinned, not least as a creative enterprise.52
Alongside if less pronounced than Labour’s rhetoric of modernity in areas such as 
housing and planning, was one of conserving and democratizing access to worthy 
traditions and institutions. The two were not necessarily at odds. In 1935 Hugh Dalton 
wrote that “the National Trust is… practical socialism in action” and that, “a Labour 
government should give it every encouragement”. As Chancellor, Dalton’s 1946 
National Land Fund did that, freeing from death duties land and property bequeathed 
to the Trust and extending its holdings.53 Centre Fortytwo received £2,000 from the 
Trust’s Historic Buildings Council for the Roundhouse in 1967. The dramas of 
evolution to a post-industrial society can be viewed in the Roundhouse’s transition 
from Victorian industry to Arts Centre (like Haynes’ Arts Lab, or latterly Tate 
Modern). Lee’s White Paper proposed “a historic building can be adapted at 
comparatively little cost – certainly less than the cost of a new centre” and thereby 
“two objects are achieved in one”. Besides the Roundhouse, Temple Newsam (Leeds 
City Council), Corsham Court in Wiltshire (Bath Academy of Art) were cited as 
examples, as was the Institute of Contemporary Art’s use of Nash House in the later 
1960s. As the Nottingham Playhouse and National Theatre evinced, new building was 
politically thornier. A neglected feature of the Wilson government – at the time for 
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contradicting the dominant technological (if not planning) rhetoric, after because of the 
conservative connotations of “heritage” – was its preservation legislation, notably the 
1967 Civic Amenities Act and 1968 Town and Country Planning Act.54
Lee’s activities and outlook can then be framed by reference to Dalton and 1940s’ 
planning besides inherited liberal-elitist traditions of cultural thought. They might also 
be read as a progenitor of purportedly distinctive New Labour traits. Wrapping itself in 
the entrepreneurial veneer of the cultural industries, New Labour chilled to ‘Cool 
Britannia’, surfed the IT heat of the knowledge economy and sought to re-brand 
Britain as “the creative workshop of the world”. Culture Secretary Chris Smith’s 
Creative Britain typified this (derided) exercise.55 Besides distancing itself from trade 
unionism, what differentiated New Labour from old ‘Labourism’ were such affinities. 
Some 1960s evidence hints at New Labour’s creative tendencies, questioning whether 
old ‘Labourism’ was as narrowly focused as New Labour ideologues like Mulgan or 
other proponents of the ‘Labourism’ concept have it. 
In 1971 Labour felt the Arts was a legacy with which it could attack Edward Heath. 
Lord Eccles’ proposed introduction of museum entrance fees was denounced as an 
attack on “our heritage” as, “the British Museum… is a British monument like the 
National Gallery… we know that whenever and wherever the need arises to refresh 
ourselves with the priceless collections which are our birthright, we can freely visit 
these”. Heath retorted by asking why visitors should not contribute to an institution’s 
upkeep and noting the success of exhibitions that charged. Besides support from Henry 
Moore and the directors of Manchester’s Whitworth and Oxford’s Ashmolean, Labour 
had Lord Kenneth Clark’s backing. Clark pointed out that National Gallery charges (of 
which he was a director to 1937) were designed to deter visitors on certain days.56
1970s’ Labour governments saw Hugh Jenkins attempt to democratize the ACGB and 
Lord Donaldson create the National Heritage Fund. In 1975 Labour discussed 
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enforcing local authority arts contributions allowed by the 1948 Act. It was hoped 
industry might contribute and that a levy on television advertising should “be 
channelled back to the creative arts”. Campaigns to culturally enliven the Trade 
Unions persisted. A 1974 Musicians’ Union motion led to a TUC Advisory Committee 
on Arts, Entertainment and Sport, though its 1978 congress motion still centred on the 
1948 Act.57 Capping museum charges was revived as Labour policy in 2001, with 
Chris Smith arguing he wanted “the best of our culture and heritage made available to 
the greatest possible number, regardless of their income” (BBC Website). 
In short, New Labour’s use of the creative/heritage industries vocabulary is not so 
new. Nor was its emergence in political rhetoric New Labour’s invention. Having 
separated the Arts from the DES in 1979 and slashed the ACGB budget, the Thatcher 
government awarded a 24% increase for 1990-93, rewarding the introduction of 
market disciplines. Besides recognizing its tourist appeal, the ACGB was felt to have 
shed its “welfare state mentality” and increased business investment tenfold from 
1979-88, to £30m. Higher education expansion boosted audiences. Though the 1990 
handout was also prompted by rising inflation and the spectacle of the RSC at the 
Barbican running out of money and closing for several months.58
During the 1980s a Labour Arts and Museums Association pressed a recognizable 
agenda. In a 1983 pamphlet the Association paid homage to the 1918 constitution as 
evincing Labour had long been “concerned with the quality of life”. It argued that like 
British Rail Intercity trains and “super pits”, the state ACGB was being forced to 
specialize by Thatcherism rather than provide for all. It proposed decentralizing arts 
funding; replacing the “secretive” ACGB and that Labour governments must commit 
to the “preservation… and development of our cultural environment”. The 1980s’ left 
advocated local initiative and independent production to circumvent Thatcherite 
control of the state. In hands like the Greater London Council’s, this fashioned a 
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cultural politics, exemplified by Mulgan and Worpole’s Saturday Night or Sunday 
Morning?59
Rich as the parallels between 1960s’ initiatives and New Labour are, there are 
differences. That the Heritage Department (as it had been since 1992) was renamed 
Media, Culture and Sport suggested a lingering suspicion of ‘heritage’, if also that 
‘culture’ was integral to, not separate or superior to other spheres and might be fun and 
edifying. New Labour is more pluralist, less attached to specific cultural forms. It has 
embraced the market, inverting the opposition of culture and commerce. Excellence 
for global competitiveness has supplanted Lee’s insistence on standards for 
edification. Critics hold that this cultivating notion of the public sphere has given way 
to one more commodified, frivolous and individual-centred. Blair’s association with 
Britpop and Art (like Damien Hirst on Creative Britain’s jacket) was more substantive 
than Wilson’s ‘pop’ credentials.60
Mulgan’s own evolution itself hints at earlier influences (including the Greater London 
Council) on New Labour thinking. As director of think-tank Demos in (and 
subsequently No.10’s Policy Unit), advanced a recognisable cultural critique of ‘old’ 
Labour in 1996: more work-oriented and producerist than European social democracy 
(as Centre Fortytwo argued); too deferential to elite and critical of popular culture; too 
fond of the state and hostile to the market; too earnest and lacking a sense of pleasure 
or risk; too attached to the worthiness of the public sphere and averse to the private or 
“domestic”.61 Evidence from Lee’s tenure blurs this easy dichotomy and questions 
Mulgan’s judgement. But however much Mulgan is playing fast and creative with 
Labour’s past, such critiques of Labour’s cultural politics have long been the norm. 
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From Cool Britannia to Generation Berlin? Geographies of 
Culturepreneurs and their Creative Milieus in Berlin1
Bastian Lange 




A New Cultural and Entrepreneurial Generation?  
Defining the Novelty 
In the wake of the political formation of a so-called “Neue Mitte” (a “New Centre”) in 
Germany in 1998, it is feasible to study the connections between political strategies 
and socio-cultural urban development processes. With the paradigmatic political 
change of 1998 in Germany, individualistic and entrepreneurial qualities were 
emphasised not only in political discourses, but also in efforts restructuring labour 
markets. These results interact with the urban sphere in a new way. The term 
‘Culturepreneur’ refers to one potential champion of these developments.  
Initially, ‘Culturepreneur’ is a compound of ‘cultural’ and ‘entrepreneur’ and was first 
suggested by Davies and Ford (“Art Capital” 13) following Pierre Bourdieu’s 
typological notion of an entrepreneur who embodies various forms of capital 
(Bourdieu 241). The term ‘Culturepreneur’ – so it is assumed – describes an urban 
protagonist who possesses the ability to mediate between and interpret the areas of 
culture and of service provision. The empirical material will demonstrate that there is 
as yet no professional category for the “curator”, “project manager”, “artist”, “website 
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designer” who is transparently multi-skilled and ever willing to pick up new forms of 
expertise. He may then be characterised, first and foremost, as a creative entrepreneur, 
someone who runs clubs, record shops, fashion shops and other outlets, who closes 
gaps in the urban with new social, entrepreneurial and spatial practices. Such 
knowledge and information based intermediaries increasingly emerged in the gallery, 
art and multimedia scene in different European metropolises, foremost in London in 
the 1990s (cf. also Grabher “Urbi et Orbi” and “Ecologies of Creativity”). Davies and 
Ford (“Art Capital”) characterise a type of people who, in structural terms, are 
communicative providers of transfer services between the sub-systems “business 
related services” and “creative scene” and, in doing so, seem to satisfy a necessary 
demand (cf. Koppetsch and Burkart 532).  
Due to this relatively vague analytical definition, the term Culturepreneurs represents 
an open (re-)search concept. With respect to the current debate on blurring boundaries 
between the economy, culture, knowledge and politics in the urban context, I propose 
to consider the economic, cultural and spatial practices of the new cultural 
entrepreneurial agents as testing cases in an urban ‘laboratory’ situation. In the context 
of lasting economic crises, they might play a decisive role as incubators and attractors 
for the formation of new creative knowledge milieus (cf. Matthiesen, “Zwischen 
Spardiktat und Exzellenzansprüchen” 11). Their creative and innovative business and 
art practices might combine local skills with creative knowledge and new ideas. This is 




Following the end of the Kohl era in 1998, a new political beginning of the type 
wished for by the generation of ‘68 seemed not to be directly achievable. Germany’s 
new holders of power took as their model Britain’s Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and 
the ways, means and strategies of New Labour. His politics provided the template for 
the envisioned new beginning of the German Federal Republic. Tony Blair, however, 
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had not carelessly discarded the political ideals of the British Labour Party, the party 
traditionally representing the working class. Rather, he gradually developed the vision 
of a new Great Britain with the slogan and buzzword “Cool Britannia”, for which he 
semantically prepared the ground. With the reformulation and reinterpretation, not 
only of existing social realities but also of those yet to be developed, a forward looking 
vision was created, initially on a rhetorical level. Carefully timetabled, and to the 
surprise of some, deregulation then appeared on the political agenda: Neo-liberal 
realities showed up in the rhetorical guise of views of society which were fit for the 
future.  
Politicians and economic policy makers thereby assigned a forward looking role to 
creative professions in an economy based on information, creativity, knowledge and 
innovation (e. g. Landry; Leadbeater; Florida). Using the slogan “creative industries” 
since the late 1990s, they promised themselves as the generation of new forms of 
work, new work places and innovative markets.  
After a first wave of very optimistic attitudes towards the new leading role of cultural 
producers at the end of the 1990s, the work and life situation of cultural producers and 
their relation to the social and urban situation have in recent years been the objects of 
increased critical scrutiny, on both the local and the global level. This occurred against 
the background of the stylisation of cultural as well as generally unpaid or underpaid 
activities and creative professions. Formerly assumed to be exceptions to wage labour, 
they served as models of self-determined work in post-Fordist society, on the one 
hand, to press ahead with the dismantling of state responsibility, and, on the other, to 
promote the entrepreneurial self-optimisation of the individual (cf. Verwoert 45). In 
this respect, the catchword “new entrepreneurship” alludes to individualised marketing 
strategies and social hardships, but also to a skilful alternation between employment 
office, employment and self-employment structures. 
In 2004, a shift of perspective occurred in the European cultural and scientific 
community with respect to the relation between self-organised creative work and the 
politically and economically defined cultural economy. It was the daily experience in 
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different European cities such as Paris, Barcelona, London, Berlin, Munich, Zurich, 
and Madrid that forced many to rethink their societal as well as individual roles 
(McRobbie, “Creative London – Creative Berlin”). Especially cultural producers as 
well as social geographers, sociologists and cultural scientists started debating new 
economically and socially conditioned mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion. Today, 
the attempt to capitalise on creative work and to bring it under the direct control of the 
capitalisation process that is summarised in the phrase of the creative industries, has 
lost much of its public appeal with the flop of the New Economy and the “Ich-AG” 
(i.e. German for “I Inc.”). But the conversion to a society of self-reliant creative 
entrepreneurs who successfully market their own ‘obsessions’ is still underway, only 
less glamorously than in the mid to end 1990s (cf. Wießner).  
The concept of the Culturepreneur has even become a new export good: In the case of 
Berlin, e. g. the city’s public relation agency “Partner für Berlin” (“Partners for 
Berlin”) makes an effort each year to send a number of entrepreneurial web, fashion, 
and multimedia designers abroad to represent and market the “New Berlin”. The 
design oriented branches are important inspirations for the successful export of a 
young and trendy creative “Berlin”, which has helped, as an urban and national label, 
to create a specific marketing identity for the most diverse creative industries. 
In the following, the question will be discussed of what this social reconstruction, 
personified by the figure of the Culturepreneur, is tending towards, whom it serves, 
and what it embodies spatially, what effects it has on the constitution and the 
necessities of urban scenes. The thesis thus emphasised is: It will be important to 
investigate locations and spatial materials used by the Culturepreneur in order to grasp 
his role in the reconstitution, reformation and performance of new social formations 
such as scenes in the age of an increasingly individualised and fragmented urban 
society. 
Following Koppetsch and Burkart (“Werbung und Unternehmensberatung”) and Casey 
(Work, Self and Society), I claim that, up to now, social diagnosis has ignored systemic 
changes (in the economy, culture, politics, etc.) concerning cultural professions (and 
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their norms, rules, values, practices). Within the framework of a spatially oriented 
sociology of work, an analysis of new job profiles in the field of knowledge and 
culture requires the systematic integration of cultural aspects, new communication and 
learning strategies, and modes of sociality. The crucial role of the spatial and 
locational aspects for the formation and establishment of new – and in the beginning 
insecure – start-up business practices, especially under the conditions of the so-called 
New Cultural Economy, has so far widely been ignored.  
Therefore, I will firstly analyse the type Culturepreneur as primarily addressed by 
Davies and Ford (“Art Capital”). I am aiming to extend this notion and will question 
whether those new professional intermediaries can possibly also be regarded as ‘space 
pioneers’. The extent to which their appearance in urban areas can specifically be 
explained by involving geographic as well as social space will be examined. I will 
clarify which abilities are attributed to the Culturepreneurs, what kinds of agencies 
they require − or create for themselves – in order to build up networks, to arrange 
meetings, and to establish urban laboratories where new products can be tested and 
where experience and knowledge may be shared. Which urban locations do they need? 
Will they create their own locations and landscapes in the absence of suitable existing 
ones? How do they communicate, perform, and present themselves beyond the 
traditional settings offered by employment agencies, trade or art fairs and corporate 
associations? 
Secondly, the aspect of performativity as well as the performative role of the 
Culturepreneurs in an urban context and in the development of cultural clusters, called 
“local cultural industries”2, has not yet been the subject of discussion. The 
accumulation of cultural facilities and “cultural capital” in one place has – as often 
assumed – a positive impact on the site policy of “placeless” service economies. 
Particularly, it is the “new creative worker”, active in the “business related services” 
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sector, who expects and requires such social and creative milieus for her/his 
professional activities (e.g. Helbrecht).  
This article, at the same time, asks for the interpretations contributed by this type of 
people to the urban conditions, and also addresses the cultural economic 
modernization status of the new German capital of Berlin. With respect to Blum 
(“Scenes” 7), who concludes that “the body of literature and research on cities seems 
to be silent on the questions of scenes”, theoretical discourses will be integrated with 
empirical results, and thus a first step to overcome this silence will be offered.  
To put it in more abstract terms: If the integrative machine “the city” no longer 
functions comprehensively, which visible and invisible social micro-formations will 
appear in an urban society? Which of these will take the place of the traditional, formal 
and, concomitantly, democratically accountable forms of work and engines of 
integration?  
 
Processes of Individualisation and `Scenification´: On the Constitution of the 
Urban Space 
Experiencing the Urban 
An aesthetic of the urban and an atmosphere of limitless possibility are fertile soil for 
the new, creative entrepreneurs, many of whom have planted in it the seed of their own 
business or urban dreams. The politics of the British and the German “New Centre”, 
starting in the UK in 1996 with Tony Blair and in Germany in 1998 with Gerhard 
Schroeder, have a significant effect on the development of this new type of cultural 
entrepreneur. The addressees of these policies (and image politics) are representatives 
of a de-structured urban society that is not only extremely individualised and 
ambivalent. As a result of numerous uncertainties, lost communal reliability, and an 
alleged multi optionality with regard to life choices, individuals are required to make a 
series of new decisions concerning their behaviour in order to situate themselves in an 
urban society.  
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The spatial location of playful experimentation with this demand for individualisation 
is the city: The city is seen as the laboratory for one’s own ideas, irrespective of the 
fact that the individual protagonists are subject to new patterns of flexibilisation and 
processes of social disintegration, which can best be absorbed in the urban. 
Individualised entrepreneurial existence strategies, however, are positively coded, in 
terms of socio-politics, and have been so at least since 1998. Here, the independence 
demanded by politics, and the gradual exclusion from the social security system are 
gallantly whitewashed by the type of language chosen. The result was a politics of 
rhetorical images and the redefinition of symbols. Images and symbols had to be found 
which proclaimed realities, rather than possibilities, ideas rather than delivery, 
attitudes rather than events. Following the German parliamentary election of 1998, 
Gabriele Fischer, editor-in-chief of the magazine Econy, suggested that the 
presentation of business as an adventure might be the formula to re-ignite desire for 
the project “work”, and proclaim the realisation of daily existence not as a burden and 
daily chore, but rather as a source of fun and personal fulfilment. This type of politics 
addresses people “who want to break free, who want to do something, who still see 
business as an adventure and are not always complaining about bureaucracy and the 
burden of taxes” (Fischer 1ff.). 
 
The City as an Adventure Playground 
In retrospect, Gerhard Schroeder’s image politics – in contrast to its self-proclaimed 
orientation towards the future – greatly romanticises the image of a self-reliant, 
pioneer-like entrepreneurship in the adventure playground of the city. Thus, on the one 
hand, the city organism appears as a potentially chaotic, open, but at the same time 
“cool” territory that provides ideal conditions for Culturepreneurs. On the other hand, 
the logic of the adventure playground means, subliminally, that as part of this 
individual entrepreneurial campaign, risks should not be judged to be existential 
threats, but rather be understood as new opportunities for orientation, i.e. opportunities 
for acquiring personal knowledge for future operations. As expressed by Gerhard 
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Schroeder in his 1998 statement of government policy, the “social net” of the welfare 
state must “become a trampoline”.  
The counterpart to these images emerges in modified form in the marketing strategies 
of cities. The city is increasingly establishing itself on media image levels, constructed 
according to imaginary models (for example, historical Middle Ages, Tuscan or 
Mediterranean) and fixed typologies whose socially integrative relationship is difficult 
to discern. In the municipal context, image strategies are increasingly geared towards a 
group which is young, dynamic, happy to make decisions and willing to consume, and 
which, in turn, tries to correspond to the ideal type represented by these marketing 
strategies for the urban.  
This way, specific urban articulations, for example in Vienna with a mid 1990s 
kicking drum‘n’bass scene, in London with hip and trendy fashion makers, and in 
Berlin with young and cool multimedia and designers, became known to a wider 
audience. The cities, in turn, see in this clientele, whose self-image comes very close 
to that of a company – the “I Inc.” – the opportunity for an expansion of the business 
related service sector, for economic prosperity and for profit in terms of image. 
One positive, yet ironic interpretation of this emerging milieu could assign to this new 
type of entrepreneur a much needed function in the economic sector of the city as the 
creator of bridges and systems of communication between the two subsystems of 
economy and culture (cf. Bude 9). At these hubs of communication, whose physical 
equivalents are club events, gallery openings and start-up opening parties, questions 
concerning the modernisation of the city are addressed anew. It is not the self-
presentation and self-celebration of the individual, which should be accepted as 
principal significance of these patently performative events. The “places of the 
Culturepreneurs” are a platform for social interaction and transfer, rather than a 
permanent and purely economically structured place; platforms on which, using urban 
materials, new relationships can be tried out. The question of the present urban 
planning and urban development making of places in the city in times of significant 
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and generally accepted transformation processes is inevitably linked with the question 
concerning who such places shall be made or changed for.  
 
Modes of Social and Spatial Re-Embedding 
Socially disintegrated, the urban individual finds him/herself exposed to a large variety 
of alternative actions and decisions that can facilitate societal place making (cf. above 
all Beck 17ff.). ‘Dis-embedded’ from known socio-structural safety nets, such as the 
church, trade unions and codified associations and increasingly also family ties, the 
individual has to decide on some social contexts – such as milieus or scenes – that 
ensure suitably flexible social integration opportunities (cf. Banks et al.). 
However, structural modes of “post-traditional communities”, noted in this process 
(Baumann 19), are very much unclear. Post-traditional communities differ from 
“settled and established communities” (Hitzler and Pfadenhauer 78) in that 
memberships can be revoked at any time since they are largely free. According to 
Baumann another difference is that they create an “imagined or aesthetic community” 
which provides the short-term illusion of being coherent in terms of forming opinions 
as to what is right and relevant. It has authority as long as it is assigned authority, since 
it has only little institutional sanction potential. The power aspect, posited by Baumann 
and Hitzler and Pfadenhauer, is based on the potential of persuasion, on the per 
definition “voluntary emotional bonds of the agents conceiving themselves as 
members”. However, from an analytical point of view, there are also obscurities with 
regard to participants of the “persuasion debate” (Baumann 19), particularly regarding 
the question of the how and the critical examination of individual contexts. How and 
where does the establishing core of the communalisation processes form? Or, to put it 
more directly: How is the urban space constituted nowadays? Who literally works 
towards its constitution? 
Initially, it appears to be less significant to identify purely aesthetic and visible surface 
phenomena (clothing, outfit, etc.) as modes of integration and motives of the desire to 
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participate in scene-formation processes. While one may surely consider this to be a 
subordinate aspect of being socially integrated, questions arise with regard to the deep 
structures and subjective motivations of agents integrated into specific social, political 
and mental formations. My findings suggest that the mere participation and 
assimilation in a collective during one of the much-quoted techno or rave events 
cannot – in analytical terms – yet manifest the core of processes of scenification.3  
 
Performativity and Spacing  
More recent approaches, however, explicitly explore the rank of space and show that 
space establishing processes are progressively more complex. Löw (Raumsoziologie) 
pointed out theoretically that such processes are “brought about in acting by a 
structured arrangement of social goods and people in places”. According to Löw 
“objects and people are arranged synthetically and relationally” (204). She posits that 
spaces are not always visible formations but can also be materially perceived. 
Accordingly, spaces are ascribed a potentiality that is characterised by the term 
“atmosphere” (Böhme 24ff). According to Blum, 
…the element of theatricality integral to the scene marks the 
importance of its site as an occasion for seeing; the scene is an 
occasion for seeing and being seen and so, for doing seeing and being 
seen. But to mention its occasioned character is to bring time as well 
as space to the grammar of scene. For if the scene is a site, a space for 
seeing and being seen, its occasioned character marks it as the site 
whose engagement is punctuated temporally as if it were a ceremony. 
(cf. Blum 14) 
                                                     
3 It shall suffice to refer here to Funke and Schroer (“Lebensstilökonomie” 219 ff.) who do not 
assess Hitzler’s dictum of a necessary integration into new forms of communalisation to be 
optional and conditioned purely emotional or aesthetical. Both authors hold that “sovereignty in 
issues of lifestyle is not superfluous luxury but competence of import for survival” (ibid. 225). 
Hence, the socially differentiating criterion is less an apparently freely selectable subjective 
stylisation but an ambivalent “non-compulsory constraint towards necessary stylisation” of the self 
(ibid. 227). 
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The constructivist approach by Blum and Löw makes a changed relationship between 
body and space, the individual and the temporal collective the centre of attention. The 
task at hand, further developed from this point, is to address the experiences and 
emotions, which are intrinsic in physical bodies and interact with the built-up space.  
Widely noticed but rarely integrated by municipal powers in the communal politics, 
the number of private exhibition rooms and clubs in Berlin has multiplied in the 1990s, 
particularly in the latter half of the 1990s. Nevertheless, the do-it-yourself attitude of 
the producers had its impact on the city’s municipalities: Until the mid 1990s, the 
illegal character of many creative initiatives was ignored or silently accepted. Later, 
forced by investment capital and reconstruction activities, this laissez-faire attitude 
was swept away. The fact that the efforts of the creative initiatives have their roots in 
the youth culture suggests a new authenticity, which is also an indication of a self-
regulated variety. So far, the protagonists of this youth culture have found themselves 
constantly at loggerheads with the municipal authorities.  
Berlin involuntarily supplied these cultural initiatives with open space, empty 
buildings and also an unclear planning situation. Due to the ongoing process of urban 
unification, existing open spaces provided the existential base for those activities. 
These cultural projects of the 1990s were confronted with the practices of many 
initiatives which had their ideological roots in the 1970s and 1980s. 30 to 40 years 
ago, Berlin’s International Building Exhibition (IBA) worked towards establishing and 
strengthening the local level, the “Kiez”4, as the distinct form of a geographically 
based and essentialist locality. As they sometimes cooperate and sometimes struggle 
against each other, a conflict is diagnosed between two generations with distinct and 
significant differences in their spatial practices.  
Other researchers claim to identify processes of spatial disintegration, for example, of 
centres of creativity (cf. McRobbie, “Clubs to Companies” 479). Using the case of 
Berlin, it will be demonstrated that outside the dominant and for the most part visible 
emplacement strategies of the historical and desired service complexes in the inner city 
                                                     
4  German for ‘hood’. 
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parts, new tactics in spatial practices can be observed by new urban protagonists, the 
Culturepreneurs. The analysis of these can provide insights into the current social 
formation structures. The following cases represent an urban platforms deal with 
action in the tense relationship between neo-liberal existential basic conditions and the 
desire for an economic and artistic realisation of one’s own ideas. This simultaneity 
and complexity of the observed processes refer all the more – on a methodological 
level – to context-sensitive approaches and a view of the transformation scenes. This 
suggests that it is appropriate to also examine the emergence of the new as something 
novel (cf. Matthiesen 130).5
 
Launching an Entrepreneurial Project  
Preparing the Place  
The first case study deals with three men aged 27, 32 and 35, two of whom studied 
graphic design in Cologne until 2000. They worked there during their studies in 
different offices and agencies, and acquired additional experience after graduating, as 
employees with far-reaching competences and tasks in other – also international – 
agencies. In late 2001, they moved from Cologne to Berlin and searched for office 
space in the Prenzlauer Berg borough. They found a suitable office near 
Helmholtzplatz, which was a disused shop with a floor space of approx. 145 m2. The 
rent was quite cheap, they redecorated the rooms themselves, brought their equipment, 
                                                     
5 The empirical material for the following analysis is based on 25 interviews chosen by virtue of 
their entrepreneurial and artistic activities, conducted by the author in Berlin between September 
2002 and April 2003. A preliminary methodological remark: whenever an individual case is 
mentioned below in methodical terms I am aiming at generating themes, categories and narratives 
from sequences of guideline-supported and semi-standardised interviews. What will come to the 
fore in doing so are above all life-world-related aspects as well as situational and socio-spatial 
ascriptions that provide a superior-level explanatory basis for certain agents and their pertaining 
professional groups and their networks. Those levels of meanings are reconstructed, i.e. developed 
from the statements in the material, subjected to comparative reviews and contrasted. First 
generalisations of professional biographic transformation situations and their spatialisation become 
possible. The latter in turn then do not provide information about an individual case but about the 
specific milieus, scenes, and social arenas, institutional local, regional and supra-regional 
intertwining and structural situations, which are articulated in the sequences of the case. 
Ethnographic field observations generate further centrally observing angles of incidence into 
specifically condensed situations. 
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and ‘organised’ table boards. An Internet connection was established via a free 
hanging cable from their window across the courtyard to another office next door. 
Work commenced with an enormous party.  
Field record: We are sitting in the anteroom and they explain to me some of their 
projects, also planned ones. It is not really peaceful, the anteroom has to be cleared 
since a friendly gallery owner and her artist plus some works from Bremen are due to 
arrive tonight. The anteroom facing the street – where work is done at four large desks 
during daytime – is emptied. The next-door DJ is setting up his sound and light 
equipment in the doorframe (the light gear includes a multi-mirror disco sphere and a 
video projector), some beer crates are lugged in.  
Half an hour later the room is empty, the curator appears and starts placing the objects, 
frames are put up at the walls, carpets unrolled on the floor, flyers and information 
leaflets put on display. There is no formal opening. At some point the whole room is 
filled with people. At about 23:00 hrs the room is brimming over, smoke, electronic 
music wavers across the heads of the visitors, some of them are dancing, more people 
pass by and crane interested heads into the place or push off. Colleagues, competitors 
and critics arrive, most discussions focus on potential orders, past jobs and safe 
contacts.  
At about 1:00 hrs two of the three office owners stand outside in front of the door, 
exchange views with colleagues from another agency. I learn that two of the three 
owners have registered unemployed with the labour office, use another person, namely 
the third owner, as a stooge to bill their services and that the two former are currently 
trying to organise start-up capital out of their phase of unemployment. The field 
discussion was started by asking “Are you also going about things like this...?”, and 
was casually answered in the affirmative (end of record, documented on 23 May 2003 




Their identity-creating work is rooted in their training as graphic designers at the 
University of Applied Sciences so that they may be called – in the widest sense –
design-intensive symbol producers. They define the specifications of their production 
with the term “holistic designs”, which for them implies necessarily high design 
standards as well as an artistic self-image in the performance of their activities. This 
specification shows, on the one hand, artistic motives; on the other hand it is 
unspecific, adjustable and extremely variable in terms of content.  
Their project-based studies at the University of Applied Sciences were characterised 
by open structures or ‘quasi pre-programmed independence’. The project studies 
trained them to become ‘universal dilettanti’. These self-ascriptions show learned but 
also unquestioned flexibility aimed at attaining the necessary and professionally 
desired expressivity, as well as absolute professional, but also personal control of the 
content of their products. 
Conditioned by the socialisation patterns of their education, the transition to their work 
life appears to have been successively prepared by their life-world. Actually, there is 
no well-defined entrance into work life; education and work life were rather entwined 
over several years. The continuation of those entwined phases systematically manifests 
itself in the conceptualisation of their business: the latter will be established, besides 
its thematic openness, also in socio-organisational terms, as an interaction platform 
and docking-stepping grounds station for other agents (friends, acquainted and 
professionally associated agents etc.). Consequentially “working in a team” entails a 
professional integration of like-minded friends and even partners. Consistently, the 
name of the Greige office does not cite the names of the owners, as is customary in 
Germany, such as Springer & Jacoby. The name Greige, a reference to a colour 
between grey and beige as coined by Le Corbusier, refers rather to the socio-
organisational idea of interdisciplinary work in network structures.  
Work in networks is structured systemically, where every agent from different 
European cities who temporarily collaborates on a project, contributes his or her skills 
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to the current work. This organisational structure can be swiftly and flexibly adjusted 
to any external requirements. Thus, new enquiries and orders may be addressed within 
a few hours or days, by putting together appropriate teams. A suitable team can be 
presented to third-party clients not only as a quantitatively large but also as a perfectly 
suited design office. 
This organisational model consistently combines and links work and private spheres. 
Strictly speaking, there are no classical work time models and time structure models 
that find application in all situations. The previously separated life-world spheres of 
“work” and “leisure” are defined according to specific order and employment 
situations. The organisational structures of agents in the field of symbol-intensive 
service provision swiftly point to – as it is documented in the above record – 
hazardous subsistence conditions of urban cultural-economic transformation 
structures, but also to strategic responses of individual precarious situations. Hence, in 
the following the focus will be placed on questions about the tactics and strategies that 
can be derived from the self-ascriptions of agents and that are developed in times of 
extremely low competition (due to hardly any order intake).  
Special emphasis is placed, on the one hand, on free design competition, networking 
and integration approaches, as well as on cooperation with associated offices. On the 
other hand, we can hypothesise from our observations that micro-spatial strategies are 
used to subject immobile and ostensibly clearly programmed office space to various 
sorts of temporary change and re-programming. However, the following is less an 
artistic or effectiveness-related evaluation of such micro-spatial policies, rather than an 
investigation into the variable range of strategic approaches adopted by 
expressiveness-geared professional groups as they offensively react to difficult 
subsistence conditions in times of economic crisis and structural upheaval. Place 
matters! 
Such internal orientation and (re-)structuring of places shows a sample of elements of 
responses to the extreme structural crisis and scarcity conditions of Berlin. Yet, 
besides their organisation as a flexible supply-oriented platform with extensions in 
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many other European cities, I have also identified approaches to a development of 
creative demand options. The necessary organisationally competitive character of the 
Greige enterprise highlights communicative strategies in order to make proactive use 
of the micro-location ‘office’, in the sense of place-making, as a hub for fluid social 
communalisation and cultural scenes targeting new attractiveness. 
 
Playing (with) the Places 
Culturepreneurs’ locations are part of a highly individual and, at the same time, playful 
practice of (attracting) attention. In order to register locations in the minds of other 
people, a specific policy of location and scene is necessary, which renegotiates (a 
sense of) cultural belonging. Greige, for example, may be the meeting place for an 
open, but clearly defined, group of friends, colleagues, and rivals, for the interested 
and for the curious. Its access and perception are guided by policies, which displays 
similarities to those of a club. However, the familiar selection mechanisms of a club – 
i.e. bouncers turning people away at the door – take on a more subtle form in the case 
of Greige. A variety of media, such as word of mouth recommendation, or mailing 
lists and flyers ensure that information on forthcoming events, exhibition openings, or 
even new products, reaches a specific target group. Apart from this information policy, 
however, efforts are also made to ensure that the location Greige occasionally recedes 
into oblivion. For months on end, nothing happens; no events are organised, partly, 
because there are other matters to be attended to.  
In the case of Greige, we can see that a game is being played with visitors, 
camouflaging the location, and then returning it to public consciousness, at a later date. 
Greige works without an annual plan and announces art exhibitions at short notice by 
sending invitations via e-mail lists, above all to selected friends and interested 
members of the wider art scene. The header on the e-mail indicates (or fails to 
indicate) membership to what has thus ostensibly become a scene and is the criterion 
for inclusion or exclusion in a social formation about which no one bothers to talk 
openly. 
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This, at first, surprising and seemingly contradictory strategy of hiding is a sort of 
behaviour, which evokes memories of the old socialist mentality with regard to the 
service industry: the customer is not king, and business apparently doesn’t matter. This 
strategy is also employed outwardly: to the outside world, the appearance of the 
location Greige offers no indication of what events take place inside. Only insiders and 
those with local knowledge perceive it as a place where events and performances take 
place; only they can read the local urban landscape. In positioning itself in urban 
space, by means of this policy of hide-and-seek, Greige creates not only social 
difference, but also keeps the broad masses at a distance.  
When eager searchers do nonetheless find the location, another subtle differentiation 
criterion is brought into play. At the parties which take place, for example, after 
openings, present guests are offered a variety of identification patterns by means of art 
exhibited and electronic music played. It is the assignment to these cultural-symbolic 
products – based on the extent to which the performance can be experienced and 
interpreted – which, in the first place, makes a memorable participation in the event 
possible. This is where the subtle exclusion strategy lies: no one is refused entry to the 
location; indeed it is rather the case that anyone may be admitted, but only a few are 
integrated. This integration is also a challenge to secure membership on a permanent 
basis, the changeable character of the location guarantees, in the first instance, that no 
trend is created, that no financial dependencies arise, and that commerce does not 
hinder the creative enterprise. It is this act of maintaining a balance of permanent 
change in the differentiation criteria, an avoidance of pure commercialisation, and the 
employment of hiding strategies, which ensures the survival of this location and its 
protagonists, for some time. If they were to position themselves as an open counterpart 
to existing cultural and social currents (the “underground” model), they would 
immediately be culturally chewed up by the urban trend machine and financially 
destroyed, as indeed they would be, too, if they adopted the “mainstream” model (as 
was the case in Berlin for Hackesche Höfe or other locations).  
Their interest in location, and in what location expresses, indicates, for one thing, 
pleasure in the local coding game. Pleasure, however, comes up against the necessity 
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of dressing the location in a specific narrative of location-symbolism in order to be 
perceived at all. In this game with the significant, locations are, for this reason, 
battlefields of symbolic landscapes in the post-industrial city. Subtle tactics of social 
positioning can be observed at (and in dealing with) these locations. Even places in 
relatively established housing areas display heterotopic characteristics. They can no 
longer be categorised as underground or mainstream, as would have been perfectly 
possible a few years ago: those who operate and play at the locations have achieved a 
degree of reflection, which makes it possible for them to employ emplacement tactics 
which work with and play in economic and cultural terms with social Utopias, with 
alternative blueprints. They make use of traditional standards of Bohemianism. Yet, 
for this very act of adaptation and their understanding of the Zeitgeist, they are pop-
revolutionaries and, so, responsible for post-urban transformation processes.  
 
Exploring and Designing Berlin 
Ethnographers and Storytellers of the Urban 
Our interview partners (one female, one male) are 26 and 27 years old and hail from 
Lucerne (Switzerland). They received training as graphic designers in Switzerland. In 
1997/8 they relocated to Berlin where they worked as interns in several agencies, took 
on the Art Direction of a magazine and did mainly freelance graphic work. Since 
January 2002 they have been working together in a disused shop in Friedrichshain, in 
the borough of Kreuzberg-Friedrichshain. They have been integrated into a residential 
quarter management project titled “Boxion”.  
Their identity-creating work is rooted in a wide range of creative design production, 
mainly in the print media but increasingly in the Internet sphere. Besides smaller 
orders, they were given the opportunity of designing the magazine Berliner in 2000. 
Three issues of this high-quality magazine were published before it was discontinued. 
It was a medium in which – nomen est omen – Berlin was re-discovered. The 
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following is a closer review of the identificatory content in the work on a Berlin 
magazine by the two Swiss partners mentioned above.  
What is striking is their approach to “move something with a company formation”. 
This moment of movement and moving in space presupposes a space that is not pre-
moulded, or better, it presupposes ‘space’ per se. This sense construction of a space 
that is, in their view, not pre-moulded, forces the agents to develop strategies of self-
assertion in space, to quasi discover their own territory, and to symbolically occupy 
and re-code it. The counter-horizon of Berlin, formulated and stylised in the process as 
a terra incognita or a ‘no land’, consists of the morbid charm of the former workers’ 
borough of Friedrichshain, cultural artefacts in the form of East German residents, 
their hidden leftover stocks of cultural knowledge, socialist practices and behaviours. 
Thus, this self-ascription of the agents shows a moment of ethnographic significance. 
The two agents conceive themselves as strangers in the city of Berlin, and basically 
take on the role of ethnographers, via which they re-define and re-evaluate the social 
relationship between insider and outsider, old and new, in and out. 
They use a variety of attributes to describe a romantic situation of Berliners, an almost 
extraterrestrial situation, a spatial peculiarity that is hard to match. The symbolic space 
of Berlin appears to the agents to be a project, a space for movement that seems to be, 




This sense-making role, however, does not only exhibit exclusively self-referential 
aspects, but also includes clear signal patterns of a network-like sociality: both agents 
develop a product, a magazine titled Berliner, which represents, on a graphical level, 
the disparate cartography of how the two protagonists perceive this city. In other 
words, this product bundles social and psycho-geographical orientation knowledge that 
is distributed to a fluid community of temporarily like-minded people.  
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This process imparts an image of a new location in Friedrichshain, a “scene and pub 
borough” that has been prospering for years, as a moving event space. The ‘mood 
level’ and new borough initiatives and siting practices by ‘culture management 
agencies’ (such as the “Spielfeld” agency6) are accompanied by very concrete 
structural changes at the ‘business structure’ level. Thus, the semantic, graphic and 
event-oriented special expertise is produced, imparted, distributed and supplied to a 
broad clientele by ‘scene’ experts. It is at this intersection that the ability to recognise 
socio-spatial potentials and their economic utilisation is combined with entrepreneurial 
philosophy. The company name chosen by the agents, ‘Substrate’, is programmatic, 
since it commodifies their entrepreneurial cultural practice and hence represents their 
life-world identity. 
This construction and situational self-ascription forms the bed of the bohème-like 
marginal position (that is also related to a cliché) from where the two Swiss can 
position themselves as artists and make professional use of their situation. Hence, the 
obvious positioning and self-ascription fits in with the spatially conditioned location 
perception in Friedrichshain so that the – in their view – disparate transformation 
material (old workers vs. new designers, anonymity vs. socialistically idealised 
practices, etc.) permits the recognition of a stimulation substrate which, in turn, is 
reflected in the products of the two Swiss. What is not shown are economic and social 
interdependencies or any other factors that keep the business economically afloat. 
Rather, they search for a necessary stage to formulate their biographical self-design in 
the unfiltered austerity and symbolically not yet fully used geography of the local. In 
their self-stylisation, the agents produce a social arena, a mental territory within which 
they relish re-coding the social hardships, deprivations and stagnation situations as a 
subtle stimulation potential.  
The counter-horizons are the common myths of Berlin, the “city as an island” that is to 
be conquered, “Berlin mentalities”, but also structures of local opportunities brought 
about by economic decline in the perforated – and declining – workers’ boroughs of 
                                                     
6 Spielfeld is a company and event agency communicating and managing cultural projects in socio-
economic instable housing areas of Berlin (online, 15 May 2004, available: www.spielfeld.net). 
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Berlin. Hence, the basic motive correlates with Berlin metaphors of the early 1920s, 
during the Weimar Republic, when individual and also entrepreneurial self-assertion 
as both a cultural and an urban project fully caught on for the first time, and fully 
unfolded its potential. 
The high degree of adjustability between professional and biographic situations is 
combined with the geographical place-making of the ‘Substrat’ enterprise. The 
economic transformation context of Berlin, with its neo-liberal and extremely 
flexibilised labour market demands in times of scarcity is translated as an invitation to 
cultural self-assertion and entrepreneurial self-realisation. The territory that is not yet 
fully transformed and encoded is identified as a stimulating milieu, with references to 
the 1920s, when the city was made out as an adventure playground and site for new 
cultural projects. 
 
Culturepreneurs? Spatial Competence! 
Empirical field material made it possible to show for the first time that, for the city of 
Berlin, Culturepreneurs’ individual emplacement strategies are not to be read as just 
the product of neo-liberal policies and processes: attaining autonomy has been forced 
upon them by a need to secure a livelihood. Culturepreneurs embody a highly 
ambivalent relationship: the catchword “new entrepreneurship” demonstrates 
individualised marketing strategies and social hardships. It also indicates the 
temporarily skilful alternation between different modes of institutional integration 
(McRobbie, “Kunst, Mode und Musik” 14; McRobbie, “Clubs to Companies” 476).  
The spatial practices of these urban pioneers provide insights into new urban ways of 
behaving and are helpful to the analysis of communal culture. They also allow, what 
Angela McRobbie (“Creative London – Creative Berlin” 3ff) named “cultural 
individuali-sation”, the observation of the playful (self) production and performance 
tactics of these individuals on the urban stage. These tactics reveal consciously 
constructed identificatory opportunities for adoption and adaptation, deliberately 
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littered with contradictions for the purpose of fine distinction. The spatial practices and 
entrepreneurial activities are treated as significant changes in the reconfiguration of the 
organisation of work, relative to space and place, and focus on how these subjects 
operate in often precarious life situations.  
Such an individual is also constantly finding new niches for work and thus inventing 
new jobs for him/herself (e.g. “incubator”, “creative agent” etc.). S/he is highly mobile 
moving from one job or project to the next, and in the process also moving from one 
geographical site to the next. Social interaction is fast and fleeting. Friendships need to 
be put on hold, or suspended on trust, and, when such a non-category of multi-skilled 
persons is extended across a whole sector of young working people, there is a sharp 
sense of transience, impermanence, and even solitude (Augé). 
The field material described characteristics and ways of perceiving through which 
Culturepreneurs make themselves known as a new urban type on the urban stage: they 
form a new type of relationship between their work practice, entrepreneurial turnover 
and their own social and creative development. This set of activities must – according 
to the author’s observations – be framed by and tied to a tension-filled, ambivalent 
self-made ensemble of spatial images and codes. The result is difficult to interpret 
from the outside but is, and this is crucial, interpretable for insiders.  
Ronald Hitzler’s sociological interpretations are blind to space. They do not take into 
account the spatial dimension when analysing symbolic differentiation processes 
(Hitzler, Bucher and Niederbacher 26). On the one hand, according to the author’s 
findings and the observed agents in Berlin, differentiation processes run on the basis of 
the readability of the physical environment without which inclusion and exclusion on 
the social-symbolic level would not be possible. On the other hand, statements made 
by Culturepreneurs indicate a playful attitude towards these very codes, which are 
sometimes connected associatively and sometimes ironically instrumentalised in order 
to express their own placing strategies. Bourdieu’s “fields” and sorts of capital 
(cultural, social or economic) are reflectively “sampled” for purpose of individual 
emplacement strategy as well as specific project-oriented needs.  
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Culturepreneurs represent the spread of a model in which the biography of work is 
derived from the kinds of lives led by classic artists. The job market for artists 
generally has long been one of the most dynamic and flexible part-time job markets. 
Discontinuous careers are the rule here. Frequent changes between employment and 
non-employment and between various forms of work are the order of the day 
(Wiedemeyer and Friedrich 163). Culturepreneurs have adopted this model in all of its 
contrasting facets. Their masterly marketing of their own labour is set against an 
existential insecurity, hidden by a playful Bohemian attitude.  
Expert knowledge within the economy of attention hides a struggle to maintain one’s 
own position in society. As creative labour entrepreneurs, Culturepreneurs (are forced 
to) take on the role of forerunners in the flexibilisation of the job market. Thus 
flexibilisation will, in all probability, grow to encompass other sections of the service 
economy (Wiedemeyer and Friedrich 167ff). 
This economic interface function of the Culturepreneurs is also clear at the dissolving 
borders between mainstream and subculture. Once, youth practices and subcultural 
practices served as a means to distinguish their practitioners from those in mainstream 
formations, but now maintaining this form of demarcation is, according to my 
findings, becoming ever more difficult. The old dichotomy has been replaced by new 
social formations, which no longer display a rigid contrast between mainstream and 
subculture, and profit-oriented service provision and cultural production, and which – 
through the constant and simultaneous processes of reshuffling and recoding – mediate 
between different social groupings. Those on the left complain about the much cited 
“sell-out of the underground”, but it is also true that no clear mainstream can be 
recognised either. Difference, rather than adaptation, is the main driving force behind 
post-modern consumption and this has led to a hybridisation of the mainstream and to 
a multiplicity of heterogeneous styles and groups. Hitzler and Pfadenhauer (“Let your 
body” 90) speak of “post-traditional forms of community formation”, in which post-
modern concepts such as individuality and community combine to produce a loose 
temporary structure, which is only momentarily binding.  
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The Culturepreneur’s functioning can generate affective identification processes only 
retrospectively. The linguistic analogy between the sociological category “Szene” 
(German for “scene”) and the spatial category “in Szene setzen” (German for “be the 
centre of interest”) links scenes to the radiation of a physical place. Club events, 
gallery, shop, exhibition and office openings, for example, are stagings and temporary 
place-makings of scenes on the urban stage, where agents use the urban fabric, the city 
or concrete buildings, to create networked relationships of power, meaning and tension 
in order to test new products. This social formation “scene” experiences and performs 
itself in its materiality and corporeality through its emotional presence at and with the 
places it selects. Consciously constructed places enable individuals to see and to be 
seen. These protagonists are at once both, participant and spectator, both equipped 
with subtle knowledge and skills of knowing how to get “in the scene” and “staying 
out” of (other) scenes. According to Blum, “scenes evoke the sign of tribal hegemony 
because their practices always means the rule of a specialized solidarity at that site” 
(“Scenes” 18).  
The Culturepreneurs studied take on a central role in the constitution of professional 
scenes, in particular through helping to develop new urban coding formations. The 
synthetic (pioneering) achievement of the Culturepreneurs lies in the fact that they 
stage new tension-loaded and ambivalent location images and motifs even in places 
that have fallen out of the traditional logic of urban use. Existing urban material is 
brought into relationship with their entrepreneurial as well as artistic activity and 
contributes, in combination with what is physically present, to an ambivalent visibility 
of the location. This (locational) policy of temporary hiding and disappearance must 
be interpreted in the context of the development of heterogeneous scene practices. 
Hitzler, Bucher and Niederbacher identify these practices for the most part a-
physically and in unclear relation to built space and not just to social space. The 
findings of the Culturepreneurs presented here, using the example of Berlin, 
demonstrate that the Culturepreneurs in Berlin provide evidence that they use their 
respective localities especially for entrepreneurial activities. First of all, they build up 
that tension-loaded relationship which guarantees them artistic and entrepreneurial 
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attention in the wider Berlin scenes. In this sense, the protagonists are representatives 
of a “network sociality” (Lash, “Network Sociality”; Wittel 75). Relational global 
networking and novel creative place-making methods on the local level are their 
vehicles to overstep the classical “handiwork” concept and to redefine the relationship 
between art and economy, subculture and mainstream, city and city image, and city 
and individual. 
The fact that greatly distorted, sometimes romantic, often very imaginative spatial 
images are thus designed, all of which flirt with the socio-political realities, cannot be 
attributed either to an outflow from the hedonistic society, or to the spatial blindness of 
the Culturepreneurs. It is rather the case, that these Culturepreneurs prove themselves 
to be the architects of spatial scavenging and recycling. As ‘space pioneers’, they 
position themselves in perforated places of the city, places which, through 
deindustrialisation and reorganisation of the infrastructure, have fallen out of the cycle 
of economic use and out of the everyday awareness of urban society. Apparently 
functionless spaces, useless, neglected, leftover, and forgotten places have come to 
exist here. In short, inner city micro-peripheries are thus reconstituted. In an age of 
ever more closely controlled, staged shopping paradises and Disneyfied city areas, the 
Culturepreneurs conjure up memories of the instabilities of the face of the nineteenth 
century city, by means of temporary use, locational politics of hiding, and spatial 
visions.  
Culturepreneurs may be considered as social switchpoints in an individualised society, 
in which new formations will be tested, and scenes formed and opened. Their 
entrepreneurial activity is characterised by fast moving fluctuations in spatial location. 
The mechanisms driving this rapid change may be sought in the spatial potential, as 
well as in the relatively unclear future of the city of Berlin. They might also be found 
in the Culturepreneurs themselves, in the ways in which they express their social 
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From Gentlemanly Publishing to Conglomerates: 
The Contemporary Literary Field in the UK  
Gesa Stedman 





Publishing is an industry like any other and books are published on 
their perceived ability to make money. Literary merit is often merely 
an added bonus. [...] It’s in no one’s interest to tell our finest authors 
that something isn’t working or that 100 pages could safely be cut 
without anyone noticing. Schedules would be disrupted, departments 
would miss budget, the company share price would fall and, to make 
matters even worse, the authors might take their next books to a 
different publishing house. All in all, everyone would be very pissed 
off indeed. Far better to keep quiet, roll out a high-profile PR and 
marketing campaign and wait for the money to roll in. (Crace) 
This trenchant portrait of the current trends in the literary field in the UK pinpoints the 
two key issues which I will deal with in my paper: commercialisation on the one hand 
and literary or cultural merit on the other. Many authors, publishers and readers 
oscillate between these two poles. First, I will look at commercialisation and how it 
has affected the literary field. Next, I will explore the different ways of resisting 
commercialisation and then sum up my preliminary findings, always with the 
methodological question in mind how one can adequately analyse the contemporary 
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literary field. I will concentrate on the literary field in the UK with a few asides 
concerning the US, France and Germany when this seems appropriate. 
 
Commercialisation 
The literary field involves many different players, institutions and processes. The key 
object is – of course – the book. The three overlapping phases of the life of a book – 








Production is affected by the initial question: what gets produced in the first place, and 
how? What kinds of books do writers write and what kinds of books are publishers 
willing to produce nowadays? Next, distribution: which books do booksellers stock, do 
libraries acquire and literary festivals promote? Finally, reception: what do readers buy 
and read, what do members of book clubs discuss and what kind of books do 
reviewers, TV hosts and radio journalists promote in their shows and reviews? None of 
these questions can be answered in isolation – not from each other, but mainly not 
isolated from wider social, political, cultural and economic concerns. 
In the last two or three decades, the literary fields throughout the Western world have 
all been affected by rapid change and a much more pronounced commercialisation 
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than in earlier centuries. This is surprisingly late, compared say to the music industry 
or the theatre world, as far as one can judge from the work done by Rita Gerlach or 
Christian Handke (see their contributions to this publication). Ever since the nineteenth 
century at the very latest, the literary field has of course grappled with the problem of 
how to reconcile art with commerce. In fact, one of Pierre Bourdieu’s central 
contentions – it is he of course who coined the term “literary field” (Bourdieu) – is that 
this opposition between art and commerce produces the key tension within the literary 
field: on the one hand, artists grapple for legitimacy, for artistic recognition and on the 
other, commercial success is what publishers vie for.  
A UK-adapted version of Bourdieu’s model could look like this:  
high degree of autonomy 
 















low degree of recognition/legitimacy 
 
low degree of autonomy
 
In the UK, the so-called system of “gentlemanly publishing” which dominated the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries up to the late 1970s has changed to what is called 
“vertical publishing” or “conglomerate publishing” (Schiffrin). It is called vertical 
publishing because no longer are there many single publishing houses which compete 
with each other but rather, a very few conglomerates have bought up the formerly 
                                                 
1 Times Literary Supplement; London Review of Books – two of the leading review journals published in the UK. 
Institutions such as The Poetry Society can be placed roughly on the same level of relatively high recognition 
and autonomy. 
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independent imprints which are now concentrated under one roof, to produce a vertical 
structure:  
Publishing Group Imprints Owned 
BERTELSMANN Arrow Books, Bantam, Bantam Press, Barrie & Jenkins, Black 
Swan, Bodley Head, Business Books, Jonathan Cape, Century, 
Chatto & Windus, Corgi, C W Daniel, Doubleday, Ebury Press, 
Eden Project, Everyman's Library, Expert Books, David 
Fickling, Fodor’s, Harvill Press, Harvill Secker, Heinemann, 
Hogarth Press, Hutchinson, Pimlico, Random House, Red Fox, 
Rider, Sinclair Stevenson, Time Out, Transworld, Vermilion, 
Vintage, Yellow Jersey 
BLOOMSBURY Adlard Coles, Alphabooks, Ernest Benn, A&C Black, 
Bloomsbury, Bloomsbury Children’s, Andrew Brodie, Peter 
Collin, EP Publishing, Christopher Helm, Herbert Press, Pica 
Press, Poyser, Thomas Reed, Whitaker’s Almanack 
PEARSON Addison-Wesley, Adobe Press, Allen Lane, Allyn & Bacon, 
Benjamin Cummings, BradyGAMES, Cisco Systems, Dorling 
Kindersley, FT Prentice Hall, Funfax, Hamish Hamilton, 
Michael Joseph, Ladybird, Longman, Markt & Technik, 
Momentum, New Riders, Peachpit Press, Pears, Pearson 
Education, Penguin, Prentice Hall, Puffin, Que Publishing, 
Reuters, Rough Guides, Sams Publishing, Scott Foresman, 
Viking, Warne, York Notes, Ziff Davis 
Source: Booksellers Association Reports Library February 2005, © 2005 The Booksellers 
Association 
 
This trend towards conglomerate publishing can also be observed in the US, in 
Germany and to a lesser extent in France. The French are still trying to hold onto their 
“exception culturelle”, but are finding it increasingly difficult to resist the lure of the 
conglomerates buying up the traditional houses (Schiffrin 11). On a scale from 
complete commercialisation on the one hand and complete independence on the other 
(if that ever existed), one can place the UK at one end of the spectrum, with Germany 
in the middle and France at the other end, although this position is becoming 
increasingly tenuous. This is what such a scale would look like: 
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What are the markers of this trend apart from the fact that conglomerates buy up 
imprints which subsequently are no longer independent? In terms of production, one 
noticeable change is the aim of large conglomerates like Bertelsmann or Holtzbrinck 
to increase profit margins. While so-called gentleman publishers were commercial 
businesses in that they also had to make ends meet and could not work as charities or 
subsidised businesses (Feather 129-224), it was always clear that book production is 
not as profitable as producing any other good such as food, clothing or cars. Today, by 
contrast, conglomerates are pushing profit margins up (from 1-3% to 12-15%) and 
therefore only publish books which allow them to reach this goal or at least to come 
near to it. Therefore, reference books, DVDs, Christmas bestsellers, thrillers, romance 
novels, cookery books and memoirs are published in great numbers, whereas poetry, 
short stories or unusual, experimental fiction and diversity in general have a hard time. 
A second feature of this commercialised drive is the fact that even conglomerates have 
begun to merge: publishers have always bought each other up but the concentration 
process has increased enormously, therefore, even big publishing houses which owned 
several imprints have begun to be bought up (e.g. the Bertelsmann group bought 
Random House). 
A third and highly remarkable trend is the increased spending and visibility of book 
marketing (cf. Squires 186ff.). Consequently, books, writers and publishers seem to be 
the new rock stars – books have become hip and some of the people involved in the 
industry have become celebrities and stars. Whereas an editor or publisher could say 
twenty years ago, “our authors write books, they don’t talk about them”, no author in 
their right minds can stay off the publicity tour. He or she has to attend book signings, 
will have to make appearances at the ever larger literary festivals throughout the UK, 
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will have to appear on radio and TV and will have to have a long portrait produced in 
the quality newspapers. Nowadays, British publishers invest enormous sums of money 
in marketing campaigns – and in paying very large advances to just a few writers. 
Because publishers rely so heavily on famous writers and on bestsellers, the so-called 
midlists have lost their importance, as have editors and the close working relationship 
which used to exist between writers and editors. Many of the editor’s tasks are 
outsourced today, to make production leaner and cheaper, and the money is invested in 
promotional activities instead (see Squire and Robert McCrum’s concise overview in 
The Observer).  
In terms of distribution, two related major changes have affected the British literary 
field in the past decades. In contrast to France and Germany, Britain no longer has a 
fixed book price. In 1995, the reign of the so-called “Net Book Agreement” which 
regulated book prices, effectively ended because a group of publishers were no longer 
willing to adhere to it. The Net Book Agreement had been under threat before – in the 
early twentieth century when it was first invented, and during the 1960s when a court 
case debated whether the Net Book Agreement was conducive to cartels or not but it 
was found that this was not the case2. Since the Net Book Agreement’s disappearance, 
American-style chain-stores have changed the bookselling scene beyond recognition. 
Internet sales have increased and the current trend is towards supermarket book sales 
and an excessive discount culture. Almost no bookshop adheres to the so-called 
“recommended retail price” (RRP) and most follow the supermarkets and internet 
stores such as Amazon with massive discounts (50% off, 3 for the price of 2, etc.). The 
bi-annual price war over the latest Harry Potter-novel or the annual Christmas price 
slashing leave publishers with less profit, authors with fewer royalties, and ultimately, 
buyers and readers with less choice. 
Is it all bad, then? No art in sight, only profit-making? From the recent figures 
concerning the state of health of the book market in the UK (and elsewhere), one can 
only gather that publishing trends in general are looking slightly more positive. Recent 
                                                 
2  On its early history see Feather, for events since its demise see http://www.booksellers.org.uk/ 
industry/display_report.asp?id=444, last visited 5 June 2006. 
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figures show that in the UK, the rise is most marked3. No country in the world 
publishes more books than the UK. About 80,000 books are published annually in 
Germany4, c. 170,000 in the US5, c. 20.000 in France (Schiffrin 10f.) and about 
206,000 in the UK. But these figures do not tell us anything about the quality of the 
books, the trends of fiction and non-fiction or what future developments will be like. 
Looking behind the mere figures, which, by the way, are mostly easy to come by in the 
UK, but at close sight are often difficult to compare to their Continental or American 
counterparts and therefore lose their significance, looking behind the mere figures 
reveals a different tendency: resistance to commercialisation. Because the trend 
towards ever-more vertical publishing is so marked, and it is so particularly in the UK, 
oppositional developments are equally marked. 
 
Resistance against commercialisation 
The next section will therefore deal with these pockets of resistance and try to assess 
their wider cultural and social meaning. One can identify three such pockets and they 
pertain to all three phases of the life of a book. On the production side, writers are 
irrepressible. There are still authors who write books they know will not be bestsellers 
or not even reliable sellers. Poets will write poetry collections for an élite readership of 
200, novelists will write experimental texts when most people want thrillers or 
romantic novels, and they will find publishers to produce these works. More and more 
independent publishers have sprung up in the UK, but interestingly also in Germany, 
which produce a tiny handful of high-quality special-interest books with little or no 
intention of becoming profitable. People invest their inheritance (e.g. Aviva books, 
Berlin) or what they earned from their former publishing houses, even from 
conglomerates (e.g. André Schiffrin, The New Press), in order to finally make those 
books they have always wanted to publish (see Hensel). There is even a special prize 
                                                 
3  6.3% in the UK compared to only 0.9% in Germany, www.boersenverein.de/de/64626, last visited 
5 June 2006. 
4  89,869 in 2005, www.boersenverein.de/64586, last visited 5 June 2006. 
5  Www.bowker.com/press/bowker/2006_0509_bowker.htm, last visited 6 June 2006. 
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for independent publishers and the Independent Publishers Guild supports and 
represents anyone who has published more than three books and is not in fact merely 
an imprint of a larger conglomerate6. 
On the part of distribution, a similar trend can be observed. In contrast to the 
ubiquitous chainstores such as W.H. Smith’s or Waterstone’s and Ottakar’s, recently 
merged after a long legal wrangle, independent bookshops are getting their act 
together. When the London Review of Books, a veteran quality review and essay 
journal, opened up its independent bookshop near the British Museum in 2003, this 
was important enough to be commented on in the national press (The Guardian 8 May 
2003). The London Review Bookshop only sells books at the recommended retail 
price, never gives discounts, organises readings and debates, and has proper 
booksellers working for them. The important and influential Guardian books pages on 
the internet list the nation’s favourite independent bookshops and the British Book 
Awards also includes an award for the best independent bookseller. 
Finally, on the part of reviewers, prize-judges and readers, a minority of those at the 
reception-end of the literary field also single out unusual, difficult or non-bestselling 
titles to review, award prizes to or discuss in their reading groups and on weblogs. 
Admittedly, buyers and readers seem to be most affected by commercialisation. With 
TV shows such as the Big Read on the BBC7, and the book club run by the afternoon-
TV programme “The Richard and Judy Show” on Channel 4, the majority of reading 
groups, 50,000 (Hartley 2002) of which are estimated to exist in the UK, most people 
stick with certain classics such as Jane Austen, thrillers by Dan Brown and the like, 
cross-over titles such as Harry Potter, romance by Danielle Steele and Jilly Cooper or 
cookery books by Jamie Oliver. Even though sales increase for the winners of the 
Booker, Orange or Whitbread prizes, writers such as the recent gay Booker winner 
Alan Hollinghurst, Whitbread winner Ali Smith, who writes experimental novels and 
stories, or Carol Ann Duffy, winner of the TS Eliot prize for poetry, are only read and 
bought by a handful of people. Most literary prizes of which the UK has an 
                                                 
6  Publishers with fewer books can become non-voting members. 
7  Copied as “Das große Lesen” on the German TV channel ZDF. 
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incomparable number in contrast to France and Germany, go to books and writers 
whose works are, if not best-selling material, at least realist, non-experimental fiction.  
 
Summary 
To sum up: on the whole, then, the lure of commercialisation is too great to resist for 
most players on the literary field. But the mere fact that pockets of resistance exist tells 
us something about the contested nature of this field. As much as the conglomerates 
are visible and drive the market, this does not mean that a complete victory of the 
profit-makers and bargain-drivers will characterise the future. The future may hold 
many more surprises which cannot be easily predicted from the current state of affairs. 
One will have to continue to hone one’s tools of analysis in order to be able to account 
for extraordinary turns of events, e.g. the rise of non-fiction, the importance of 
independent bookshops or new reading trends such as weblogs, bookcrossing or 
reading groups which, although sparked off by commercial TV shows, move in 
unpredictable ways. The one reliable thing about the literary field is that it can still 
produce surprises – just as it did in the nineteenth century when commerce and culture 
were almost as closely linked as they seem to be today. One will therefore have to wait 
and see whether one of these days commercialisation will take a down-turn and 
diversity, interesting as well as challenging books, and readers who don’t 
automatically follow the recommendations of TV shows or simply buy bestsellers will 
be on the rise once again. 
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A Wee Bit Different: 
Socio-Cultural Influences on Scottish Marketing  
Annika Wingbermühle 




Has the world become the ultimate marketplace? Not really, because resurging 
nationalism in many European countries indicates that globalisation has still failed to 
create complete cultural homogeneity. The convergence thesis in cross-cultural 
marketing therefore appears to be wrong because consumers remain highly susceptible 
to stimuli that fit their cultural expectations (De Mooij). However, culture as a “whole 
way of life” (Williams 122) offers predictable social interactions in a post-modern 
world. Scotland and its quest for an independent identity in particular is a perfect 
exhibit for this observation. In this country conventional sociological and economic 
categories turn out to be too wieldy. Therefore, culture is particularly promising as an 
analytical approach. 
This paper analyses how cultural differences influence the way the creative industries 
work. The analysis is based on various works of David McCrone (“Being British”; 
Understanding Scotland), McCrone et al. (“Who Are We?”), Murray Pittock (Scottish 
Nationality) and Gerry Hassan (“Anatomy”; “Tales”). Main players in Scottish 
marketing were interviewed about their views in March 2005. The Scottish trade 
magazine The Drum offered further insights into the industry. Finally, campaigns were 
analysed to find out whether or not a ‘Scottish approach’ in marketing exists. All 
samples are reproduced with kind permission and copyrights remain with the 
designers. Full results are published in my Diplomarbeit at Passau University 
(Wingbermühle).  
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Scotland – Afraid to Know Itself? 
Authors like Tom Nairn (The Break-Up of Britain), Linda Colley (Britons) and 
Andrew Marr (The Day Britain Died) described the waning of the notion of 
Britishness in the twentieth century. Today, it is very much another name for 
‘Englishness’, but historically, Britishness in Scotland was tied to the mixed blessing 
of the Empire (Ratcliffe 7): Scotland did not only supply the army with over-
proportional numbers of troops, but Glasgow became a major manufacturing centre in 
the nineteenth century (Smout, A Century 85). Scottishness became one of many local 
nationalities within the ‘Pax Britannica’ (Cohen 35). On the other hand, notions of 
“internal colonization” and Scotland’s role as England’s “junior partner” developed 
(Harvie 44, Nairn 61). In the 1950s, the heyday of Scotland’s Britishness was reached 
with its positive connotations of the Welfare State. However, as the welfare state and 
other all-British institutions like the BBC were later on weakened, Britishness was 
declining, too (J. Mitchell 49, 61). 
In a 1999 MORI poll, Scots identified themselves primarily with Scotland (72%) and 
their particular region (62%), whereas the English opinion was almost evenly split 
between the options respectively (“All Power” 4). The so-called Moreno Question 
reveals that ratios remain at 7:1 and 10:1 in favour of Scottishness between 1986 and 
2000. The Scottish thus strongly identify with their nation. Social variables have an 
influence as young people and manual workers mostly think of themselves as Scots, 
compared to a ‘centrist’ view of women and middle class groups. However, 
differences between party supporters are not clear cut, although voters of the Scottish 
National Party (SNP) are least likely to choose a more British identity and right-
wingers are less inclined to call themselves exclusively Scottish (Bromley et al., 
Moreno). It was only in 1988 that the SNP started to promote “Independence in 
Europe” in order to disconnect Scottish nationalism from its parochial outlook.  
If, consequently, Scottishness seems to be a preferable frame of reference for the 
majority of people, it is important to define this concept more clearly. In the 1997 
National Election Survey, 83% of respondents claimed that the ‘accident of birth’ was 
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the most important criteria for being Scottish, 75.5% rated ancestry as very or fairly 
important and 67% agreed with a civic definition (Heath et al. 12). Yet, one might 
argue that Scottish national feeling remains “both passionate and unfocused”. In 2003, 
the Scottish Social Attitudes’ Survey, nonetheless, found 97% of respondents either 
somewhat or very proud of being Scottish (Strategy Unit 11). One account director 
explains that this affects “the way we approach the business and marketing” 
(Wingbermühle 7). 
Scotland, moreover, appears to be divided between its romantic ‘heart’ and its rational, 
‘Germanic head’. The rivalry between Glasgow and Edinburgh is as fierce as the 
encounters between cities and rural areas. Even Scottish history is often falsely 
illustrated as a set of mutually exclusive stories, for example, the Clearances versus 
Enlightenment. Various authors have tried to create an origin-myth to solve the 
identity problem. According to these writers the name ‘Scots’ derives from the Scots 
of Dalriada, an Irish tribe that settled in Argyll in the sixth century. However, in the 
fourteenth century, John of Fordun attributes the name ‘Scots’, originally Latin for 
‘Irish’, to Scota, the daughter of the Egyptian Pharaoh in the Gathelus myth. The 
Greek not Trojan roots are emphasized to create an ancestry that differs from the 
English (Ferguson 14, 21, 301-307). 
The battle for securing its distinct identity dominates most of the rest of Scotland’s 
history. In 1314, Robert I’s triumph did not secure independence for long. The attempt 
to get papal protection led to the Declaration of Arbroath, an impressive manifest of 
nationalism in medieval Europe (Harvie 9ff). James IV’s disaster at Flodden finally 
threw Scotland back into military crisis. In 1603, James VI became King of England 
which foreshadowed the “marriage of convenience” of 1707. Scotland remained semi-
detached and anti-Union riots followed (Goodare 399). Later on, the Enlightenment 




The Favourite Guinea Pig 
Looking into the past to create a community is only one way of dealing with identity 
issues. Another approach is simply to look across the border. Minor differences are 
often amplified to set Scotland apart from England, which led to an awkward adoption 
of Highland imagery after 1707 (Parry 151). Even nowadays anti-English movements 
attract huge media attention, e.g. the “Settler Watch” poster campaign (J. MacDonald 
2): In a Citigate SMARTS’ beer campaign a road sign saying “Welcome back to 
Scotland” is juxtaposed to the words “The worst is over”. Account director Petra 
Cuthbert grins: “Things like that tend to go down really well up here” (Wingbermühle 
10). On the other hand, account manager Mandi Taylor warns that agencies risk 
abandoning part of their target group with such campaigns. And the Marketing 
Magazine reports that tartanized M&S sandwich boxes are not well received either. 
Scottish imagery consequently should only be applied to indigenous brands like Kwik-
Fit or Baxter’s. Even innocuous expressions like “regional sales manager” could be 
considered offensive (Fairweather 23).  
It is really astonishing how many mistakes were made by UK companies in this area in 
the past. An English department store once announced “back to school deals” weeks 
after the Scottish holidays had ended. The Poll Tax is moreover a prominent example 
for using Scotland as a test market (Seawright 68). Test marketing in this small market 
is cost effective as you can reach about 90% of the population on a single TV station, 
but it comes with a health warning. Consumer behaviour differs substantially as 
managing director Ian Wright knows: “If you would test [a chocolate bar] in Scotland, 
it would do really well because we like sweets […]. It might not be like that elsewhere 
in the UK” (Wingbermühle 12). 
 
Remote Control 
The agency Family sees itself as a “European agency that happens to be placed in 
Edinburgh” (Wingbermühle 12). It recently did a campaign in Estonia. Marketing guru 
Colin Marr has also been in Perthshire for 37 years: “You can do good work from 
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anywhere” (Wingbermühle 12). On the one hand, local knowledge can be a huge asset 
in marketing. Citigate SMARTS does all the Scottish PR for John Lewis although they 
use a London agency: “There’s still no substitute for picking up phones and saying: 
‘Can you come around in ten minutes?’” (Wingbermühle 12). Conversely, Andy 
Hughes, Director of Barkers Scotland, thinks location becomes less important. The 
Royal Bank of Scotland, for example, operates a digital artwork approval system. 
Remoteness moreover depends very much on the point of view: Glasgow is sometimes 
perceived to be remote from London, even though “travel time by air is probably faster 
to central London than the drive time from many London suburbs” (Anderson et al. 
33).  
Mobility is one hook, cost effectiveness another, admits David Gaffney from Beattie 
Media: “The equivalent salary of what we’ve got paid in London is probably about 10 
grant more minimum because people have got higher rent, higher travel costs and 
living expenses” (Wingbermühle 14). Access to professional labour is assumedly more 
difficult for Scottish agencies. However, taking a closer look, for Gaffney’s colleague 
Nick King the opposite is true as well: “In the UK, there are three main media centres: 
London, Manchester and Glasgow. [...] If you’re based in central Scotland […] you 
can draw on that pool of people who work in the media in Glasgow” (Wingbermühle 
15). 999 Design claims that it even receives CVs from San Francisco while Newhaven 
forges links with art colleges.  
 
The Scottish Market 
After Scottish agencies realized that it made perfect sense to set up business in 
Scotland, they had to find out who the people are that they are targeting. While the UK 
population is projected to reach 65.7 million by 2031, the natural decrease in Scotland 
is likely to reach over 13,000 a year by 2027 as the number of births continues to fall. 
Net gains of students and retired people counterbalance net losses in employed people 
(Macniven 4-8). Only 1.7% of the Scottish population belong to an ethnic minority 
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compared to 28.3% of all Londoners (Office for National Statistics 32) – strangely 
enough, for a country that picked St. Andrew to unite “the Picts, Scots, Danes and 
Norwegians” (Macinnes 174). Social justice became a buzz word for the Scottish 
Executive, but the repeal of Clause 2a, which tried to prevent teaching about 
homosexuality in schools, still caused a media uproar. The popular myth of the 
egalitarian society nonetheless survived: somehow, the class system is seen as an 
English intrusion (Paterson 125-126).  
Relative income and expenditure are much at par with other UK regions (Clifton-
Fearnside 13). According to ACORN ‘Urban Prosperity’ and ‘Moderate Means’ are 
above average, but 35% of the population are ‘Hard-Pressed’ in comparison to only 
22% in the UK as a whole. Regional price levels in Scotland mirror the UK average 
(“Regional Price” 1). Apart from an inexplicable Scottish affinity for Deep Fried Mars 
Bars, Family’s Managing Director Ian Wright points at higher consumption levels for 
crisps and alcohol. Lack of physical activity and alcohol misuse contribute to the 
‘Scottish Effect’: life expectancy for men in 2003 was the second lowest in whole 
Europe after Portugal (Armstrong 14-22). Understandably, advertising spending of the 
NHS has increased rapidly (“Still Ill” 1). Different consumer behaviour also asks for 
special research but in 2002, only 15 of the UK’s 600 market research companies were 
located in Scotland.  
 
Closed Community 
“Scotland will only really start to believe in itself […] if it gets some sort of 
independence.  ” The Leith Agency’s Chairman John Denholm calls the Parliament a 
“halfway house” while the SNP envisages a ‘neverendum’ on constitutional change 
(Wingbermühle 19). The demand for devolution “has arisen from the politicisation of 
national identity” (Taylor et al. xl) and is therefore vital for understanding the Scottish 
people. In 1948, two million people signed the calling for Home Rule of the Scottish 
Covenant. Symbolic acts like Napier’s regnal numeral protest reflect the swelling 
conflict. Hopes for a devolved parliament were repeatedly destroyed: in 1977, it was a 
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lost guillotine motion, two years later the yes vote came short of the 40% required in 
the Cunningham Amendment. The broad campaign group ‘Scotland Forward’ 
prevented another failure in 1997. In 2000, 60% of the Scots expected independence to 
occur within the next twenty years (Jones, New Song 6; Harvie 193-6).  
The new parliament in Holyrood passes laws on devolved matters such as education, 
economic development and transport (Warhurst 195). The limited fiscal powers of the 
Scottish Executive, however, remain controversial: its expenditure is largely funded by 
a block grant fine-tuned by the disputed Barnett Formula (Leeke 9). Before devolution, 
high expectations were created by a “fantasy Parliament” onto which people projected 
their hopes. Post-war electoral behaviour saw the fall of the ‘English’ party because 
Thatcher’s centralising efforts were perceived as an “attack on Scotland itself”. This 
shows that Scottish politics are highly intertwined with issues of national identity. The 
SNP also proved its marketing skills in 1965, with the introduction of the party 
symbol, a combined thistle and saltire, and with the 1973 “It’s Scotland’s Oil” 
campaign. However, the political classes are traditionally Labour dominated: Being 
Scottish is equated with favouring state intervention (Macwhirter 32-35). 
The accusation of parochial cronyism alludes to the Scottish Office fostering a “close-
knit community” in the 1980s (Fry 29). Scotland still sports an incredible plethora of 
business organisations and quangos. After World War Two, magnates like the 
Colvilles, Coats and Alexanders made room for business men like Sir Angus Grossart 
(Hope 145-146). Scottish Enterprise usually argues that Scotland’s problems rather 
stem from a low business birth-rate (Parry 144). Strategic Planner Victoria Milne also 
calls the marketing community “incestuous” borrowing Alex Neil’s term (Rosie 128). 
Newhaven Communications’ Ken Dixon sighs that Edinburgh could do with “a few 




The semi-autonomous status of the media has often been used as another metaphor for 
Scotland’s role in the UK (Schlesinger 3). The Scots consume more media across the 
range with all figures 100 or above on a British index. There are more people from 
sociological groups C to D, which supposedly translates into more tabloid press 
readership. Press advertising still remains the most popular marketing method for 54% 
of clients (“Press Fares Best” 1). Sunday Mail, Daily Mirror and Daily Record lead the 
table of the most popular national papers. The regionalised market resembles the US 
rather than the UK. The Scottish read up to 85% more regional papers probably due to 
geographical reasons. For this, companies have to spread adverts across a range of 
relevant titles to maximise penetration (Fernie and Woolven 26). What the ‘city state’ 
press lacks is a truly national paper as the major publications have a bias towards their 
heartlands (Schlesinger 8). Gillian Cairney of Feather Brooksbank Media thinks the 
Scotland on Sunday comes closest to a national paper. One solution could be to merge 
the Scotsman with the Herald, although it might alienate their traditional readers. Or a 
‘tartanised’ edition of a London paper might take the lead (Garside 196). Account 
manager Nick King argues that most London papers are “very London-centric”. The 
change of format of some Scottish broadsheets recently renewed interest in the 
industry.  
Foreign ownership is another major concern. In 1954, Canadian Roy Thomson bought 
the Scotsman (Harvie 151-153). The Swedish Bonnier family and two English 
companies compete with D.C. Thomson and the Scottish Media Group. Outside 
owners might occasionally pursue different interests. For example, the Scottish Sun 
frequently changed back and forth between supporting the SNP and New Labour 
(Garside 197-199). Consolidation does not help either. The SMG owns not only the 
Herald but also Scottish and Grampian TV, cinema advertising and parts of Scotland’s 
largest commercial radio group (Schlesinger 5).  
Commercial radio has also been dominated by Scottish Radio Holdings. In 2002, 
Radio Borders reached higher audience levels than any other British station (“Out and 
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About” 1). Scots surf the Internet more frequently than the English, too. In 2001, 70% 
of businesses had their own website compared to 62% in the UK, but e-commerce 
figures remain slightly below average (Goudie 105). The BBC is still regarded as the 
“cultural arm of the English colonial machine” as the public debate about a ‘Scottish 
Six’ news show in 1999 reflected (Garside 190-194). Unfortunately, regional TV 
programmes are always put against strong programmes on BBC. Agencies have to be 
aware of these differences in media consumption when creating a campaign for the 
Scottish market. 
 
Distilling Business Opportunities  
Despite the size of the market, there are lots of business opportunities in Scotland. 
Since 1995, Scotland’s GDP continually rose to £14,440 per head in 2002 (Goudie 
17). Scottish Enterprise under Crawford Beveridge tried to create a “Smart Successful 
Scotland” (Shaw 164) while critics of the dependency culture remarked that too much 
intervention turns Scotland into a screwdriver economy (Warhurst 189). In the 1990s, 
public policies to attract subsidiaries of IBM and Motorola to ‘Silicon Glen’ were 
indeed increased with unemployment soaring (Hood 44). Today, services contribute 
around 70% of total GDP (Scottish Executive 4).  
Modern Scotland now sports a variety of sectors that all pose different challenges to 
marketing. 80% of the food processing industries’ £3.3 bn strong exports in 2003 were 
whisky. When the agency Tayburn designed Glenmorangie’s Annual Report 2004, it 
faced a trade-off between the consumers’ interests in the heritage and the shareholders’ 
interests in a contemporary feel. Newhaven Communications flipped the desire to 
emphasize Tennent’s Scottishness on the head by creating a spoof movie trailer in 
classic Bollywood style for the lager brand. Consequently, indigenous products do not 
necessarily have to wave their Scottish credentials all the time. In 1994, the Leith 
Agency recommended to present Irn Bru as a ‘likeable maverick’. This increased the 
beverage’s tiny market share in the Southern ‘export market’ (Wingbermühle 28).  
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Tourism is another promising sector. It generated almost £4.1 bn in 2001. In the 
Highlands over 17% of the workforce is employed in this sector (VisitScotland, 
Tourism in Scotland 1; Goudie 122). With the reiteration of the rural idyll in literature 
and film, a “sense of place” comes natural (Smout, “Perspectives” 107). Scotland is 
traditionally marketed as a “land out of time” (Rojek 181). The agency 1576, for 
example, ran a London campaign to make people travel to Scotland. On the posters, 
litter boxes with the label ‘stress’ were put in the landscape to hint at the relaxing 
components of a Scottish holiday. A sense of Scottishness therefore best applies in a 
tourist context. Tartan and bagpipes are pulling first-time visitors. Victoria Milne 
thinks that “people are intelligent enough to see what cliché is” and dumping 
stereotypes could be a mistake as foreigners expect them: “We’re really creative, 
leading in technology […] that’s not what they want to hear” (Wingbermühle 29).  
The strong imagery is Scotland’s main USP and a valuable asset, something other 
countries have to create artificially. On the other hand, 1576 targeted the London 
market with a ‘romantic breaks’ campaign in 2001. The sexy posters ran lines like 
“The Scottish weather is perfect for a romantic break. You won’t go out much” to 
attract a younger audience. Responses were satisfying, apart from Tom Forrest who 
owns a B&B in Kinlochewe: he would prefer VisitScotland to promote climbing and 
fishing instead of sex (VisitScotland, Case Study 1).  
Scotland’s over 300-year-old financial sector has long been another pillar of national 
identity. The ongoing consolidation in banking causes major concerns for Scottish 
marketing agencies. In 2001, the Bank of Scotland was taken over by the UK’s largest 
mortgage bank Halifax. HBOS is still headquartered in Edinburgh but all marketing 
functions went south. Besides, Scotland definitely produces world-leading results in 
life sciences. The country houses 50% of the industry’s manufacturing facilities. 
Invitrogen’s EU headquarter is located in Scotland, next to Glaxo Smithkline. 
Research focuses on drug discovery, nanotechnology, stem cells and bioinformatics. 
The Scottish repeatedly made headlines from Sir Philip Cohen’s work in signal 
transduction to ‘Dolly’ the sheep. Since 1999, the sector has grown by an average of 
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28% compared to the European average of 15%. It thus becomes another attractive 
target for local agencies (“Life Sciences” 1).  
 
The Creative Industries 
Before we take a look at various campaigns that were run in the Scottish marketing 
sector, we have to identify the main players in the industry and how they broke into 
the market. The term “creative industries” as defined by the Department of Culture, 
Media and Sport comprises media and design as well as publishing and cultural 
industries (S. MacDonald 173). In Scotland, the sector employs approximately 
100,000 people, more than any other region outside London. Forecast to grow 10-20% 
per annum, it is ready to reap the net gain of a growing entertainment industry 
(“Software & eBusiness” 1). Successful studios such as Rockstar North and the Digital 
Animation Group, world leading designers of avatars, reflect the nation’s strength of 
content origination.  
Nevertheless, it was quite difficult to build business when the Leith Agency started 21 
years ago. London’s major advantage is that a marketing director might struggle to 
defend the appointment of a small, unknown Scottish agency. Leith finally managed to 
compete against London agencies by offering “great advertising without the grief”, the 
proposition was thus to counter the arrogant prima donnas’ approach. In general, 
Scotland’s marketing history is filled with success stories. Thanks to several EPICA 




Some critics claim that high levels of government intervention caused entrepreneurial 
sluggishness. To be successful again, Scotland needs to recover its image of 
pioneering. Tayburn’s Jon Stevenson accounts that the Scottish Enlightenment proves 
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that Scottish history is “not all about castles”; Nick King cites Carnegie and Adam 
Smith (Wingbermühle 36). Business insider Janice Kirkpatrick even maintains that in 
the global marketplace “culture equals cash”, as it provides a consistent picture to 
outside trading partners (The Identity 224- 226). Agencies should definitely use these 
stereotypes of Scottish inventiveness and salesmanship for their self-marketing.  
Nevertheless, many clients of Scottish agencies are first and foremost interested in the 
market itself. VisitScotland or the RBS contrarily target a UK wide audience although 
they are based in Scotland. A number of agencies state that the majority of their clients 
are Scottish, so it is not difficult to convince them to use a Scottish team. It is harder to 
grasp how Leith managed to attract Coors of the States: “Carling is the biggest drinks 
brand in the UK, its heartland is South of England and the Midlands, so there’s no 
Scottish rational for us handling it other than we’re pretty good in doing beer 
advertising”. Chairman John Denholm regrets that the myth about obligatory local 
expertise was invented by his Scottish colleagues to keep London consultancies out: 
“We can’t argue that in the same breath saying, ‘we want to handle Carling across the 
UK’” (Wingbermühle 36).  
Apart from this, it is mainly local food and beverage companies that emphasize their 
Scottishness. For consumers in those segments, heritage means trust. The “Glen of 
Tranquility” ads push Scottishness simply because Scottish culture is inheritant to 
whisky.  
Nevertheless, Scottishness has to be done by Scottish agencies. Beattie Media 
generated enormous press coverage when they put ‘hey jimmy wigs’ on the statures of 
Glasgow’s George Square for Scottish Leader, a brand of distiller Burn Stewart. 
Family also gave their ads a national flavour by putting “jimmy” wigs on ‘non-
Scottish leaders’ like Harold Wilson or Gandhi (see advert 1).  
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Both agencies say that the play on common stereotypes was a key to success: "If an 
English agency would have done that, they would have been accused of being 
xenophobic but the same thinking applies the other way around, if a Scottish agency 
would get a contract for the London Olympic Bit" (Wingbermühle 37). Account 
manager Nick King hints at 1576’s VisitScotland campaign which nearly backfired 




It is interesting to note how devolution influenced Scottish marketing. Some 
interviewees claimed that devolution only drove property prices. In 1999, the business 
community feared that the creation of ‘artificial cultural constraints’ might hinder 
trade with England. Business leaders expected creeping marginalisation with tax 
increases and extra layers of red tape (“Questions of Business” 1). On the other hand, 
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75% of Scottish business leaders think they would be worse off in an independent 
Scotland (“Captains of Industry” 1). Leith’s Denholm philosophises: “We would at 
least stop blaming England for everything” (Wingbermühle 39). 
Interviewees finally agree that devolution made little difference in marketing. Scottish 
media devotes much space to politics, which means that PR agencies sometimes 
struggle to win editorial space and Holyrood Parliament gives newspapers a lot more 
to talk about. Consequently, this enhances media clout according to Beattie Media: 
“Previously, if it was an MP, a Scottish title couldn’t actually do anything to affect 
him, but in our small community if the Scotsman would to have a front page about an 
MSP, it could finish his career” (Wingbermühle 40). More reporting also means more 
influence of journalists like The Herald’s Alf Young. Kirsty Wark is regularly featured 
in the ‘100 most influential’ lists (Parry 143; Garside 199). 
PR probably enjoyed the biggest devolution windfall as lobbying targets became more 
accessible in the eyes of the Beattie Media team: “Companies like the Scottish Book 
Trust before didn’t feel the need to have a PR agency […] the people they get funded 
from are now based in Edinburgh” (Wingbermühle 40). TBWA’s Gary O’Donnell 
criticizes the over-reliance on the public sector devolution created: “Very few 
successful agencies in London have a piece of ‘government’ business whereas it is 
difficult to be successful in Scotland without one” (Wingbermühle 40). A place on the 
Executive roaster means secured business in a volatile market. The three year contract 
helped Consolidated Communications to expand substantially.  
Some big networks, nevertheless, have already left. In 2003, Fauld’s Advertising, once 
the largest independent agency outside London, went into liquidation. At that time 
other top agencies reportedly suffered from a downturn in earnings, too (Beach 1). On 
the other hand, phoenixes like Troyka and Multiply emerged from the ashes of KLP 
EURO RSCG. Communication consultancy 60 Watt successfully specialized in B2B, 
recruitment and technology to address the shrinking market: they won more Scottish 
Recruitment Advertising Awards than anyone else. Small businesses might be quicker 
to implement new strategies, whereas integrated agencies like the Union, Family or 
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1576 agree that it is important to offer ‘360 degree thinking’. Divisions like media 
planning or new media are joined back into agencies because clients do not like to 
shop around. Another solution to a shrinking home market could be to attract 
international clients. HBOS or Scottish & Newcastle are two of the remaining big 
names, as the number of public limited companies has halved in the last 15 years. An 
exploding demand for content management systems and weblogs might finally help 
the media industry out.  
 
Cultural Strategies 
Men in Skirts 
“‘Design’ is a process of […] manipulating the elements of culture” (Kirkpatrick 223). 
It is consequently of particular interest to analyse how agencies handle Scottish 
imagery, as it reflects the self-definition of a culture. In general, Scots tend to have a 
positive sense of their national identity compared to the English. In a survey, Scottish 
respondents described their compatriots as ‘friendly’ and ‘patriotic’ with the most 
prominent negative notion being ‘low self-esteem’ (Lindsay 55). The common use of 
stereotypes in the media can be explained by their powerful iconic significance (G. 
Mitchell 122). Hollywood exploited the strong image of the Highlander in Brigadoon 
and Braveheart. This appeal of old icons to a modern audience was also the idea 
behind Leith’s ad in which ‘William Wallace’ fights for the radio station Beat 106. 
Added with traditional music, he announces “our enemies may take our lives, but 
they’ll never take our Feeder” – an obvious pun on the anticipated word ‘freedom’. 
The national pride of modern Scots is addressed to motivate them to support a national 
radio station.  
Highland imagery in general was already promoted in Victorian Britain. Sentimental 
‘Tartanry’ was depicted in Landseer’s paintings as much as in the middle classes 
wearing kilts on Sundays (Harvie 21, 40; Hamilton 6). Macpherson’s Ossian poems 
were attacked because they handled historic facts rather generously, even though 
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critics like Pinkerton were not less creative (Ferguson 228-243). Finally, Tartanry 
culminated in the pastoral escapism of the Kailyard School (Campbell 111, 117). Even 
today, Arcadian dreams are still common in advertising (Anderson et al. 26-34). For 
example, Harris Tweed is protected by an Act of Parliament, it therefore has to be 
hand-woven on the island Harris Lewis. Their website features pictures of little 
cottages and heather to allude to this natural image (Devine 22).  
The superiority of Quality Meat Scotland is connected very much with the Scottish 
nature. Their agency the Union borrowed all premium images from the landscape and 
the commercial shows green hills and unspoiled nature. In addition to this, the ad is 
predominantly aimed at middle class female shoppers. The meat is therefore embodied 
by a handsome man who is contrasted with a filthy guy eating junk food. Glen walks 
around wearing a kilt and chops wood, emphasizing his connection to the Scottish 
scenery. He became a real icon and was even requested for guest appearances. 
Walker’s Shortbread is another intrinsically Scottish product, therefore it clings to its 
tartan wrapping, too. However, there is no copyright to the universal design pattern. In 
1994, it asked Baillie Marshall to concentrate on elements like the miniature painting 
of Bonnie Prince Charlie that embody a more protectable property (Gofton 25). Soup 
producer Baxters only retained its tartan design in the overseas market where heritage 
goes down well (Vass 5). Still, when it sponsored the Loch Ness Marathon in 2004, it 
ran a poster showing a shoe-lace in the classic pose of ‘Nessie’.  
Another theme that is frequently sported in the field of Scottish marketing is soccer 
because Scottish football has always been linked with a strong nationalist feeling. In 
1977, Scottish fans broke down the Wembley goalposts chanting: “Gi’e us an 
Assembly, and we’ll gi’e ye back your Wembley”. Today, the Tartan Army “good-
humouredly awaits defeat”. The website whatthefaro.com (WTF) was run for 
Tennent’s during the European Championship 2004, even though Scotland did not 
qualify. Newhaven’s website sported a ‘Euro Bingo’ in which you could tick off 
moments that were guaranteed to happen like “A Scottish pundit mistakenly referring 
to England as ‘we’”. WTF’s language and implied self-mockery is deeply rooted in 
Scottishness: “Our game is not in a very great place, but still we’re celebrating it” 
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(Wingbermühle 47). Most importantly, terrace humour stresses a genuine passion for 
the game as an antidote to the commercial interests of most sponsors. Leith similarly 
chose to shoot the biggest Scottish commercial ever in one of Glasgow’s ‘dodgy’ 
areas. In January 2004, over 1,000 extras were playing football in their underwear to 
reflect the true spirit of the game.  
 
The Right ‘Slogorne’ 
Apart from the right pictures, adverts have to hit the right tone with their audience. 
One can only speculate about the original language of Scotland and the relation 
between P-Celtic and Q-Celtic, the precursor of today’s Gaelic (Ch. Jones 95; Corbett 
et al. 5-6). Linguistic influences begin with Germanic streams in the fifth to seventh 
century. Viking raidings brought Scandinavian contributions until French and Latin 
spread among the aristocracy. Scottish English was called Inglis until the fourteenth 
century to reflect the problem that the two languages are not mutually exclusive 
(Corbett et al. 4-9). For example, the Durham burr, a uvular [R] sound, was quite 
common in the Scottish Border Regions (Ch. Jones 72ff). Under the Anglo-Norman 
influence, English quickly became the language of commerce of the medieval burghs 
(Ferguson 305). From the sixteenth century onwards, a standardised form of Scottish 
was established. Though the unpopular Union of 1707 created a revival of the Scots 
dictum in literature, did the English language remain a worthwhile accent until the 
nineteenth century. It seems also doubtful to regard Gaelic as a cultural signifier, when 
less than 2% of the population speak it, although Gaelic radio still enjoys high loyalty 
(Chapman 12). However, many Scots prefer their local dialect or sociolect to English 
(Corbett et al. 14). Qualitative research shows that dialects increase the impact of 
advertising because people feel they are addressed personally (“Case Histories” 1).  
In Scotland, it is easy to give a commercial a regional colouring because words like 
‘wee’ and ‘aye’ are instantly recognizable as Scottish morphemes (“Notes” 1). For 
example, although Newhaven’s spoof Bollywood trailer seems to have an international 
flavouring, it has a Scottish twist. In the subtitles, the word ‘aye’ appears two times. 
Annika Wingbermühle 200
Another linguistic device is the use of the distinct Scottish grammar. Sentences are 
linked in a different way with ‘like’ highlighting explanations. Furthermore, tenses 
vary from the English use with past forms like ‘goed’ (J. Miller 93-97). Scots also 
prefer other modal verbs than their English counterparts whereby modals can be 
combined. Verbs are negated by ‘no’ or ‘nae’ which can be cliticised (Ch. Jones 1-20). 
A series of commercials for Whyte and Mackay starred Kenny Logan and Ally 
McCoist mocking the Adidas ‘Kicking It’ spots featuring Jonny Wilkinson and David 
Beckham. The Scottish tone was essential in this persiflage. In the ad ‘Free kick’ 
Logan almost stereotypically asks: “That’s going in the back, in’t it?”  
Classic examples of the idiosyncratic pronunciation are Germanic sounds of fricatives 
in words like ‘loch’ (Ch. Jones 28, 57). Another is the phonological alternation 
commonly known as Scottish Vowel Length Rule: vowels are long when they precede 
voiced fricatives or [r] and at the end of a word. In the Great Vowel Shift around 1500, 
the high vowel [ii] was converted into the diphthong [əı] in England while all other 
vowels were raised by one height. The Scottish however kept the Old English 
pronunciation of words like ‘house’ as [hus] (Macafee 116, 145-147). It therefore 
comes as no surprise that Consolidated Communications, for example, announces 
“prime coups” in its advert. This parodies the Glaswegian pronunciation of the word 
‘cow’ as [cuu], which makes sense when you interpret the line as a caption to the 
picture of a highland cattle (see advert 2):  
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The Sean Connery Problem 
Local culture plays another important part in marketing when it comes to national 
holidays and traditional festivities. Apart from St. Andrew’s Day or Burns’ Night, the 
Royal Highland Show and the Edinburgh International Festival create major 
opportunities for promotional activities. In 2003, Tayburn designed and produced the 
international EIF programme (“Portfolio” 1). Another important event in the Scottish 
calendar is the music festival ‘T in the Park’ sponsored by Tennent’s. Newhaven 
Partner Ken Dixon explains why their commercial stars Franz Ferdinand: “Anytime 
we’re doing something for Tennent’s there’s a certain level of Scottishness […], even 
though it’s not stated” (Wingbermühle 52).  
In general, commercials often work with celebrities to borrow on their popularity. In 
“Broadband for Scotland” Ford Kiernan plays a guy who loses his mind when trying 
to work with a slow internet connection as in the Scottish BBC comedy series 
“Chewing the Fat”. The immediate response of nearly all interviewees when they were 
asked to come up with a good Scottish testimonial, was: “Not Sean Connery”. 
Unfortunately, Connery does not only lend his voice to the SNP, but already offered to 
become an unofficial Scottish ambassador to Jack McConnell (P. Miller 2). So who 
would be a nice figurehead for an all-Scottish campaign? Ewan McGregor was 
described as a heartthrob with an international reputation for playing Obiwan Kenobi 
in Star Wars, but some marketers had problems with the probable arrogance of a 
movie star. In a brave move, Citigate SMARTS used both McGregor and Connery in a 
campaign for a Scottish beer brand. The ad “Who’s your favourite?” put the two 
Christian names next to each other in the style of the Star Wars resp. James Bond 
logo.  
In general, the biggest problem is that most successful Scottish people are low profile 
business managers. Consolidated Communications normally chooses testimonials like 
Julia Ogilvy for their public sector photo calls. Many of Petra Cuthbert’s colleagues 
went along with Tom Hunter because the former chairman of the Entrepreneurial 
Exchange invested money back into sports and children. Politicians are not regarded as 
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very sexy either; otherwise Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and Lord Robertson would 
make great ambassadors. One way to avoid the clichés could be to choose someone 
from the vibrant music scene. In the past, it already catered for odd Scottish 
testimonials like Madonna who married at Skibo Castle or Rod Stewart.  
 
Conclusion 
The concept of globalisation reflects that cultural influences are stronger than ever. For 
marketers it is therefore of utmost importance to take into account these notions that 
form consumer behaviour. This paper has shown that the Scottish marketplace differs 
substantially from the UK market in consumer preferences. Marketing opportunities 
are fantastic with a huge appetite of the Scots for all kinds of media and healthy 
growth rates of sectors such as Tourism, Biotechnology and Creative Consultancy. 
From the 1980’s onwards, Scottish agencies managed to drive attention away from 
Britain’s centralised marketing, although devolution did not have a great impact on 
advertising itself, but more so on media buying and PR. Scottish stalls are highly 
successful in attracting both local and international business with their quirky 
campaigns which often play on common clichés and stereotypes. The question then 
arises of what the future will hold in store for Scottish marketing. 
“Scotland is very good at doing history, it’s not very good at doing future” claims 
Newhaven’s Ken Dixon (Wingbermühle 55). Like most European countries, Scotland 
used to look into its past to construct a sense of identity (Smout, “Perspectives” 108). 
Most interviewees know the problem of promoting a contemporary image of Scotland 
abroad. The Saltire will not lose its emblematic significance, because 75% of the Scots 
still strongly identify with it (“All Power” 4). Alternatively, Vin Diesel’s appearance 
in a Black Leather Kilt at the 2003 MTV European Music Awards proved that old 
insignia can be transformed into cool badges.  
The tourist industry will probably cling to their hackneyed clichés, simply because 
they sell. New Zealand could become an alternative role-model, as it positions itself on 
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its natural beauty. Although the impact of devolution on Scottish marketing remains 
disputable, it nevertheless helped to increase international recognition of Scotland as a 
modern nation. In the coming years, the marketing community is, therefore, well 
advised to foster the newly won reputation of cities like Edinburgh to position itself as 
an international hub for creativity which it definitely already is. Because marketing is 
not the only field where, once in a while, it helps to be a ‘wee bit different’. 
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In order to examine the risks involved in the development of creative goods and 
services, the article presents a historical case study of a recent and highly controversial 
British theatre production: Jerry Springer the Opera. By using historical analysis and 
drawing on management theory, this paper explores key content and process elements 
which contributed to the production’s development, highlighting various risks faced by 
the lead creative and commercial entrepreneurs and their attempts to manage these 
risks over time. On an individual level, the case also reveals complex dynamics 
between the primary entrepreneurs and secondary project champions. On an 
organizational level, the production’s trajectory illustrates the development of a small, 
subsidised and entrepreneurial venture into a large-scale and commercially viable one.  
As such, this case aims to shed light on the developmental process of creative ventures 
with wider implications for a theoretical understanding of the management of risky 
projects. I conclude with some comments regarding future research and aim to 
stimulate discussion regarding the application of these findings to other creative 
industry projects within the British context and more widely.  
The case presented here is based on publicly available archival material including 
2,271 press articles on Jerry Springer the Opera published in English language 
newspapers from 2001 to 2005 as well as in-depth interviews with industry 
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practitioners involved in the production. The newswire search and case-based methods 
were used to extract the data and construct the historical narrative (also detailed in 
Dempster, “Managing Uncertainty”) are consistent with prior creative industry studies 
(e.g. Fee; Jones). 
 
Background Literature Review 
Classical theories of entrepreneurship stress that the principle role of the entrepreneur 
is to bear risk for the chance of a profit (e.g. Knight; Drucker). According to Knight’s 
famous distinction, as opposed to pure uncertainty, risk is associated with a specific 
probability of success/failure and as such can be measured (Knight). The implication is 
that this ability to ‘measure’ risk can in turn contribute to the entrepreneur’s ability to 
manage it. An alternative view of entrepreneurship stresses the entrepreneur’s role in 
the process of innovation (e.g. Schumpeter; Leibenstein). Interestingly, in the context 
of creative industries there are distinct complementarities between these divergent 
views of the entrepreneur precisely because creative industry entrepreneurs have both 
economic and artistic concerns. For the process of this paper the creative entrepreneur 
is therefore defined as the primary risk bearer whose underlying aim is to innovate. 
The case-study that follows illustrates in detail the symbiotic relationship between the 
need for creative innovation from the artistic perspective with the desire for economic 
gain from the commercial perspective.  
A key challenge facing creative entrepreneurs is that they generally operate in 
environments with very high levels of demand uncertainty (Caves). This has resulted 
in very difficult to predict outcomes for creative goods and a persistent allusion to the 
infamous “nobody knows” property (Caves; De Vany). In fact, research into the film 
industry has attempted to disentangle levels of uncertainty (Miller and Shamsie) and 
sources of variance (Faulkner and Anderson). Nonetheless, specific drivers of 
consumer demand uncertainty have only recently been explored in the context of the 
theatre industry (Dempster, “Managing Uncertainty”).  
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While demand uncertainty is a major source of risk for creative entrepreneurs it is not 
the only one. The development of creative products e.g. a theatrical production, is also 
highly uncertain because itdepends not only upon the existence and quality of each 
individual input (for example the scriptwriter, actor, musician, technician, producer 
and so on) but also on the co-ordination between them all and over time.  
Furthermore, the success of each production is determined not only by internal 
dynamics but also by external events. Relatedly, Modern Portfolio Theory (e.g. 
Markowitz) concerned with the diversification of risks to investors, makes the 
distinction between unsystematic (e.g. company specific) risk which are random 
factors that cancel each other out as the size of the portfolio increases, and systematic 
(e.g. such as macro-economic) factors that affect all firms in a particular market in the 
same way and therefore would not cancel each other out even if the size of the 
portfolio of investments was increased. Therefore, while unsystematic risk can be 
managed, systematic (or market) risk remains in all portfolios.  
Although in the case of just one production, a creative entrepreneur does not have the 
opportunity to eliminate their risks simply by increasing the size of the overall 
portfolio, they can still, for example, assess and distinguish between unsystematic risks 
(often internal) and systematic risks (often external). Internal risks may then be 
managed by the entrepreneur (who has some power over these components), while 
external risks may be mitigated. Interestingly, in the case presented here it can be 
argued that the creative entrepreneurs developed an innovative strategy for managing 
the unsystematic (diversifiable) risks by splitting the project up into a number of 
distinct investment stages (Dempster, “Managing Uncertainty”) with progress on a 
subsequent stage depending on success at the previous one. 
The concept of a production strategy which evolves over a serious of distinct stages is 
not dissimilar to strategies of staged investments employed in other highly risky 
projects, such as those involving significant research and development. For example, 
academic studies of staged-financing between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists 
suggest that it has been used to manage risks related to monitoring of employees by 
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the VC’s (Gompers); diminishing the hold-up problem (Neher); overcoming the 
entrepreneurs commitment problem (Admanti and Perry); and mitigating moral hazard 
(Wang and Zhou). Relatedly, the case presented here illustrates with a real-life 
example of how staged investments can facilitate the development of a venture in a 
creative industry which might not otherwise be commercially viable, considering the 
use of a staged investment strategy by the creative entrepreneurs as a form of risk 
reduction and uncertainty mitigation.  
 
History 
The first act of Jerry Springer the Opera is set during a live filming of the American 
television talk show Jerry Springer which features invited guests revealing their secrets 
to Jerry, fellow guests and the audience. At the end of the first act an attack is made on 
Jerry’s life and he finds himself descending into hell. Act two is set in what resembles 
Hell, as the character of Jerry Springer is asked by the Devil to mediate a conversation 
with God. The studio guests from act one return as biblical figures and participate in 
the debate. 
The dramatic history of the British production of Jerry Springer the Opera (henceforth 
JSTO) can be broadly divided into five main stages that represent specific investments 
and are defined by the venue:  
1. The Battersea Arts Centre in London’s theatre fringe  
2. The Assembly Rooms at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival 
3. The Lyttleton at the British National Theatre 
4. The Cambridge Theatre in London’s West End  




Stage 1: The Battersea Art Centre  
The production began life as How to write an Opera about Jerry Springer on the 8th 
February 2001 when writer, musician and comedian Richard Thomas sat at the piano 
with four singers performing a twenty minute version to an audience of seven as part 
of Battersea Arts Centre1 (henceforth BAC) experimental ‘scratch nights’. Under a 
“pay what you can” ticket scheme, performers and writers are given the opportunity to 
experiment and receive feedback directly from a live studio audience. The initial show 
was financed by Richard Thomas himself and advertised by a flyer that read “Have an 
idea. Think it’s a shit idea. Despair. Do it anyway” (The Independent 20 August 2001). 
In what became part of the shows’ mythology, Thomas offered a can of beer to 
everyone in the audience who came up with a good idea and four days later the show 
was selling out (The Scotsman 11 April 2003).  
Rapidly building on the audience’s feedback, Thomas recruited comedian Stewart Lee 
in May 2001 to write the libretto and co-direct, completing the core creative team 
which would provide the underlying vision for the duration of the project.  
Following the success of its first staging, Tom Morris, the then Artistic Director of 
BAC commissioned an extended version to run for five nights as part of BAC’s 
experimental Opera Festival The Works (21 August to 2 September 2001). Richard 
Thomas’s agent, Jon Thoday also became involved at this early stage. As the founder 
and managing director of the theatrical management company Avalon which 
specialises in the representation and production of comedians in the UK, Thoday 
provided some initial seed capital and oversaw the show’s development from this early 
stage. The partnership between Thomas and Lee on the creative side and Thoday on 
the commercial side was central to the production’s evolution. Thomas explained that 
“the purpose of these shows [at BAC] is to try and raise money to stage it on a Lion 
King-size budget” admitting that at this stage “the work will be, to an extent 
unfinished” (Page Six.com 2 August 2001). As part of its development, the production 
was re-written and extended to include an embryonic second act.  
                                                 
1  Http://www.bac.org.uk. 
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Word of mouth was so enthusiastic that the show sold out virtually without being 
advertised. In August the production was spotted and previewed not only by trendy 
internet papers, but also by several of London dailies such as The Evening Standard 
and by early September it had made the critics list of both The Independent and The 
Sunday Times (2 September 2001). Interestingly, it was also covered by a number of 
papers in the U.S. including The New York Post’s online version Page Six.com (2 
August 2001) and The Detroit News (10 October 2001). Almost without exception, the 
reviewers were impressed by the innovative coupling of such a low-brow subject (an 
American daytime chat show) with a high-brow art-form (opera) (The Independent on 
Sunday 19 August 2001). 
As well as the positive reviews, the fledgling production was given a boost by the 
attendance of a number of London’s ‘educated tastes’, not least of which was Nicholas 
Hytner, the then future artistic director of the National Theatre, who had been spotted 
enjoying it. Both the financial support of Avalon’s Jon Thoday and Nicholas Hytner’s 
public endorsement at such an early stage would prove pivotal in the production’s 
development. In an interview with The Sunday Times on 7 October 2001, Hytner was 
explicitly quoted as saying “We should do all sorts of musical theatre” singling out 
JSTO as the kind of progressive new musical theatre that should be staged at places 
like the National (The Sunday Times 7 October 2001). Such tangible and open 
promotion by one of London’s leading theatre practitioners played an important role in 
attracting publicity and attention. 
When JSTO returned to BAC for a full three weeks run from 5th to 23rd February 
2002, the show sold out. This time the production received extensive and largely 
positive reviews in all the major UK newspapers. Although it had evolved into a full-
length musical with a full first and second act, the creative team still described “the 
current run as a work in progress [which] is an attempt to develop the idea further and 
see if there is the backing for a possible West End run” (The Guardian 9 February 
2002). This early developmental stage was seen as key to the production’s future 
success and backed by Thoday financing the creative team of Thomas and Lee who 
had noticeably big plans for the future. Even though this latest incarnation was still 
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being described as “aiming to put more flesh on the bones,” it was nonetheless deemed 
“a must-see” by The Sunday Times (10 February 2002).
 
Stage 2. The Assembly Rooms, Edinburgh Fringe Festival  
Following a frenzied period of rewriting and re-casting, JSTO followed the well-
trodden path of much British experimental theatre to the Edinburgh Fringe Festival, 
the largest performing arts festival in Europe. The production now had two full acts, a 
total cast of 21, a larger ensemble of 10 chorus singers, and a live band. The success of 
JSTO at BAC contributed to making JSTO the ‘Hot-ticket’ show at Edinburgh, where 
it again sold out. According to The List (Edinburgh’s main theatre guide) the “extra 
buzz” surrounding the show was “generated because of the way it’s been put together 
by Lee and Thomas [who] have slowly built this tribute to telly’s king of dysfunctional 
relationships from tentative concert performances to try-out first act, all the time 
getting audience feedback and pointers about which way to head next.” Lee explained 
how the show had “evolved in a weird, Labour Party-style public partnership with its 
financial supporters” (The List Festival Guide 1 August 2002). Indeed the self-
confessed symbiotic relationship between the creative and commercial members of the 
core team characterised the production.  
The function of Edinburgh (stage 2) was therefore other than pure profit. The sizable 
investment of £300,000 made by Jon Thoday, was seen as necessary to develop the 
production into one with West End potential (The Independent 29 September 2003). 
This investment, considered ‘a small fortune’, was intended to showcase the 
production rather than make a profit since the ticket price multiplied by the number of 
seats in the Assembly Rooms venue meant costs could not possibly be recouped with 
box office receipts even if the show sold out every night (The List 1 August 2001).
This stage was also seen as an important training ground and opportunity for exposure 
to the target audience. “It’s good doing it here because the Assembly [Rooms] is quite 
like the West End in a way,” explained Lee (The List 1 August 2001). JSTO was 
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exposed to a wider critical spectrum than previously, which was another important 
test. “It’s written and sung to an incredibly professional level and that really throws 
people because they think they’re going to get some sketch show burlesque of 
American talk shows,” Lee explained (The List 1 August 2001). 
The production’s success can in part be attributed to the way in which it introduced 
both radical and incremental innovations. While many shows have either incremental 
or radical forms of innovation – few have a mix of both which made JSTO distinctive 
but comparable to other acclaimed productions (Dempster, “Learning from 
Theatreland”). The show mixed traditional themes (that an audience and critics could 
relate to) with a radically novel framing and treatment of those themes (which 
challenged the audience and excited the critics). Radical innovation included Richard 
Thomas’ experiments of setting swearwords to classical operatic music and the free 
mixing of high- and low-brow cultural references in a blatant disregard for established 
boundaries. Incremental innovation included the development of the musical theatre 
genre to a subject and style with more currency and potentially younger-audience 
appeal. In a challenge to conventional counterparts, Richards Thomas explained how 
“One night I was watching the [Jerry Springer] show, and I realized there were eight 
people screaming at each other, a chorus baying for blood, and I thought – that’s 
opera” (The Independent 27 August 2001). 
On the 24th August 2002, half way through the first act a wave of whispers swept 
through the auditorium as people realised that the real Jerry Springer was seated in the 
audience. Springer was greeted warmly by a round of applause in the interval 
following which he stood up, took a bow and playfully replied … “its not true!”… 
(The Observer 25 August 2002). In a full-length feature in The Observer the following 
day, Springer was quoted as pronouncing the show “wonderful”, “great” and “many-
layered.” He added, “I hope the show comes to America” and “I only wish I had 
thought of it first. I don’t object to anything in it. The whole show is tongue-in-cheek, 
so what’s the problem?” (The Observer 25 August 2002). Jerry Springer’s active 
endorsement of the production removed the rumoured threat of legal action which had 
overshadowed the production and threatened its long-term commercial viability. 
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Springer’s decision not to get involved therefore represented the resolution of the 
major external uncertainty and removed a major barrier to the show’s development. 
The production left Edinburgh having generated a significant amount of publicity for 
itself. It was singled out by critics as a production that was ‘going places’ and won the 
coveted Best New Musical Award.  
 
Stage 3. The Lyttelton Theatre, British National Theatre  
On the 5th December 2001, Nicholas Hytner, the incoming artistic director of the 
British National Theatre in London, made the dramatic announcement that he would 
open his directorship and the National’s season with JSTO. The significance of this 
decision can only be fully understood within the greater context of the British theatre 
industry at the time, the role of the National, and the effect that such an event had on 
the industry as a whole. 
Hytner’s decision to open the season with a piece of new writing, which had been 
described by the relatively liberal Edinburgh press as “outrageous” and “subversive,” 
was a radical departure for an institution that was seen as the bastion of ‘High Art’ and 
establishment in British Theatre. A show inspired by “trailer-trash T.V.” whose subject 
matter included “weird sexual practices and lap dancing” was hardly in tune with the 
staple fare offered at the National and consumed by its regular patrons prior to 
Hytner’s arrival. The juxtaposition of JSTO with the gentle American musicals on 
offer under the previous directorship of Trevor Nunn, could not have been more stark. 
As such, the announcement was interpreted as a bold statement of intent to break with 
the past regime. “As a first choice it sends an unmistakable message that the years 
ahead are likely not only to be risky and exciting but revolutionary in a way that Sir 
Trevor Nunn’s were not” (The Guardian 5 December 2002). In what seemed an 
instant, Hytner gained himself the enviable reputation as the new enfant terrible of 
British theatre. It also put the National back on the map of ‘trendy’ London and 
redefined it as an institution not only willing to compete with, but also promote, the 
more radical and innovative products of the industry. 
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Facilitated by a sponsorship deal with Travelex, the National offered £10 tickets in an 
attempt to encourage first-time buyers, young audiences and boldly target a new 
market niche. As such the National was actively re-defining itself and its target 
audience “as the mass-market youth”. The inexpensive tickets were particularly 
notable at a time when the rest of the West End was becoming more expensive (Daily 
Telegraph 5 July 2003).  
The National’s decision to stage a piece of new writing also had profound repercussion 
on the fringe sector of the theatre industry. A direct beneficiary was BAC which, 
following Hynter’s announcement, received unprecedented press coverage further 
bolstering its reputation as an “innovation powerhouse”. The impact on theatre 
entrepreneurs in general should also be noted. JSTO was heralded as the kind of ‘rags 
to riches’ story that exemplified success for creative entrepreneurs, arguably providing 
inspiration for others in the industry. 
Furthermore Hytner’s decision provided tangible proof that there could be cooperation 
between the commercial and subsidised sectors of the theatre industry – whose 
relationship had historically been characterised by mutual ill-feeling and distrust 
(Cogo-Fawcett). On a personal level, the National provided invaluable training to the 
core creative team. “The two-year journey to the South Bank has been a learning 
curve,” admitted Stewart Lee who had “a newfound respect of commercial theatre” 
(The Scotsman 11 April 2003).  
When JSTO opened at the National’s Lyttelton Theatre on 9th April 2003, it was 
greeted with an almost synchronised exclamation of approval by the reviewing press. 
The Times praised it as “gloriously spot-on.” The Mirror declared “For originality I 
have no hesitation in declaring Jerry Springer The Opera to be the greatest production 
on earth ... and in hell” (30 April 2003). The Independent noted the “heartening 
statement of intent by the Hytner regime. And what better place for a ‘chick with a 
dick’ than in an opera with balls?” (30 April 2003). The Herald again noted the 
remarkable selection and promotion by Hytner: “It’s the stuff of dreams” (1 May 
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2003). The show gained remarkable 4-5 stars in all the major UK newspapers known 
(internationally) for their notoriously tough critics (The Guardian 6 May 2003). 
When box office figures were released on 24th September 2003 it became clear that 
JSTO had been a major financial success for the National Theatre. By the end of the 
run, box office takings were a reported £1.8million (The Independent 29 September 
2003) with the season attracting houses of between 80 and 90%. According to research 
based on the use of credit cards, 46% of those who had seen JSTO, some 300,000 
people had been first-time bookers opening a huge potential consumer market for 
future productions (Financial Times 25 September 2003; The Guardian 25 September 
2003). Nonetheless, at this stage, box office takings went predominately to recoup the 
National’s development and production costs rather than to the core entrepreneurs. 
JSTO’s last performance at the National was on 30th September 2003 after which the 
creative entrepreneurs had negotiated it would transfer to the West End.  
 
Stage 4. Cambridge Theatre, London West End 
By the time that JSTO opened at the Cambridge Theatre on 11th November 2003, it 
was well known in theatre circles. The first month of the £3 million production was 
reportedly nearly sold out, with theatres in Germany, Scandinavia and Broadway 
“clamouring” for a run (The Independent 29 September 2003). At this stage JSTO 
played for the first time in a much larger venue of over 1,000, charging commercial 
ticket prices. It was also at this stage that the core entrepreneurs, Richard Thomas, 
Stewart Lee, and Jon Thoday hoped to make back their investment and eventually 
profit. With West End production costs in the region of £2.5-3million, Thoday brought 
in another experience theatre producer, Allan McKeown, as the show’s co-producer 
and largest single investor after Thoday. However, before making a profit the show 




In spite of the production’s critical acclaim and financial success to date, its future was 
far from certain considering the (theatre) industry rule of thumb which suggested that 
seven out of nine West End productions lose money (The Independent 29 September 
2003). As a production with high running costs (all weekly expenditures including 
payment to cast, crew and the Cambridge theatre), JSTO depended on a relatively 
lengthy run and steady ticket sales contributing to the critical need for ongoing 
success.  
The transfer to the West End took only ten days – the faster the show was putting 
‘bums on seats’ (as the industry expression goes), the faster investors might see a 
profit and the producers might capitalise on the market buzz following the National’s 
sell-out run. 
The West End opening came complete with the usual fanfare as London glitterati 
mingled with stars and reporters and the show was attended by Jerry Springer himself 
(The Guardian 12 November 2003). Following the opening, some reviews remained 
positively upbeat: “Seeing it for the second time, I remain convinced that this is a 
musical with a touch of genius about it” (The Daily Telegraph 11 November 2003). 
Many, however, were conspicuously more critical. “OK – it’s a terrific show,” another 
reviewer admitted, “But, just because it’s been hyped, may I point out its limitations?” 
(Financial Times 12 November 2003).  
For the first time, a number of commentators questioned how this profanity laden, 
sacrilegious show would be received by the mass market. “It’s hard not to wonder who 
this show – essentially an operatic re-enactment of Springer’s televised fisticuff 
sessions, first in his Chicago studio, then in hell – is aimed at?” one critic questioned 
(The Guardian 12 November 2003). It was also noted that the higher ticket prices 
could potentially exclude precisely the consumers JSTO had attracted to date (The 
Guardian 13 November 2003). Clearly the radical show would not appeal to everyone. 
“I wouldn’t recommend taking your own mum to this opera,” warned one critic, “the 
language alone is strong enough to turn her hair white … and she may be more than 
mildly shocked by such sights as a ‘chick with a dick’, a large man who is turned on 
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by wearing nappies, and a chorus line dressed in Ku Klux Klan hoods” (The 
Independent 6 November 2003).  
A few reviews were outwardly hostile. The Independent stated that in spite of the 
“near-universal praise for Richard Thomas and Stewart Lee’s show” and “built up 
expectations”, he was “left cold” and questioned “Where was the devastating satire? I 
was numb from being beaten over the head with the same joke.” (The Independent 13 
November 2003). Similarly, the Daily Telegraph warned that a colleague “felt as 
though he needed a bath after watching this foul-mouthed musical satire on the lowest 
dregs of confessional television” (11 November 2003). By the time the show reached 
the commercial arena of the West End, the press reaction was highly mixed. 
In spite of coinciding with a general down-turn in the West End and receiving mixed 
reviews, it was at this stage (2003/2004) that JSTO won a string of important industry 
awards, including the Evening Standard Theatre Award for Best Musical decided upon 
by a panel of judges and public nomination, a Critic’s Circle Theatre Award and four 
Laurence Olivier Awards. On 27th April 2004, Thoday’s production company Avalon 
was confident enough to announce the show’s West End run was open-ended with 
plans to open on Broadway in October 2005 and screen JSTO on 100 U.S. television 




The opening of JSTO at the Cambridge Theatre should also be considered in the 
context of wider external economic and social context. The attacks on the World Trade 
Centre in New York on 11th September 2001 not only had devastating effects on near-
by Broadway, but sent ripples throughout the tourism industry globally. These were 
also acutely felt by the London theatre industry which relied in part on cash-rich 
American tourists and large group-booking from tour agencies for a regular income. 
By end-2003, when JSTO opened at The Cambridge Theatre, the West End had 
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suffered a serious and protracted economic downturn blamed on a combination of 
9/11, the agricultural Foot & Mouth crisis which decimated the British countryside in 
2001-2002, and in 2004 the impending war in Iraq. 
London’s West End itself also came under attack. Michael White, a producer of almost 
40 years’ blamed the down-turn on “greedy theatres, tramps sleeping in theatre 
doorways, rip-off ticket prices, the lack of a buzz about theatre … but most of all the 
poor quality of what’s on stage.” Similarly, The Guardian’s theatre critic Michael 
Billington, argued that the West End was suffering a “neon sickness”, and that slap-
happy productions undermine its collective reputation for quality. Charles Spencer of 
The Daily Telegraph joked that he’d been trying to decide which was the bigger 
problem, “the rubbish on the West End’s streets or the rubbish on its stages” (The 
Guardian 22 October 2003). Veteran producer Duncan Weldon also reportedly 
believed the increasing number of poor-quality shows was damaging the West End’s 
image.  
In such an environmentally unfriendly context, the improbable transfer of a radical 
fringe show to the West End was seen as a significant achievement and by 2004 JSTO 
was credited with helping revive the West End. At the same time that JSTO risked 
offending members of the public, by refusing to conform to common West End 
musical formats, the show seemed to breathe life into a failing industry. It also 
provided some healthy competition in a marketplace dominated by a few powerful 
incumbents such as Andrew Lloyd Webber’s Really Useful Theatre Group which 
owned 30% of West End theatres and offered Webber productions in many of them. 
The juxtaposition of JSTO’s success was particularly poignant as several classic 
Webber musicals closed, transferred to smaller venues and his new show Woman in 
White, which opened on 14th September 2004, was savaged by the press. “The West 
End has reached the end of an era. Les Miserables headed for the exit just as a musical 
about a talk-show host containing 8,283 swearwords made a grand entrance” 
triumphantly reported The Times (15 November 2003). JSTO’s opening was 
romantically heralded in the press as the dawning of a brighter era in which British 
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theatre would be artistically braver and bolder than both its predecessors and its 
Broadway counterparts.  
 
Internal Events 
As JSTO was winning awards, being heralded as having helped to revive the West 
End, and announcing ambitious plans for overseas transfer, a storm was brewing 
backstage. The problems dated from a claim published by the (tabloid) Daily Mail in 
January 2004 that the musical was “losing money hand over fist” at a rate of £40,000 
a week. There was a great deal of speculation at the time and subsequently as to what 
source could have fed such a line to the tabloid paper – a source which the paper 
clearly trusted to have the insider knowledge of JSTO’s situation and running finances 
and possibly an industry competitor.  
The furious producers responded by presenting their accounts in March 2004. After 
this the paper printed an admission that it had been “wide of the mark” and the show 
was in fact making a “healthy profit”. In spite of the Daily Mail’s written retraction, 
John Thoday decided to take legal action against the newspaper because he argued that 
the episode had resulted in cancellation of group bookings from tour operators and 
agents and a “loss of confidence” by the theatre-going public who read the papers (The 
Guardian 26 October 2004). The direct loss of income for the production was 
estimated at £400,000 (The Independent 25 October) for which Thoday filed for 
damages. Nonetheless, the legal action also resulted in immediate and substantial costs 
which jeopardized the production. Thoday admitted that “we’ve been spending a lot of 
money on a court case that we should have been spending on marketing.” (The 
Independent 25 October). Thoday estimated that legal fees could run as much as 
$500,000 or more than $900,000 while “The marketing budget for a show like Jerry 
Springer would be between £1 million and £1.5 million a year”. Furthermore, once the 
court case was initiated, Avalon seemed locked in up to completion. “If we were to 
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settle with them”, Thoday believed “we’d have to pay their legal costs, so we don’t 
have any choice but to go to court” (The New York Times 27 October 2004). 
The crisis came to a head when on 25th October 2004, Allan McKeown publicly 
disassociated himself with the litigation announcing that the decision had not been 
taken with his approval and Thoday and his company Avalon should bear all costs 
rather than the production. “(Neither) Allan McKeown nor the production of Jerry 
Springer The Opera are a party to, nor do they endorse, the action that (co-producer) 
Avalon Promotions has brought against the Daily Mail,” McKeown announced in a 
public statement.  
In fact, relations between the two producers had reportedly soured as early as July 
when the show was recast after which McKeown acknowledged he had not been active 
in the management of the show, nor supported it financially, since the original cast 
departed (Daily Variety 25 October 2005). The producers also fundamentally 
disagreed over the capitalization of the Broadway production, originally planned for 
the fall of 2005. Thoday wanted to spend $11 to 13 million reflecting London’s 
successes. However, in light of the recent West End run, which had made less than 
expected returns to that date, McKeown wanted the Broadway production to be 
capitalized at a much smaller $7 million. To bring down weekly running costs, 
McKeown also recommended a cast of 10 in New York, down from 33 in the London 
company and reiterated that he wanted JSTO to come to America but on a much 
smaller scale. “For it to be successful there you would need to cut it to 90 minutes and 
have no interval. It should do really well here but it won’t do well if you’re expecting 
1,500 people a night,” McKeown explained (The Times 30 October 2004). 
With McKeown, the major US-based backer alienated by the disagreement, JSTO’s 
U.S. transfer was severely jeopardised. By 25th October the show was in serious 
trouble and Jon Thoday announced that it could be forced to close that very same day 
because of the legal disputes and infighting. He announced they had until lunchtime to 
inform the Cambridge Theatre, where it has been running for just over a year, whether 
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JSTO could renew its contract. During frantic negotiations in London and New York 
Thoday struggled to save the show (The Guardian 26 October 2004). 
By the 30th October 2004, JSTO had been temporarily saved after negotiations with 
the production team and contractors to slash costs including the sacrifice of royalties 
for a month by the creative team (The Times 30 October 2004). “The show is not dead 
yet,” Thoday announced triumphantly in the statement, “We have told Andrew Lloyd 
Webber’s theatre company Really Useful Theatres2 that the show will not be closing. 
We are determined not to allow anyone to kill the show.” Nonetheless, Thoday warned 
the show remained on a “knife edge” and that “a final decision… [would] not be taken 
until the show’s case with the Daily Mail is heard on 13th December 2004” (The 
Independent 30 October 2004). The legal action was eventually settled out of court.  
JSTO’s turbulent history – characterised by bitter infighting, painful lawsuits, reputed 
conspiracies and last-minute rescue attempts seemed more dramatic than an episode of 
its namesake show … and the story was not over yet.   
 
Stage 5. BBC Broadcast and Beyond 
In late 2004 the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)3 announced that a live uncut 
version of JSTO would be aired on national television in early January 2005. Clearly, a 
television broadcast would bring JSTO to a much larger and more heterogeneous 
audience than ever before or is possible in live theatre. On the other hand, there was a 
risk that a television audience would not engage with the production in the same way 
that a theatre audience had. However it represented a major marketing/publicity 
opportunity from which the creative entrepreneurs hoped to benefit. The station’s 
controller Roly Keating was quoted, provocatively, stating that the show would “push 
back the boundaries of taste and decency,” and added “There will be warnings but we 
don’t intend to cut it. Our audience will expect it to be broadcast uncut.” (Daily Mail 3 
December 2004). 
                                                 
2  Also owner of the Cambridge Theatre. 
3  The UK’s state-owned and part publicly funded broadcasting network. 
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The television broadcast brought JSTO to the attention of the infamous British tabloid 
press, a rather less benign chorus than the ‘high-brow’ reviewers who had followed 
JSTO previously. The News of the World criticised the BBC for broadcasting a 
production which it described as “a cult musical known for sex, swearing and 
violence” (21 November 2004), in spite of the fact that the paper regularly featured 
half-naked women in its pages. Another tabloid, the Daily Mail accused JSTO of being 
“the most expletive-strewn programme in TV history” with the headline “BBC to Air 
Springer Musical and all its 8,000 Obscenities” (6 January 2005) while the Daily Star 
ran the similarly provocative headline “It’s An Effing Record.” 
The broadcast also attracted several other fervent opponents including the highly 
conservative television viewers group Mediawatch-UK and right-wing Christian 
groups Christian Voice and The Christian Institute. In an interview, Colin Hart, 
Director of The Christian Institute, said: “I think this is the most offensive and spiteful 
show ever broadcast by the BBC. There may be many shows running in West End 
theatres that I find offensive, but I am not paying for them to be pumped into my living 
room.”4  
At the time, the treatment of religious themes in theatre was being avidly discussed 
following the closure of the play Behzti on 19th December 2004, which was perceived 
as blasphemous by the Sikh community. The Birmingham Reparatory Theatre 
eventually backed down after a night of public disorder and rioting and withdrew the 
show, but then came in for widespread criticism from the theatre world for sacrificing 
artistic expression by capitulating to minority views.  
Christian Voice lobbied against the production of JSTO in the same way that members 
of the Sikh community had protested against Behzti. Christian campaigners argued that 
unlike other religious groups, Christians in general put up with blasphemous and 
sacrilegious treatment of their religion far too often, from the ridiculing images in 
Monty Python’s The Life of Brian to most recently Jerry Springer the Opera (Daily 
Mail 22 December 2004). A particularly controversial scene was one in which Jesus 
                                                 
4  Http://www.christian.org.uk/pressreleases/2005/january_19_2005.htm.  
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confides he is “a bit gay” (The Times 24 December 2004). Following the BBC’s 
announcement, December 2004 was characterised by a vitriolic debate in the press 
with scores of major and minor political, religious and cultural figures coming out on 
both sides of the argument. On the 6th January 2005, solicitors for Christian Voice 
wrote to the chairman of the BBC, Michael Grade, threatening legal action if the 
programme went ahead. They claimed that broadcasting the show was not only 
offensive, but it would “constitute a criminal offence of blasphemy” and be in breach 
of the BBC’s Royal Charter as a public service (Daily Mail 7 January 2005). Similarly, 
the conservative lobby group Mediawatch-UK announced that it had been inundated 
with e-mails and telephone calls from licence fee-payers protesting “the continuous 
stream of obscene and profane language, as well as the debauched behaviour that 
characterised Mr Springer’s shows,” which they argued “is unacceptable and will 
alienate a large number of viewers (The Independent 5 January 2005).  
In opposition to the lobby groups, the BBC argued that a T.V. screening of a 
production with multiple awards provided access to many more people than could 
possibly see it in the theatre. “It is a serious work. People who can’t get to London to 
see it at the theatre can now see it in their own home. It will transmit well after the 9 
o’clock watershed and carry appropriate warnings,” the BBC argued (Reuters News 5 
January 2005). The BBC’s decision to commission the screen version of a West End 
show was also part of their social mission to “introduce a new generation of viewers to 
opera” (The Independent 5 January 2005). Whilst reiterating that “of course we take 
comments and complaints seriously”, they also dismissed the large number of 
complaints against the production because “there is evidence that most of these are 
from an organised lobby encouraged to contact us,” and many of which “would appear 
to be misinformed on the content of the show” (The Independent 5 January 2005). 
Other observers were outraged by the scale and ferocity of the opposition and rallied in 
defence of JSTO and the BBC’s decision. For example, The National Secular Society 
urged the BBC to stand firm against “religious bullies”, saying the campaign against 
JSTO was an “organised attack ... the latest of a series of attempts by religious 
interests to control what we can see or say in this country” (The Daily Telegraph 7 
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January 2005). Similarly The Independent published a scathing article asserting: “The 
days when the entire British viewing public could be scandalised by a rogue 
swearword on television are, thankfully, over. The handful of irate voices calling for 
the BBC to pull Jerry Springer The Opera from its schedules tomorrow night belong to 
a different age…” (The Independent 9 January 2005).  
However, the opposition lobby groups refused to be silenced and on the 7th and 8th 
January 2005, Christian Voice organised street vigils in protest against the screening 
which took place outside the London BBC premises and around the country.5 In a 
dramatic gesture that echoed scenes in JSTO itself, protesters set fire to their television 
licences (Reuters News 7 January 2005). Much more sinister were the warnings of 
‘bloodshed’ and abusive and threatening telephone calls received by BBC bosses and 
their families, including Mark Thompson and Roly Keating. After which senior BBC 
executives were given security guards and their phones monitored for their protection 
(Daily Mail 8 January 2005; Reuters News 8 January 2005). 
The number of press articles both for and against the decision to screen JSTO was 
overwhelming, and the furore surrounding it mounted daily up to the event itself. The 
fact that the BBC received a record number of complaints (near 55,000 at a final 
counting) attracted international (media) attention. According to the Daily Mail “The 
TV watchdog Ofcom has already received 5,500 complaints – three times as many as 
it received over Martin Scorsese’s The Last Temptation of Christ, which sparked 1,554 
complaints when it was shown on TV in 1995” (7 January 2005). Reuters News 
reported Ofcom complaints were closer to 7,000 (7 January 2005). 
Following JSTO’s screening at 10 p.m. on Saturday, 8th January 2005, the debate did 
not die away. As much as two months later, the BBC’s Director General, Mark 
Thompson, still felt the need to defend his decision in The Times which published a 
full length feature entitled “Why I stand by my decision to broadcast Jerry Springer,” 
where Thompson raised concerns that a small lobby group could use the internet to 
raise disproportionate alarm and incite fury. He also implicated the tabloid press for 
                                                 
5  Http://www.christianvoice.org.uk/springer12.html. 
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inflation and sensationalism and warned against the growing power of “extremist” 
religious groups (The Times 8 March 2005).  
Far from fading away, the debate on the BBC’s decision to screen JSTO rumbled on in 
2005. Like many avant-garde creative products, this production stimulated discussion 
of wider issues including the influence of the press, the power of minorities groups, 
religious sensitivities and ultimately the role of art in society. In October 2006 these 
debates resurfaced with renewed force during the worldwide controversy surrounding 
the publication by a Danish Newspaper of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad. 
Perceived as offensive by some Muslim groups, the cartoons sparked street protests 
and rioting. It was widely noted that the controversy surrounding this publication 
paralleled that of the JSTO screening nearly two years earlier.  
The backlash of complaints, albeit dramatic, was not initially taken very seriously by 
the JSTO production and creative team. Stewart Lee joked that to arrive at its 8,000 
count, the Daily Mail must have multiplied the number of swearwords by the number 
of people on stage: “My show has 7,549 fewer swearwords than people say, but who’s 
counting?” (The Daily Telegraph 7 January 2005). However, what started as a joke, 
quickly escalated into a situation with potentially serious consequences. On 27th 
February 2005, Thoday announced that a financial backer of the New York run had 
pulled out as a result of developments in the UK. “At the moment it’s off ... because of 
the furore” (Independent On Sunday 27 February 2005). Rumours also began to 
circulate that the national tour was in jeopardy because of the opposition lobby and 
negative media frenzy. Christian Voice published a letter on their website in December 
2004 that had been sent to regional theatres which threatened “Should any regional 
theatre stage ‘Jerry Springer the Opera’ this autumn, we shall be looking to prosecute 
them as well.” By 15th March 2005 JSTO’s producers announced that “pressure from 
radical Christians has caused 11 regional theatres to pull out of showing Jerry 
Springer-The Opera” (The Times 16 March 2005). 
In spite of their vocal and visible protests, the precise effect of the anti-JSTO lobby is 
debatable. Rows of “empty seats” had been reported for some time by JSTO audience 
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members (Observer Review Pages 11 July 2004). By mid-March 2005 it was 
becoming increasingly clear that JSTO was far from the financial success that had 
been expected. For example, Dennis Hall, chief executive of Southampton’s 
Mayflower theatre, stated that his decision to turn down JSTO was not based on the 
controversy surrounding it but because he “did not believe it would be commercially 
viable at the box office” explaining that as a financial proposition JSTO simply did not 
match up to the competition (Newsquest Media Group Newspapers 19 March 2005). 
In a highly competitive industry, JSTO’s ability to attract mass market audiences, both 
in the West End and at the regional level was questionable. In a final bid to broaden 
JSTO’s appeal, Thoday announced JSTO would be screened at MipTV in Cannes6 
(Independent On Sunday 10 April 2005) with transfers negotiated to other English-
speaking countries as well as adaptations abroad as “a way of perpetuating the show 
and generating a bit of revenue for the [UK regional] tour when it happens” 
(Independent On Sunday 10 April 2005). Amid ongoing controversy, JSTO closed at 
the Cambridge on the 19 February 2005.  
The decision to broadcast JSTO on television therefore had some radical and 
unforeseen consequences. It attracted massive media attention and a record (for a 
musical) audience of 2.6 million viewers – a far greater number of people than could 
ever have seen it in the confines of a theatre. It also received a record number of 
complaints – some 50,000 at a final counting and sparked a heated and protracted 
debate. From the creative entrepreneurs’ perspective, apart from the publicity, the 
benefits were less clear since the publicity did not clearly translate in tangible financial 
returns in the form of theatre tickets sales and a lengthy run. 
 
Conclusion: Risks and Opportunities 
The case presented here shows how creative industry entrepreneurs in the British 
context must constantly balance artistic aspirations with commercial realities to 
                                                 
6  The world’s largest television marketplace. 
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achieve ongoing success. On the artistic level, JSTO was characterised by a creative 
continuity which informed key decisions and direction at important junctures and was 
provided by a profoundly entrepreneurial core creative team, Richard Thomas and 
Stuart Lee. As well as guiding the production’s evolution, the core creative team 
facilitated the development of the creative product allowing it to metamorphasize from 
a small, subsidised show into a large commercial production. The creative 
entrepreneurs personally bore some financial and substantial reputational risk 
especially as their future success was closely tied to the success of their present 
venture, as is characteristic in the industry (Caves).  
At the commercial level the production was financially backed and tirelessly backed 
by Jon Thoday of the agency Avalon Promotions. Thoday acted as the prime economic 
risk-bearer and was central in facilitating the production’s growth over the course of 
its turbulent lifetime. To encourage its survival through the early stages, Thoday 
teamed-up with various allies across organizations and over time. The ability of 
Thoday to share risks with various project ‘champions’ at each stage of this 
production’s life cycle was an important strategic solution to flexibly managing risk 
over time.  
From an internal perspective, the primary entrepreneurs had to manage a complex 
network of relationships. As well as balancing the creative and commercial aims of 
members of the core team, this included a number of secondary champions who played 
a critical role in promoting JSTO, contributed financially, and perhaps most 
importantly, also took on significant reputational risks associated with a radical piece 
of new writing. On the one hand, the positive reputational effects for JSTO of being 
associated with innovative (in the case of BAC) and venerable (in the case of the 
National Theatre and the BBC), institutions cannot be underestimated. On the other 
hand, in the case of Tom Morris, Artistic Director of BAC and Nicholas Hytner, 
Artistic Director of the National, their personal risk-taking translated into real returns 
in terms of reputational (and financial) gain for themselves and their organizations. 
Following an organised protest by opponents, the gains were less clear for the BBC 
and reputational risks born by the stations controller Roly Keating and BBC’s Director 
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General Mark Thompson which were arguably costly. At the final stage of 
commercialisation this included Allan McKeown, a major financial backer who would 
contribute to developing the production to West End scale and again who took on large 
financial and reputational risk with questionable reward. In all cases these secondary 
champions helped the creative entrepreneurs spread their creative and commercial 
risks across players and over time there-by facilitating the growth and development of 
the production as a whole.  
As well as managing their own production, the creative entrepreneurs of JSTO had to 
be conscious of their external environment. Unforeseeable events internationally 
triggered a global recession in tourism which the British, and especially London 
theatre, also weathered. At a sensitive time, and with a controversial and innovative 
production which challenged established norms and “pushed back boundaries”7, the 
creative entrepreneurs could expect a reaction from the outside world. In spite of their 
defiance to JSTO’s opponents, the creative entrepreneur’s sensitivity to external 
considerations was evident in, for example, the constant dialogue that Thomas and Lee 
had with the press in first explaining and subsequently defending their artistic vision. 
Emerging from the financially protected world of (predominately subsidised) fringe 
theatre, the creative entrepreneurs also had to evolve to manage the highly competitive 
and concentrated nature of the West End theatre industry once they became new 
entrants alongside existing and established industry players. Interestingly, JSTO went 
through a large number of developmental stages before it was launched as a fully-
fledged show in the West End catering for the theatre-equivalent of a mass-market 
audience. The multi-staged nature of the JSTO production process was both noted by 
the public and heralded as one of the main reasons for its meteoric rise from Fringe to 
West End (Dempster, “Managing Uncertainty”). However, in spite of significant 
public and critical acclaim, JSTO’s earlier successes did not immediately translate to 
mass commercial market success. External events and the reaction of members of the 
television viewing public were unanticipated and in many ways eclipsed the 
                                                 
7  As Roly Keating was quoted describing JSTO. 
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production’s creative achievements. The production continues to tour the UK with 
performances (currently) booked into 20078 in an attempt to capitalise on its prior 
success and rather infamous reputation.  
The history of the production of JSTO exemplifies how internal and external 
uncertainties can interact in complex and unpredictable ways, translating into risks and 
opportunities for the creative entrepreneur which ultimately buffer and shape the 
production and its progress. The case also illustrates how, relevant risks must be 
anticipated, managed and mitigated by the creative entrepreneurs, if their creative and 
commercial aims are to translate into real and sustainable gains. Using historical 
analyses, the case shows how the creative entrepreneurs involved in this production 
intuitively managed their risks over time and a number of strategies they employed. 
Future research should consider how risks in the creative industries might be 
identified, assessed and managed a priori, thereby facilitating the development of 
creative products, goods and services, and contributing to the success of creative 
entrepreneurs both in terms of art and commerce.  
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